Introduction
============

What can Europeans learn from Americans about the financing and organization of medical care? The obvious answer is "not much." We Americans are spending nearly 12 percent, going on 15 percent, of gross national product (GNP) on health care, while most European countries are spending an apparently stabilized 6 to 9 percent ([@b6-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b16-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b42-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The western European democracies have achieved essentially universal coverage, but some 35 million Americans---17.5 percent of the population under 65 years of age---have no financial protection against medical expenses, public or private ([@b45-hcfr-89-supp-049]). (Those who cannot pay may get free care from community or public hospitals, after they have paid what they can. This places an inequitable burden on the hospitals that care for the uninsured and motivates them to find ways of avoiding attracting patients who cannot pay, such as by closing emergency rooms.) Millions more have inadequate coverage that leaves them exposed to large risks or to exclusions for care of preexisting conditions. At the same time, our infant mortality rate is higher than that of most of the western European democracies, but life expectancy is about in the middle of the group. A recent public opinion poll found that only 10 percent of Americans agree with the statement "on the whole, the health care system works pretty well," compared with 56 percent of Canadians and 27 percent of the British ([@b1-hcfr-89-supp-049]). So it would be, quite frankly, ridiculous for an American to suggest that we have achieved a satisfactory system that our European friends would be wise to emulate.

Americans like to believe that we have the world\'s best medical care---at least for those who are insured and can pay for it. I have some doubts. For example, it has been well established that there is a pronounced negative relationship between annual volume in a hospital and mortality for complex surgical procedures such as open-heart surgery ([@b31-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The curve relating death rates to annual volume for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery is still descending at 150 operations a year, indeed at several hundred ([@b38-hcfr-89-supp-049]). That is why the California Department of Health Services and the American College of Surgeons recommend minimum annual volumes of 150 for open-heart surgery. Nevertheless, in 1986, of 103 California hospitals in which open-heart surgery was performed, 37 did fewer than 150 such procedures ([@b50-hcfr-89-supp-049].) This helps to explain the high death rates from CABG surgery in some California hospitals, ranging as high as 17.6 percent in 1986 ([@b49-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In Des Moines, Iowa, a metropolitan area with a population of 380,000, two hospitals did kidney transplants, with 1988 volumes of 8 and 15, respectively. At the university hospital about 100 miles away, the volume was 69 cases (Iowa Department of Public Health, 1989).

A recent genre in our medical literature is called "appropriateness." A panel of expert and generalist physicians reviews the literature and determines the indications for surgery: Under what conditions is it appropriate (i.e., clearly beneficial to the patient), equivocal, or inappropriate? Then a team reviews a large sample of medical records and classifies cases. Such studies have recently reported 32 percent of carotid endarterectomies inappropriate, another 32 percent equivocal ([@b58-hcfr-89-supp-049]); 14 percent of CABG surgery inappropriate, another 30 percent equivocal ([@b58-hcfr-89-supp-049]); 27 percent of hospital days inappropriate ([@b39-hcfr-89-supp-049]); 20 percent of pacemaker implants inappropriate, another 36 percent equivocal ([@b20-hcfr-89-supp-049].), etc.

Somewhere in America might be found the world\'s best medical care. But the merits of that claim will not be apparent to the families of hundreds of Californians who have died of inappropriate or equivocal open-heart operations in low-volume hospitals, especially if the widows are being hounded for payment because their deceased husbands did not have insurance.

I could go on. We have much to be humble about.

The difficulties of writing this article are compounded by the fact that European health care systems and practices are not all the same. Their diversity exceeds that among and within the different States in the United States. If there are lessons, their relevance will vary considerably from one country to another. Moreover, our intellectual roots and cultures are intertwined. Americans and Europeans read many of the same books and professional journals. Most, if not all, of the ideas I discuss in this article have some European roots. So identifying some ideas leading to good things in America these days is not meant to deny their European ancestry.

One approach I considered was to recommend that Europeans learn from our mistakes, lest they repeat some of them. For example, various British writers, and lately Her Majesty\'s Government, have proposed offering tax breaks for the purchase of private health insurance (*Working for Patients*, 1989). The merits of this idea are likely to depend a great deal on exactly how it is done. But in the United States, the open-ended tax break for employer-paid health insurance has had some very negative consequences ([@b8-hcfr-89-supp-049]). It greatly weakens the incentive of upper income people to make cost-conscious choices of health care financing plans. Considering payroll and State income taxes as well as Federal income taxes, the tax break reduces by 35 to 40 percent the marginal cost, in net after-tax dollars, of the employee\'s decision to choose more costly coverage. It costs the Federal budget more than \$40 billion a year---an amount that grows about 10 to 15 percent per year, and an amount that substantially exceeds Federal contributions to Medicaid, the Federal-State program that pays for health care for welfare recipients. About 80 percent of the revenue loss goes to households with above-average incomes.. This subsidy offers a costly inducement to buy health insurance to many who would buy coverage anyway; at the same time, it offers little to people in low income brackets and nothing to people who have no employer-paid health insurance. There are lessons to be learned from our mistakes. The problem here is that it is hard to find Europeans who need these lessons.

Each country\'s health care system reflects its own history, culture, political system, and society. And incremental change is one of the most persistent themes in all of our democracies. Labour rhetoric notwithstanding, there is no prospect for the Europeans to adopt the American system or vice versa. And there is no point in discussing whose system is superior. The really interesting questions are how to identify and design politically feasible incremental changes in each country that have a reasonably good chance of making things better. Each country can get useful ideas from others about how to do this.

I like to believe that there are some things in the rich variety of American experiences that may be quite useful to some Europeans, although I recognize that other Europeans are already well informed about such developments. Even the most interesting and promising of these ideas are not uniformly or even widely applied in the United States. In this article, I am pointing to "best practice," not average practice in America. I group these ideas under two headings: Glasnost and Perestroika.

Glasnost
========

Glasnost, of course, is generally understood to mean "openness," and thus published information. Beginning with this general definition, we can then expand it further to include meaningful evaluated management information, especially in health services research. Some European health care systems---at least those I have visited---struck me by their lack Of relevant management information and evaluation studies based on such information. It appears to be a fair generalization that many European health care systems have not developed and put into use the tools of management information and control that any modern industrial enterprise would consider necessary to plan and manage efficiently. Nor do they take much advantage of their opportunities for research. Volvo, Mercedes, and BMW would not be selling nearly as many cars in California as they do if they attempted to conduct their operations with so little information. Nor has our health care system taken advantage of such opportunities on a wide scale.

Until recently, few policymakers have considered efficiency to be a relevant or appropriate goal for the health care system. In the western European and North American democracies, social policy was initially preoccupied with equity, with extending equal financial protection and access to health care services to most or all of the population. In more recent years, as health care expenditures have grown rapidly as a share of GNP, limiting the growth of spending has become the great preoccupation. But until recently, the efficiency with which resources were used has rarely been addressed in any fundamental way. The creation of institutions that would systematically motivate efficient behavior by providers has received even less attention. Efficiency in the use of resources has not been a part of the culture of our medical professions.

Moreover, the problems in defining and obtaining meaningful information about efficiency in medical and hospital care are exceptionally complex and subtle. Many simple measures, such as a hospital\'s cost per bed-day or in-hospital mortality unadjusted for medical risk, can be quite misleading. Average cost per bed-day can be reduced by needlessly prolonging hospital stays. The patients of the best surgeon in the country may have a high mortality rate because the sickest patients are referred to him or her. So, development of a really satisfactory system of management information will be a formidable intellectual task. Moreover, before the advent of modern information technology, the collection and processing of the types of data I discuss would have been prohibitively costly.

So, my purpose is not to criticize anyone for the lack of management information. There are good reasons why the "information revolution" in medical care did not happen sooner. But Europeans now have great opportunities to take major steps forward by implementing nationally some of the best ideas being developed in America. European health care systems are more organized than ours, and people do not move around as much, so it should be much easier to keep track of what happens to most patients. Europeans could now take advantage of powerful, flexible, and economical information technology to achieve truly valuable systems of medical and financial information for planning, management, analysis, and evaluation. First, I suggest some opportunities for institutionalized production of information; then I identify research opportunities.

Uniform hospital discharge data reports
---------------------------------------

Apparently uniform reporting to a central authority of all hospital inpatient cases is not mandatory in most European countries. For example, in Sweden I learned that there are discharge reports but that not all hospitals report, nothing compels them to report, and the reports are not very detailed. It is therefore difficult to compare efficiency by hospital or region without reliable summary reports on many aspects of hospital operations (e.g., per capita admission rates by age and sex, procedure rates per capita, death rates by procedure).

One good place to begin such information production would be with a system of mandatory reporting to a national data bank of all hospital discharges, including the following information:

-   Personal identification.

-   Date of birth.

-   Sex.

-   Residence.

-   Hospital identification.

-   Dates of admission and discharge.

-   Identification of attending physician and operating physician, if there was a procedure.

-   Diagnoses.

-   Procedures and dates.

-   Disposition of patient (i.e., alive or dead, discharged to home or to an institution).

This list comes from the Uniform Hospital Discharge Data Set (UHDDS), which must be reported for all care paid for by Medicare and Medicaid (two large Government programs that pay for care for the aged, disabled, and welfare recipients) and for all hospital cases in some States, such as California and Maryland ([@b51-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In addition to these data, it may well be that additional information, such as some key diagnostic measurements, should also be included. The UHDDS has served as a foundation for developing diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), comprehensive longitudinal records, risk-adjusted measures of outcomes, outcomes management, utilization review, and peer review, which are discussed later in this article. For these developments to take place, it has been necessary that these data, with individual patient identification removed, be available for use by health services researchers.

Mandatory reporting alone is not enough to produce good data. The data have to be put to significant uses for the people who prepare it, so that they will be motivated to make it accurate. Both doctors and medical records technicians must be involved in coding. American experience suggests that there is a substantial potential for error (or at least disagreement) among people who prepare discharge reports. The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences did a study in which specially trained medical records technicians prepared new abstracts from hospital records for discharges in 1974 and then compared them with reports already submitted by leading private abstracting services. The study found that the old and new abstracts agreed on principal diagnoses in 65 percent of cases and on procedures in 72 percent of cases ([@b23-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Therefore, a data commission or board is needed to provide leadership in a continuing effort to improve the coding of information, including; clarifying definitions, ruling on disagreements, and requiring audits to check on accuracy. There will be some hospitals that will be reluctant to report on a timely basis. So there must be some real penalty that actually can and will be applied, such as the nonpayment of State subsidies, if timely reports are not submitted. In the American Medicare program, the hospital is not paid for a case until it has submitted a satisfactory discharge report signed by the attending physician.

National uniform hospital cost accounting
-----------------------------------------

I have asked a number of people in Britain, France the Netherlands, and Sweden to tell me how the average costs per case for particular types of cases compared among hospitals. I was told that such information was not available. (American hospitals can all say what they charge for various types of cases, but few can say what their costs are, and many of their managers do not know the difference.) If European hospital managers had such information, they could analyze and compare medical and management practices in different hospitals to identify the best, i.e., the most cost-effective, practices. Regional and county managements could use the same information as a guide for resource allocation, as, for example, in deciding which services to expand. In the United States, there can be quite wide variations in the charges and apparent costs among hospitals for similar cases, e.g., more than a threefold variation in median charges for CABG surgery among Los Angeles hospitals in 1986 ([@b49-hcfr-89-supp-049]). At least one American management consulting firm has developed a successful business by working with groups of hospitals to identify "best demonstrated practice" in each department ([@b26-hcfr-89-supp-049]). They found variations averaging 40 percent in the cost to treat the same kind of case, and thus substantial opportunities for savings.

The European health care systems could open up significant opportunities for efficiency enhancement by developing and implementing systems of hospital cost accounting capable of producing cost reports for "intermediate products" (such as laboratory tests and X-rays) and "final products" (individual patient cases). With such a system, it would be possible to compare cost per test and cost per case (e.g., CABG surgery in different hospitals) to pinpoint just how and where less costly hospitals save money. As an example of such a system, Sweden\'s Uppsala Academic Hospital has contracted with Transition Systems, Inc., for installation of a cost-accounting system developed at the New England Medical Center in Boston.

In the European nonmarket systems, I believe there is a case for a uniform national system, at least down to the level of cost per case by type of case, despite the preferences of many hospital administrators to be free to develop their own systems. In a market system, people use prices as indicators of the costs of goods and services they are thinking of buying. It does not matter whether all producers use the same system of cost accounting, because their customers will compare quoted prices. But in the nonmarket systems, such as in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia, there are few or no prices. Cost comparisons must be based on cost information. In this case, there are two reasons to prefer uniform national systems. First, without a truly uniform system, every proposed cost comparison is likely to bog down in detailed arguments about why one hospital\'s data are not comparable with another\'s. People who do not want to be compared can prevent comparisons by raising issues of accounting definition. Second, such systems are costly to design and implement. It would be more economical for each country to use a single system. American experience suggests great resistance to such uniformity. Attempts by the U.S. Government to require uniform cost reporting in the early 1980s failed in part because hospitals consider detailed cost information to be trade secrets in our competitive, pluralistic system. As in the case of discharge data reports, auditing and supervision by an accounting principles board would be needed to put life into this idea.

Diagnosis-related groups
------------------------

In the 1970s, a team at Yale University developed a system for describing a hospital\'s production called diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) ([@b15-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In 1983, the Medicare program adopted the prospective payment system (PPS), based on DRGs. All inpatient cases are classified in one or another of about 470 DRGs that are relatively homogeneous with respect to resource use, and hospitals are paid a fixed price per case, depending primarily on the assigned DRG. Medicare DRGs are now updated each year, based on the latest available information. PPS has not solved all of Medicare\'s cost problems. The physician fee and outpatient care part of Medicare remains open-ended and out of control. But PPS has had great success in slowing the growth of real inpatient cost per beneficiary. From 1980 to 1983, real Medicare inpatient costs per beneficiary rose 6.8 percent per year; from 1983 to 1984, they rose 2.7 percent.

Kaiser Permanente, our largest nongovernmental medical care organization, uses DRGs as a management tool. Hospital administrators in their Southern California Region are evaluated on the basis of their ability to control their cost per case, with DRGs used to measure case mix. Hospital administrators with costs per case above the average have been directed to bring their costs down to the level of costs in the low-cost hospitals. I have been told that this innovation has led administrators in the high-cost hospitals to become very interested in how the low-cost hospitals achieve their favorable results, and that cost differences have been narrowed considerably.

DRGs are being studied actively in Europe. The most promising use for DRGs in Europe that I can see is as an indicator of a hospital\'s total inpatient workload or output, to serve as a denominator in a calculation of cost per case. Although it is not perfect, it is the best available indicator of hospital inpatient case load. There are continuing unresolved issues about differences in severity of illness within DRGs, and research is under way to produce a more refined system. Medicare has experienced some "DRG creep," that is, a change in reported case mix for what appears to be in fact the same case mix. But these problems have proven to be relatively minor. Again, regular audits are needed.

Like Kaiser Permanente, European health care systems might evaluate and compensate hospital managers in part on the basis of their ability to control and reduce growth in cost per case, using DRGs. Europeans would need to develop their own sets of DRGs, based on their own medical practices. To get an adequate sample size, the smaller countries would need to form groupings.

Research is now under way in the United States to develop systems for long-term care and ambulatory care that would be somewhat similar in purpose.

Studies of medical practice variations
--------------------------------------

John E. Wennberg, M.D., professor of medicine at Dartmouth Medical School, has pioneered in the study of geographic variations in medical practice patterns. In an early study of variations in incidence of surgery in different hospital service areas in Vermont, he found a greater-than-eightfold variation in the per capita incidence of tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy from the lowest to the highest areas ([@b18-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Nonphysicians used to think that there were well-established scientifically based standards for medical practice. Wennberg\'s studies made us aware that this was not the case. As Wennberg has effectively illustrated with data, there is great uncertainty and differing opinion associated with much of medical practice. And there is a widespread lack of scientific data, especially on the quantitative aspects of medical decisionmaking.

In addition, Wennberg found that feeding data back to doctors led the high users of some procedures to cut back ([@b54-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Wennberg has teamed up with Europeans to study variations in common surgical procedures in New England, England, and Norway. Similar degrees of variability in surgery rates were found in England and Norway as were found in New England ([@b33-hcfr-89-supp-049]). McPherson and colleagues at Oxford have done similar studies ([@b34-hcfr-89-supp-049]). With a national uniform hospital discharge report, it should be possible for each country to prepare regular reports of age-sex standardized per capita rates of hospitalization by DRG and procedure, by district, department, or county of patient origin. Such reports, when fed back to doctors, would help "outliers" to see where they are. These data might complement cost-per-case reports. A "low-use" district might justify higher costs per case in certain diagnoses, because fewer patients are hospitalized there than in other districts and only when they are sicker. These data could be used to target for further study areas of high medical uncertainty affecting large numbers of patients.

Comprehensive longitudinal patient records
------------------------------------------

One of the large handicaps under which American physicians work is a lack of longitudinal data on outcomes of care. Unfortunately, most surgical patients can be followed systematically only to the hospital door. Registries are kept for some patients in some institutions, but these are quite limited in scope. Continuous comprehensive records exist for long-term members of some health maintenance organizations, but usually these are not electronically stored and easily retrievable. Patients in some controlled clinical trials are followed for years. Dr. Wennberg has recently linked Medicare inpatient and outpatient records and Social Security records (which record survival) for Medicare beneficiaries in New England. This has enabled him to follow histories of surgical patients over an 8-year period to see what happens to them. For example, a recent study of patients who had undergone transurethral resection of the prostate found a considerably greater incidence of mortality, complications, and reoperation than previous professional consensus held ([@b56-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Similar records exist in the Provinces in Canada.

The development of standardized longitudinal records has been inhibited in the United States by the decentralized and pluralistic nature of the American health care system. Nobody is in charge to direct such a development. Americans regularly change insurance carriers and providers as they move, change jobs, or merely exercise their choices. Medicare may offer us our most promising data source, because practically all Americans are enrolled in Medicare at age 65 and remain in it for the rest of their lives. Because European health care systems are more homogeneous and people do not move around as much, it should be far more feasible for Europeans to keep track of each patient\'s medical history in a standardized way. Wennberg\'s work shows that problems such as preserving confidentiality can be managed and that analysis of such longitudinal data---possibly supplemented by followup questionnaires and other studies---can provide very important information about the outcomes of different treatments.

Risk-adjusted measures of outcomes
----------------------------------

An important and promising new development in the United States has been called risk-adjusted measures of outcomes (RAMO) by Dr. Mark Blumberg of the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program ([@b2-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The steps in this process as he describes it are as follows:

-   Select a study population.

-   Select a clinical care subject (e.g., a procedure or event).

-   Select appropriate measures of outcome.

-   Identify independent variables that measure risk of adverse outcome (e.g., birthweight, age, presence of multiple diagnoses).

-   Develop a technique to estimate expected risk of adverse outcome (e.g., multiple regression, recursive partitioning).

-   Estimate the probability of adverse outcome for each case.

-   Compare the actual number of adverse outcomes with the expected number for each provider.

-   Where there are significant differences, investigate them.

The first example of a risk-adjusted measure of outcomes was R. L. Williams\' study of perinatal mortality in California ([@b57-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The Williams study is now an annual report that compares actual with expected perinatal mortality for every hospital in California. Blumberg has recently analyzed mortality from elective surgery in Maryland ([@b3-hcfr-89-supp-049]). And the Health Care Financing Administration, which administers the Medicare program, is reporting risk-adjusted mortality by hospital for Medicare patients.

This research is still in its infancy. As Blumberg emphasizes, there are many difficult problems to be overcome, including data accuracy, development of good risk-adjustment models, identification of appropriate outcome measures, and overcoming statistical bias in estimation. Publication of RAMO studies in the United States has been criticized by some physicians on the grounds that "it could be misleading." But analysis of such data, interpreted by people using informed judgment, is really all we have to go on in evaluating outcomes of care. There is no other scientific way of evaluating the quality of care. In the United States, providers have resisted publication of any data that could link results with specific providers. But growth in health care expenditures has forced government and employers to take cost-cutting measures. In response, providers have argued that cost containment would threaten the quality of care. This, in turn, has led government and employers to start measuring the quality of care directly and to take action to correct poor quality care. When significant variations in risk-adjusted outcomes are identified, they should be investigated. In California, risk-adjusted mortality rates for CABG surgery in 1986 ranged all the way from 1.0 percent to 17.6 ([@b49-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The methods used by the best hospitals should be considered for adoption by the worst hospitals. Prospective patients should have a right to such information.

European health care systems ought to designate at least one center in each country for RAMO and embark on a systematic well-funded research and development program to monitor outcomes of care. American experience shows this could be done.

Outcomes management
-------------------

Dr. Paul Ellwood, chairman of the influential health policy research institute InterStudy, has recently proposed a bold concept he calls "outcomes management ... a common patient-understood language of health outcomes; a national data base containing information and analysis on clinical, financial, and health outcomes that estimates ... the relation between medical interventions and health outcomes ... and an opportunity for each decisionmaker to have access to the analyses that are relevant to the choices they must make" ([@b7-hcfr-89-supp-049]). InterStudy is now working with participating medical centers to implement outcomes management by defining the common data set. The proposed data base will include patient description, diagnostic information, therapies, periodic reports by the patient on quality of life, specific medical results, and complications peculiar to the patient\'s illness or therapy ([@b24-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Dr. William Roper, until recently head of the Health Care Financing Administration, and associates responded to Ellwood\'s proposal with an "effectiveness initiative" ..." a four-step process involving monitoring, analysis of variations, assessment of interventions, and feedback and education. In Step 1, monitoring, an ongoing universal data base composed of all Medicare claims is used to characterize the health status of the population involved, ... monitor the outcomes of various interventions, ... and screen for emerging beneficial or adverse trends. ... In Step 2, the goal is to describe and define variations in medical care, in terms of both practice patterns and outcomes. Such studies may be population-based ... or may examine the effect of certain interventions. ... In Step 3, interventions are assessed. ... Step 4 concerns feedback and education" ([@b40-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

This is an important idea, not yet an achievement. As with the other ideas I have mentioned, this one has European antecedents. Florence Nightingale first proposed this more than 100 years ago, so this is not particularly an American idea. If successful, this initiative could open up large and valuable sources of data regarding what does and does not work and for whom. This could lead to substantial improvements in medical practice. As mentioned earlier, progress in the United States has been inhibited by the diversity, independence, and pluralism of our health care financing and delivery arrangements. Europeans would have an easier time of it, because of their unified comprehensive health care system, and should pursue outcomes management aggressively.

Service and access standards
----------------------------

British and Swedish people complain about access to doctors and about insensitivity of the health care system to reasonable patient demands. [@b41-hcfr-89-supp-049] summarized the Swedish problems in these terms: "... non-medical characteristics of service delivery often respond more to the internal interests of the provider organizations rather than valid concerns of the patient ... the continued rationing by queue of certain elective surgical procedures ... inability to accommodate fundamental differences in treatment preferences ... long waiting room times, inconvenient appointment hours, ... complicated regulations regarding delivery sites, poorly coordinated services, and so forth." Dr. David Owen has written of the British situation, "The public concern about NHS \[National Health Service\] is expressed by \'waiting\': waiting for an appointment; waiting then in hospitals or in surgeries for the doctor; waiting to come into hospital; waiting at home for the promised visit. Those who work in the NHS, particularly doctors, have grown to accept too easily that waiting is inevitable." ([@b37-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Poor service to patients is not an inevitable part of medical care, even in large institutional settings. All of our health care systems could learn important lessons from the best companies in service industries such as hotels, restaurants, and airlines. In the United States, large multispecialty group practices have had to work hard on the design and operation of their systems to improve patient access to compete effectively with solo and small group practices. Kaiser Permanente has experimented with detached primary care clinics of various sizes and with primary care panel systems. They have found that waiting times can be reduced and patient satisfaction improved by implementing procedures designed on the basis of management engineering and operations research studies. For example, appointment scheduling has been improved through use of a computerized "airline reservation" type of system. Access to doctors on the same day that the request is made has been improved by reserving a number of places in each doctor\'s schedule for same-day appointments; the actual number reserved is equal to the statistically estimated demand for that day. Knowing that Monday morning is a time of exceptionally heavy telephone demand, the organization cross-trains some personnel to answer telephones on Monday mornings, while performing other duties the rest of the time. Improved systems of electronic storage and retrieval of records offer great potential for saving doctors\' and patients\' time.

NHS regions and Swedish county governments could contract with independent market research organizations to measure patient preferences regarding different combinations of service aspects of the health care system. Based on the results, they could develop and publish service and access standards, create systems of measurement of performance in relation to those standards, and regularly publish the results. Examples of such standards might be along the following lines:

-   Patients should not have to wait more than 3 months for elective surgery.

-   Ninety-five percent of telephone calls to primary care centers should be answered by the sixth ring.

-   Primary care centers should be open and staffed a certain number of evening and weekend hours.

-   Waits for appointments (excluding routine physical and eye examinations) should not exceed 3 weeks.

-   Ninety-five percent of in-office waits to see the doctor should be less than 30 minutes from the scheduled time.

These data must be interpreted with judgment. Waiting lists can be manipulated by providers to strengthen their case for more resources. But these data can be used to assess relative service efficiency in different centers. Comparative performance can be assessed, and poor performers can be encouraged to adopt the practices of the best performers.

Measuring patient satisfaction
------------------------------

As a part of the Health Insurance Experiment, Allyson Davies and John Ware at the RAND Corporation developed a patient satisfaction questionnaire to evaluate the impact of different health care financing arrangements on patient satisfaction ([@b5-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Some American employers are now polling their employees about their perceptions of the quality of their health care and feeding back the results to the health care organizations that serve them. This is intended to identify needs and motivate improvements in service and care. To provide useful information, the questions should be focused quite sharply on specific aspects of service delivery. For example, one employer asks whether employees have experienced a wound infection after surgery or a medical problem at the end of a stay in the hospital that they didn\'t have before they entered the hospital. Researchers know that the answers depend on how the questions are framed. So it makes sense for the questionnaires to be designed and administered by organizations that are independent of the health care system and that have a consumer point of view. Patients themselves are a great potential source of information about the quality of care and service they receive. The practice of obtaining such information and using it is not yet well developed in America. But I believe it is potentially important, and I include it for the sake of completeness of the glasnost story.

Publication of information
--------------------------

European voters and public policymakers would be helped in their decisions if the results of all this data gathering and analysis could be interpreted and published in a way that would be accessible to them. For example, it would be very helpful if newspapers would make the investment to develop a corps of a few journalists with the special background needed to understand and responsibly interpret data on the health care system for the general public. This type of reporting might be done by physicians with some postgraduate education in quantitative management tools.

For example, the *Los Angeles Times* has employed Robert Steinbrook, M.D., as a medical writer. Here are some examples of headlines and lead sentences from Dr. Steinbrook\'s recent articles: "Care for Newborns Varies, Studies of Hospitals Show ... California\'s hospitals vary widely in their ability to provide quality medical care to newborn babies, according to a sophisticated hospital-by-hospital analysis of perinatal death-rate data by researchers at the University of California, Santa Barbara." ([@b47-hcfr-89-supp-049].) This article reports the results of R. L. Williams\' RAMO study for the years 1980-84. "Heart Surgery Death Rates Found High in 1 in 6 Hospitals \... Nearly one-sixth of California hospitals with heart surgery programs had significantly high death rates for heart bypass patients in 1986, according to a *Times* analysis of data covering all such operations in the state" ([@b49-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This article reported the results of a study actually commissioned by the *Times* and performed with the assistance of three leading academic health services researchers at the University of California. A third, "U.S. Issues Data About Hospitals\' Death Rates," described a risk-adjusted mortality study of Medicare beneficiaries published by the Health Care Financing Administration ([@b47-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This article published mortality rates for California hospitals significantly above and below average, for all Medicare patients, and for patients with several specific diagnoses. The names of the hospitals were published, and the sky did not fall in. Nor have the patients fled the poorly performing hospitals, which is a disappointment to those of us who believe informed consumer choice is potentially a powerful force for good. If Europeans are looking for incentives to improve efficiency and effectiveness in their health care systems, it seems reasonable to suppose that the professional pride of doctors and managers would motivate many of them to take energetic and imaginative action to avoid appearing on the list of the worst departments or hospitals.

Utilization review
------------------

In the 1970s, our Congress created professional standards review organizations (PSROs) to review the use of services in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. These were local nonprofit cooperatives of doctors in each of about 200 health service areas. Studies in the late 1970s showed that these organizations were ineffective in reducing Medicare utilization ([@b17-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This was not surprising. There was no incentive for PSROs to be effective. A dollar saved in Medicare in California, at the expense of California doctors and hospitals, was a dollar returned to Washington.

In the 1980s, PSROs were replaced by peer review organizations (PROs). These are independent organizations in each State that contract with the Health Care Financing Administration to review the quality and appropriateness of care. These organizations compete to win and keep PRO contracts, so they have a real incentive to produce results. They use statistical "screens" to identify problem areas meriting detailed examination, and they use experienced physicians in the appropriate specialty to evaluate the care given. We do not have broadly based studies evaluating the effectiveness of the PROs.

Our many private sector insurance carriers engage in a great deal of utilization control and review activities, mostly for inpatient hospital care. They engage in preadmission review and authorization for nonemergency admissions, concurrent review, and discharge planning. There is little controlled evaluation of all this activity. One controlled study reports that a Blue Cross utilization review program reduced hospital admissions by 12.3 percent, inpatient days by 8.0 percent, and hospital expenses by 11.9 percent ([@b14-hcfr-89-supp-049]). We have no documented evidence of effects on quality. In any case, inpatient hospital admissions and days have been declining markedly in this decade. For example, total admissions for people under 65 years of age fell about 9.0 percent from 1984 to 1986.

The utilization review approach to quality and economy of care in the United States attempts to correct the deficiencies in a system the basic incentives of which do not motivate quality and economy to begin with. This approach has several fundamental defects. First, it looks for outliers, "bad apples" that can be identified, punished, and removed. There is no doubt that we have bad apples that ought to be removed. But this approach contributes to an atmosphere of fear, defensiveness, and resentment among physicians, and this atmosphere may be counterproductive in the quest for better quality. By definition, outliers are a small minority. And this month\'s outlier may be next month\'s average performer. Removal of outliers will not do much to improve average performance. A second defect in the utilization review approach is that it is too costly, if not impossible, to detect and control the behavior of doctors who are motivated to defeat the utilization control system. Such controls may have a useful effect on inpatient care, but ambulatory care is another matter. The indications for care are too numerous, too uncertain, and too changeable for a police force of reasonable size to be able to keep up. Some system of auditing and real public accountability is needed. But negative restraints in the face of inappropriate incentives seem unlikely to be nearly as effective as positive incentives to do the right thing to begin with. What we all need are systems of organization of care that include evaluation and feedback as a positive incentive to motivate continuous improvement in average performance. For the most part, American systems of utilization review and control are symptoms of the fact that we have not yet achieved that desirable state. We all need to think carefully how this can best be done.

Perestroika
===========

Decentralization and independent institutions
---------------------------------------------

American health care may suffer from an excess of pluralism, diversity, and innovation, without an effective market system to encourage the high-quality economical providers while driving out the low-quality and costly providers. But European health care systems, either of the public or highly regulated private variety, often appear frozen, resistant to innovation and change in financing or organization of delivery.

This is not surprising. There are several reasons public systems in Europe or the United States are especially resistant to change. First, there is what Charles Schultze has called the rule of "Do no direct harm. \... we cannot be seen to cause harm to anyone as the direct consequence of collective actions" ([@b44-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Thus we find it extraordinarily difficult to close an unneeded public hospital or military base. Second, politicians are understandably risk-averse. Most of the innovations people think of prove not to be good ideas, despite the positive connotation of the word. But this can often be discovered only in actual practice. So if politicians try something, the odds are it will fail and they will be blamed. If it succeeds, the rewards are usually quite limited. In the private sector, people can take risks with their own money. In the public sector, the risk-reward ratio often does not favor innovation. And third, most public sector services are monopolies.

On the whole, we have benefited from our Federal system of government. Health care finance and regulation is a mixed Federal-State responsibility. Californians can try many things that appeal to them without being blocked by New Yorkers, who are culturally quite different from Californians. Unitary states in Europe give proposed innovations an "all or none" character.

In the spirit of 1992 (when the trade barriers come down), the different countries of Europe can fill the role of the separate American States. Europeans should build on their practice of studying and learning from each other\'s experiences, while avoiding legislation that would force uniformity. And within their own countries, Europeans would do well to think more seriously about decentralization, to accommodate more diverse preferences, and to create a climate more tolerant of experimentation.

In the United States, we benefit greatly from the existence of independent nonprofit institutions in the fields of health, education, and social welfare. Indeed, most of our famous universities and hospitals are in that category. These institutions depend on a variety of sources of support, including payments from those they serve, tax-deductible contributions, and grants and contracts from foundations and governments. The element of consumer and provider choice is important. All this creates a framework that fosters diversity and innovation. For example, in health care, we have benefited greatly from the existence of independent nonprofit prepaid group practices (as discussed in the next section). Doctors in the traditional sector tried hard to stop them, including using the power of the State. We never would have had this important innovation, if health care had been entirely provided or controlled by the public sector. The public sector is inherently the protector of the status quo. The established interests have all the power. Our independent nonprofit institutions are usually more socially responsible and long-term oriented than the for-profit sector, but less rigid than the public sector.

Of course, independent (nongovernmental) institutions in health care and finance also exist in Europe. The sickness funds of Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany are independent nonprofit institutions, as are many of their hospitals. Britain has independent provident associations as well as independent hospitals, both nonprofit and investor-owned. The challenge for European societies is to find ways to expand the roles of independent institutions to take advantage of their flexibility and potential for innovation, without sacrificing the social goal of universal access. For example, the British Government is now proposing to transform NHS hospitals into self-governing NHS Trusts, potentially a very productive step in the direction of greater decentralization and greater tolerance of innovation (*Working for Patients*, 1989).

Prepaid group practice
----------------------

There has been a great deal of European interest in American multispecialty prepaid group practice, (e.g., Kaiser Permanente, Harvard Community Health Plan, and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound). I use the term "prepaid group practice" rather than "health maintenance organization" (HMO), because the latter is quite nonspecific and is also used to describe what amounts to insurance arrangements with little actual organization and management of care. There has been a great deal of research and documentation of the performance of these organizations ([@b30-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b32-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Prepaid group practices combine multispecialty group practice and periodic, per capita payment set in advance in a competitive marketplace. The patients always have an annual choice of health plan, so the prepaid group practice has some incentive to solve patients\' medical problems while holding down the cost---in short, to give value for money. This feature probably makes prepaid group practice unique, and therefore understandably an object of considerable interest. Their incentive to seek efficiency in the United States is often attenuated by a lack of serious competitors and by employer practices and features of our tax laws that subsidize employees\' choice of more versus less costly health care arrangements. Nevertheless, these organizations have developed a number of characteristics worthy of study and emulation by others.

Prepaid group practices have attracted the loyalty, commitment, and responsible participation in management of their doctors. They have managed to bridge the cultures of medicine and management. Doctors and managers work together in an atmosphere of mutual respect. Management principles are applied to matters of quality and economy of care. The opportunity for continuous quality improvement is enhanced by the fact that the doctors are full-time salaried members of the organization, not independent operators with no organizational commitment. In prepaid group practices, making the correct diagnosis promptly and treating the patient without causing complications are rewarded. (In the fee-for-service system, failure to make a prompt diagnosis results in more visits and more money for the doctor.) These organizations have been leaders in systematic quality measurement and control. They match resources used to the needs of the population served, including numbers and types of doctors. Thus, in each specialty, doctors have full schedules seeing and treating patients whose problems fit their specialty. This is good for proficiency and economy. Doctors can make a good living at a low cost per case because they have lots of cases, and they are not under economic pressure to do procedures that are not really indicated. All this is in marked contrast to our fee-for-service solo practice system, which now has an excess of doctors and no effective way of aligning numbers of doctors to patients\' needs. The prepaid group practices concentrate specialized services in regional centers to assure economies of scale and experience. They have pioneered the use of treatment settings less costly than inpatient hospital care: outpatient day surgery, many other treatments on an outpatient basis, and home nursing. They have orderly processes for technology assessment and organized responses to changes in technology. (Doctors in fee-for-service solo practices have powerful incentives to deny the validity of new information that is negative about their "bread and butter" procedures. A large multispecialty group can assist the doctors to retrain in other procedures.) Also, these organizations have innovated efficient use of paramedical personnel, such as nurse practitioners.

A unique feature of prepaid group practice is systematic regular professional interaction of generalist and specialist physicians. With relative ease, the generalist can call on the specialist for consultation in which they can examine the patient and discuss the treatment together. This contributes to the professional education and stimulation of the generalist and keeps the generalist\'s perspective of the whole patient in the picture when the specialist becomes involved. The generalist need not fear "losing the patient" when he or she makes a referral, and the specialist need not fear a loss of business from assisting the generalist to care for the patient. Professional checks and balances help to moderate single specialty points of view.

Some of these features can be found in some European health care systems, but not in others. For example, with respect to regional concentration of specialized services, Kaiser Permanente probably resembles the British and Swedish systems more than the typical American setting.

Some European countries may find it advantageous to attempt to create similar organizations. For example, [@b28-hcfr-89-supp-049] have proposed an adaptation of the idea as an experiment in France. The recent proposal of the British Government to create some budget-holding general practitioner (GP) group practices draws some inspiration from the same idea. Alternatively, many Europeans would do well to examine prepaid group practices for detailed ideas on how to improve efficiency.

None of our countries will achieve a truly satisfactory health care system until we find a way to create internal incentives and dynamism for quality, economy, and good customer service. The model of prepaid group practice in a competitive environment comes as close to that as we have seen.

Demonstrations, pilot projects, and experiments
-----------------------------------------------

In the United States, we have gained a great deal of useful information from demonstration projects and social experiments in health care and other fields. The Office of Research and Demonstrations of the Health Care Financing Administration directs and supports more than 300 research, evaluation, and demonstration projects related to the management, organization, and finance of Medicare and Medicaid, our public health care financing programs for the aged and the poor ([@b21-hcfr-89-supp-049]). And other agencies such as the National Center for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment sponsor and conduct many more. Faculty members from leading research universities and institutes participate in the research designs, and generally a high standard of research design is achieved. Some examples follow:

### Medicare and health maintenance organizations

Until 1985, care for Medicare beneficiaries was paid for on the basis of fee-for-service and cost reimbursement (or DRGs), even if the beneficiary got his or her care from an HMO. In the 1970s, there were legislative proposals to pay HMOs on a per capita basis, but no action was taken until the late 1970s, when a new law was proposed, providing for Medicare per capita prepayment of HMOs. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) contracted with four HMOs to test the proposed payment method. The test was a success ([@b19-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Many fears expressed by the critics were shown to be unfounded. A new law was enacted in 1982 to implement the results of the experiment, and the law went into effect in 1985. Subsequently, 1 million Medicare beneficiaries joined HMOs on a "risk-basis" capitation contract. Now HCFA is sponsoring a dozen followup studies of refinements to the Medicare HMO payment methodology.

### The health insurance experiment

Does requiring patients to pay 25 percent of their medical bills, up to an annual limit on out-of-pocket costs (as compared with free care), reduce the use of services? Is it more likely to reduce inappropriate, rather than appropriate services? Does it harm patients\' health? The RAND Corporation, under a long-term contract with the Department of Health and Human Services, conducted a long-term, multisite, randomized controlled trial of alternative health insurance arrangements. They found that requiring a 25-percent coinsurance payment reduced spending by about 19 percent, compared with no coinsurance requirement and, with a few small exceptions, had no discernable effect on health ([@b36-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b46-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b4-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This put to rest debates about whether coinsurance was penny-wise and pound-foolish. They compared fee-for-service with a prepaid group practice HMO and found the HMO cut total resource use by 28 percent and hospital use by 40 percent, with no significant negative effect on health ([@b32-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This was important in settling debates as to whether or not HMO economies could be explained as the consequence of favorable selection of patients.

### Preferred provider insurance

Preferred provider insurance (PPI) was effectively outlawed in most of the United States until a coalition of business, labor, and the insurance industry defeated organized medicine in the California legislature in the summer of 1982. Subsequently, most of the larger States have also changed their laws to authorize PPI. The Health Care Financing Administration recently announced a demonstration project to test PPI for Medicare beneficiaries in five different cities ([@b52-hcfr-89-supp-049]). If someone attempted to pass a law requiring all physicians serving Medicare patients to accept the Medicare-approved fee as payment in full, organized medicine would doubtless be able to block it. But they have not been able to block this demonstration. And it seems likely that if this experiment succeeds, it will be replicated on a much larger scale, at which point it may acquire a momentum of its own.

Of course, such demonstration and pilot projects are far from unknown in Europe. A recent paper by [@b27-hcfr-89-supp-049] describes more than 20 very interesting local demonstration projects in the Netherlands in the areas of monitoring and feedback of medical care utilization and costs, incentives for cost-effective care, community care (substituting home nursing for hospital), and coordination of care. The British National Health Service has attempted clinical budgeting experiments and is now doing pilot projects of indicative prescribing budgets for general medical practitioners. [@b28-hcfr-89-supp-049] proposed experimental réseaux de soins coordonnés, (networks of coordinated care) an idea inspired by American HMOs adapted to French circumstances. However, established interests in France were too entrenched to permit a potentially threatening idea to get a start, even as an experiment. (Of course, entrenched vested interests are not unknown in America.)

My general recommendation to Europeans would be to make more widespread and large-scale use of pilot and demonstration projects and to make less use of coercive decree, to foster a process of continuous incremental improvement rather than discrete "great leaps forward" ordered from the center. For example, in 1983, the Griffiths inquiry made a number of very sensible recommendations regarding NHS management in Britain, including competitive tendering by commercial contractors for catering, cleaning, and laundry services. The government attempted to implement this by decree, requiring all districts to submit programs and meet tight schedules. In 1985 I wrote that, "... it would have made far more sense to begin with a dozen pilot Districts whose managements were enthusiastic about the idea, develop and test the methods, with plenty of expert advice from private sector hospital groups, ... from airlines and hotels that have much relevant experience, then push tendering to the maximum, display the benefits for all to see, then write the manuals and sample contracts, and develop the short training courses" ([@b9-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In 1989, the British Government again proposes some promising and innovative ideas, such as NHS Hospital Trusts. But they announced tight timetables for implementation of ideas that have not been pretested and shown to be workable in practice (*Working for Patients*, 1989). I believe that in the long run, a phased pilot-project approach would be more effective.

Managed competition
-------------------

The two best known simple conceptual models for organizing the health care economy are at opposite ends of a spectrum: the free market and the tax-supported public sector monopoly. Proponents of each like to point to the evident deficiencies of the other in support of their own preference. In fact, a free market cannot work in health insurance and health care. There are too many ways in which these markets depart from the conditions necessary for a market to produce an efficient outcome: pervasive uncertainty, great asymmetry of information, moral hazard, adverse selection, many not-truly-voluntary transactions, etc. A free market in health insurance cannot produce either equity or efficiency ([@b10-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In the United States, for the most part, we do not have a free market in health insurance at the individual level. We have mainly collective purchases by groups, in which the elements of tax subsidy and other government regulations are important. We do have roughly 40 million or so Americans who do not get their health insurance through employment-related groups or public programs Most of them are uninsured and must rely on public hospitals and clinics.

On the other hand, public sector monopolies have their problems, which any impartial observer will admit. They generally contain no serious incentives to improve efficiency. Indeed, they are likely to contain perverse incentives that punish efficiency ([@b9-hcfr-89-supp-049]). They are unresponsive to consumer preferences regarding times and places and modalities of treatment. They are guided much more by provider preferences and convenience than consumer preferences. They ration by queues. They lack accountability.

So it is understandable that people are searching for intermediate possibilities, institutional arrangements that capture some of the advantages of markets without their disadvantages, arrangements that can motivate efficiency while safeguarding equity.

A desirable arrangement would separate the demand side from the supply side so that an independent demand side could present the desires of consumers and taxpayers to the providers, set standards, measure performance, and make choices. A desirable arrangement would allow the demand side to become well informed about the costs and the benefits produced by different providers. Thus it would allow the demand side to compel glasnost as described earlier.

A desirable arrangement would also allow choices at two levels: at the level of large group purchasers and at the level of individual choice. The large group purchaser would be able to bring to bear the information and expertise to evaluate all suppliers and exclude those with unacceptable performance; such a purchaser could also structure the market for individual choices so that consumers could make well-informed choices and so that consumers would be guided by correct signals to choose those suppliers that produce high-quality economical care. The element of consumer choice would make the system responsive to responsible consumer preferences regarding quality of care and service.

A desirable arrangement would thus allow the demand side some choice of supplier. It would systematically select and promote the organization and delivery of high-quality, economical, responsive care. How this goal is to be approached in any given country must reflect the cultural preferences, history, and institutional realities of that country. Useful policy proposals must represent politically feasible incremental change. A model that makes sense in one country may have little apparent relevance to another. However, insights gained in one country\'s experience may be usefully adapted to another.

For the United States, I have been working out and proposing a concept I call managed competition ([@b10-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Managed competition joins two ideas. First, as previously noted, we now have in the United States a rich variety of schemes that join health care financing and delivery, schemes of varying success in organizing high-quality economical care. Each, in its way, is trying to innovate to find ways to control cost without cutting quality of care or service. Second, managed competition is based on the recognition that the market for health insurance in the United States involves three types of parties: consumers, health insurers (including prepaid group practice and other arrangements), and sponsors. The sponsors are the large group purchasers: employers and the public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. In managed competition, the sponsor\'s job is to structure the marketplace, to design and actively manage a process of informed, cost-conscious consumer choice, to motivate the participating health care financing and delivery schemes to produce a favorable combination of efficiency and equity. Efficiency here means value for money as seen by informed consumers. Equity means that the sick do not have to pay much more than the well for coverage and care. Perfect efficiency and equity are of course far from possible. Thus, the sponsor should manage a process of consumer choice that rewards with more subscribers those health care financing and delivery schemes that produce better quality, less costly care, and that does not reward them for selecting good risks, segmenting the market, or doing anything that does not contribute to high-quality economical care.

We have some prototypical examples of managed competition in actual operation. There is the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, in which more than 400 health plans of various types compete to serve about 9 million Federal employees, dependents, and retirees. This program has been in operation since 1960. In recent years, it has suffered from various correctable design deficiencies that make it vulnerable to risk selection, segmentation, and other problems ([@b11-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In California, we have a similar system for public sector employees. And many large private sector employers offer multiple choice of health plan to employees. Richard Kronick and I have recently shown how these concepts might be generalized into a model of universal health insurance for the United States ([@b13-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Much of managed competition as described here is specific to the American scene, where we have multiple competing health care financing and delivery schemes and strong cultural preference for such pluralism. But some Europeans have been watching this development with interest, to see if similar ideas can be adapted to their situations.

In March 1987, the Committee on the Structure and Financing of Health Care, an advisory committee set up by the Netherlands Government, chaired by Dr. W. Dekker, published a report that proposed major changes to the Dutch health care system ([@b35-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In this proposal, market forces would be used to motivate the search for efficiency, especially through better coordination of health and social services, and flexible substitution of more effective, less costly services. In the words of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, English summary, "Market forces provide an answer to the organizational inflexibility and cumbersome operation of the health system in the Netherlands, characterized as it is by high costs, lack of choice and lack of incentives for change." In the Dekker scheme, all citizens would become free to choose among health insurers. Insurers would be paid in two ways. First, a central fund would collect an income-related premium from all those able to pay, and it would pay insurers a risk-related premium contribution based on the characteristics of its subscribers. (This is an important sponsor function in managed competition.) Second, each insurer would charge a flat-rate premium to all insureds. Insurers would compete on this flat-rate component and would be free to negotiate selectively with providers for pay and scope of services. Insurers would no longer be obliged to contract with all providers. They could select those they considered to be efficient. And guaranteed funding for providers would be eliminated. After much public debate, the Netherlands Government indicated broad agreement with the Dekker proposals, and, in March 1988, issued a plan for their cautious and gradual implementation. This Dutch version of managed competition will give Europeans a "demonstration project" to watch much closer to home.

In January 1989, the British Government published a white paper outlining its strategy and proposals for restructuring the National Health Service (*Working for Patients*, 1989). Broadly speaking, one might characterize it as a strategy for separating the demand and supply sides of the market and for strengthening the ability of the demand side to make informed choices. In the government\'s strategy, District Health Authorities (DHAs), which are now monopoly suppliers of services to the people in their districts, are to be recast as purchasers of services on behalf of the populations they serve, which services are to be supplied competitively. That is, DHAs will be free to seek value for money outside their districts and even outside the NHS, in the private sector. Regions will actually receive their main budget allocations on the basis of population, adjusted for age, morbidity, and other demand-related factors, with the present adjustments for cross-boundary flows replaced by direct payments for services between regions. Regional targets have long been based on such a formula, but actual payments followed targets only gradually, because of fear of disrupting the supply side. In the new plan, district budgets will be based on estimated need, not influenced by the services they produce.

The government\'s strategy includes allowing hospitals to opt out of district control and to become independent self-governing NHS Trusts. These hospitals will be free to set their own pay, contract with their own personnel, and compete to serve several districts. A key idea is that "money follows patients." Today, a hospital that does an excellent job of producing high-quality care efficiently, thereby reducing or eliminating its queue, is likely to attract more patients without correspondingly more money--- a perverse disincentive. Under the new scheme, such a hospital will be able to contract with sending districts for a prompt payment per case. The government\'s plan also includes strengthening medical audit, and experimentation with the idea of large GP practices holding budgets for a broad range of services beyond primary care. All this is sometimes referred to as an "internal market" for health care, compatible with universal tax-supported provision of comprehensive care ([@b9-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b37-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

The Swedish health care system seems even less amenable to concepts of managed competition than the British. And the geographic pattern of very large county hospitals seems almost a guarantee of territorial monopolies for inpatient care. However, introduction of some elements of managed competition is not beyond the realm of conceivable political reality. I have recommended a program of glasnost like the one described in this article, combined with a policy of rewarding with pay and promotion those physicians and managers who demonstrate superior performance ([@b12-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Beyond this, it might be productive to consider competition within the public sector at the primary care level, along the lines proposed by Saltman and von Otter. Moreover, the Swedish Government instituted an arrangement whereby patients waiting for certain procedures could obtain care from other counties if the waiting time in their own county exceeded certain limits, with the patient\'s county paying the providing county, and the government throwing in a bonus. I understand that this appreciably reduced waiting times. What is needed is the political will for the Swedish people to create an institution independent of the health care providers, with the power to compel production of information and the resources and charter to take initiatives to get more informed choice into the system.

What these ideas and experiences illustrate is that intellectual discourse on health policy does not need to be limited to debates over the merits of polar opposites. Nor is it useful to argue abstractly over the merits of regulation versus competition. Every health care system is likely to have elements of both. The really interesting questions today are about the merits of marketlike incremental changes intended to make our systems more efficient and responsive to consumers. In this realm, American research and debate have produced what ought to be a good deal of interesting reading for Europeans.
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Introduction
============

It is particularly appropriate for a British health economist to be asked to comment on Enthoven\'s article "What can Europeans learn from Americans?" The British Government has just undertaken "the most far reaching reform of the National Health Service in its forty year history" (*Working for Patients*, 1989). The government\'s announcement was preceded by an unprecedented public debate about the future of the National Health Service (NHS) ([@b61-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b65-hcfr-89-supp-049]; The [@b69-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b70-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b71-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This debate made frequent references, both positive and negative, to the U.S. experience. More specifically, several commentators put forward ideas based on Enthoven\'s "Reflections on the Management of the National Health Service" ([@b64-hcfr-89-supp-049]), and some have suggested that, in key respects, the government\'s final proposals bear a striking resemblance to his suggestions.

I wish I could write as confidently about the situation in other European countries, but, as Enthoven has indicated, their health care delivery arrangements are very diverse. Several countries have recently undertaken or are considering reforms, but my knowledge does not extend to the lessons they have learned, if any, from the United States. Accordingly, my remaining remarks tend to be dominated by a British perspective.

Growth of health expenditure
============================

Enthoven begins his article by conceding some shortcomings in the American health care system. Here he illustrates neatly the rule that Americans are usually more authoritatively critical of institutions in the United States than are foreigners. However, it is true that Europeans tend to feel superior about their universal health insurance coverage, and they look with mixed feelings at the growth rate of American health expenditures.

I was a little surprised that Enthoven did not bring us more news on cost containment. There is much interest in European countries, with their predominantly public sources of finance, in the growth rate of total health expenditures. This is especially so in those countries with relatively open-ended social insurance systems, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Belgium. They, presumably, would be curious to know what, if anything, has been learned in the United States from the long debate about competition and regulation. To what extent have the new developments, such as payment based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and utilization reviews, influenced total health expenditures? Is there still optimism that competition will secure cost containment?

In countries such as Britain and Sweden, where governments, central or local, have taken upon themselves the awesome responsibility of setting the overall level of most health expenditures, there are invariably painful debates about the right level of health spending and considerable uncertainty about the criteria for reaching decisions. In this connection, I found Enthoven\'s summary of findings from the literature on appropriateness particularly thought provoking. What is missing from public decisions on the level of health expenditures is some measure--- however partial---of the marginal health outcome per increment of spending. The new work in the United States on appropriateness and outcome offers a glimpse of how we might establish a relationship between outcome and expenditure, at least for certain programs.

Glasnost
========

Enthoven devotes the bulk of the first half of his article to an informative and stimulating report on certain recent developments in management information in U.S. medical care under the general heading of "glasnost." In my own research ([@b68-hcfr-89-supp-049]), I have been struck by the general similarity (if not the equal accessibility) of management information in the United States and the United Kingdom, putting aside payment methods. Thus, picking up four of Enthoven\'s recommendations, the United Kingdom has had uniform hospital discharge reports and a uniform national system of hospital cost accounting since soon after the formation of the NHS. The latter now provides specialty costs but not yet DRGs for inpatients.

England has had a long-standing trial of comprehensive longitudinal patient records in the Oxford Region. There have been regular national polls of patient satisfaction with the NHS ([@b63-hcfr-89-supp-049]), and there has been an ongoing, high-quality debate about the achievements and failings of the NHS and private medicine in some British newspapers. I could go on: The United States and the United Kingdom have similar health and vital statistics, similar household surveys, and similar data on health expenditures and manpower. True, I have only examined data collected nationally in the United States, but I assume that the superstructure gives important clues to the foundations.

On the other hand, there is, so far, a desperate lack of health outcome and quality data in both countries. This leaves consumers (and governments) short of information with which to make rational choices. What is now being confirmed, from studies of medical practice variations, is that doctors themselves are often uncertain about the indications for and effectiveness of treatments. It is sometimes said that there is a major asymmetry of information on the two sides of health care markets (consumers and providers). On some occasions, it looks more like a symmetry of uncertainty.

Meanwhile, European countries often look to the United States for advances in management information. Several have already started their own work on DRGs and on variations in medical practice. In Britain, experts have also done a good bit of work on some other imports from the United States, especially avoidable mortality ([@b62-hcfr-89-supp-049]) and the idea and practice of quality-adjusted life years ([@b72-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The latter has helped to focus (and sometimes to inflame) some debates about the allocation of resources; the former is now used as a performance indicator for the NHS (*The Government\'s Expenditure Plans*, 1989).

The recent review of the NHS has underlined the importance of the measurement of health outcome, clinical audit, and achievement of consumer satisfaction. Hence, I would expect the Department of Health (in England) to look carefully at risk-adjusted measures of outcomes, outcomes management, utilization review and peer review organizations, and the development of service and access standards. I would add to this list the important American work on appropriateness and risk-adjusted capitation payments.

A major concern about such advances, however, is what they will cost. Enthoven does not attach price tags to his proposals. It has been estimated that America already devotes about 22 percent of its health expenditures to administration ([@b67-hcfr-89-supp-049]). It is sobering to learn that the available management information is nevertheless not enough. The same authors estimate that the share of British health expenditure devoted to administration is about 6 percent. There is an expectation in some quarters that this figure will rise, because the reforms call for, and will demand, better management information. Nevertheless, the whole exercise will, as usual, be governed by a tight budget. It would have been nice to know which bits of glasnost, if any, have been shown to represent particularly good value for the money in the United States.

This leads me to a final point about management information. There seems to be a certain tension between the two parts of Enthoven\'s article---in particular, between his plea for uniformity and centralization (of information systems) in the first part and his plea for diversity and decentralization (of organizational structures) in the second part. Is it that the production of information is to some extent a public good and that, therefore, we cannot rely on the market to produce the optimum quantity? Will perestroika fail to produce glasnost? Later in his article, Enthoven argues that a desirable arrangement would allow large group buyers of health care to become well informed about performance and to compel glasnost. But would large group buyers necessarily have either the incentive or the power to do this adequately? Is this one area in which there is an inescapable role for government?

Perestroika
===========

In the second half of his article, Enthoven recommends that Europeans think seriously about decentralization, the accommodation of more diverse preferences, and the creation of a climate more tolerant of experimentation. He suggests that we steer between the extremes of the free market and the tax-supported public sector monopoly. He recommends managed competition, which would involve a separation of the demand side of health markets from the supply side and would offer two levels of choice: choices by individuals among large group purchasers and choices by large group purchasers among providers. Such arrangements could "\... motivate efficiency while safeguarding equity."

The recent reforms in Britain seem to follow some of these prescriptions. From 1948 to date, the NHS has provided medical care to all, when needed, mainly free of charge to the patients. It has been funded out of general taxation. There has been only a small, but growing, private sector. Primary care has been supplied by independent general practitioners (GPs), remunerated partly by capitation fees and under contract with the NHS. Individuals have been able to choose their GP and about 75 percent of episodes of medical care have started and finished with the GP. Hospital care has been supplied by public hospitals managed by District Health Authorities (DHAs), funded by block grants from central government. Apart from emergencies, access to specialist doctors and to hospitals has been through the GP gatekeeper.

The reforms retain tax funding, and services will continue to be available to all patients mainly free of charge. But, as Enthoven has reported, the reforms introduce a new separation of the demand side from the supply side for hospital services within the NHS.

On the demand side, there will be two levels of choice: level 1, where the existing arrangements for individuals to choose their GP will be strengthened; and level 2, where DHAs will now become mainly buyers of hospital services, able to contract with both local and more distant hospitals, public and private, for services to their resident populations. In addition, large GP practices can volunteer to have transferred to them part of the DHA\'s hospital budget, thereby allowing them for the first time to back up with cash their referrals of patients to hospitals.

On the supply side, public and private hospitals will be encouraged to compete for the business of both DHAs and those GP practices holding hospital-referral budgets. In addition, well-managed public hospitals will be able to volunteer for self-governing status within the public sector.

Such arrangements should offer an opportunity to increase efficiency without reducing equity. Moreover, taken together with those features of the NHS that have been retained, they seem to qualify for the title of "managed competition."

Despite the parallels with American thinking here, it is not clear that Europeans have as many lessons to learn from the United States about perestroika as they do about glasnost. One difficulty is that it is hard to draw conclusions when institutions are quite different on either side of the Atlantic. Another difficulty, of which Enthoven warns us, is that America is still wrestling with the appropriate mix of management and competition in her own health markets. It would have been nice to know more about whether the "\... prototypical examples of managed competition in actual operation" in the United States (from Enthoven\'s article) have provided answers to the sort of questions that tend to be posed about managed competition, such as:

-   How can information and administration costs be prevented from eating into the savings that result from effective competition among providers?

-   How can cost-conscious competition avoid focusing on cost at the expense of quality, when cost is more easily measured than quality?

-   To what extent can adverse selection be dealt with by using either risk-related capitation payments or regulations, when there is consumer choice among providers?

-   How can the right balance be struck between consumer choice and agency choice in health care?

On the last of these topics, it is interesting to read in Enthoven\'s article that in California patients have not fled poorly performing hospitals (in terms of mortality), despite negative publicity. Can we take it that Californians are more concerned about the convenience of hospital care than about its clinical quality, or have these patients been poorly advised by their agents? What is the appropriate scope for consumer choice and agency choice, respectively, in hospital care?

Convergence
===========

One of the most striking facts about the financing and organization of medical care is the extent to which it varies among developed countries. With the arrival of ideas that amount to managed competition in several countries simultaneously, may we now expect some convergence?

I think it is premature to talk about convergence. One of the features of managed competition is that it seems to be capable of coexisting with some very different financing regimes---with private insurance in the United States, with social insurance in the Netherlands, and with tax-funded global budgets in the United Kingdom. Countries with private and social insurance will no doubt look to managed competition to deliver overall cost containment, among other things. Britain will ask less of it. There is no sign that Britain will abandon its reliance on tax-funded global budgets: They seem to be the surest way of limiting the burden of health care on the taxpayer while such care continues to be available to all mainly free of charge to the patients. Also, managed competition is capable of coexisting with some major differences in organizational arrangements, ranging from specialty doctors with hospital admitting privileges and mainly private hospitals in the United States, to strong primary care, the GP gatekeeper, and mainly public hospitals in the United Kingdom.

So, I believe that diversity will continue. Nevertheless, it is clear from this exchange that Europeans and Americans still have a lot to learn from each other as we continue to pursue our somewhat separate ways.

I am grateful to Andrew Burchell, Mike Parsonage, Jean-Pierre Poullier, and Clive Smee for comments on the first draft of this article.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Health in England.

Introduction
============

As Enthoven emphasizes in the introduction to his article, there is not one single European health care system, but many. The ways in which health care is financed, organized, managed, and delivered vary probably even more within and among the countries of Europe than in the United States, with its great variety of health care institutions. The relevance of the advice and suggestions given in Enthoven\'s article thus depends very much from which country\'s perspective they are seen.

These circumstances call for some caution on my part. I do not know enough about every country in Europe to be able to speak for all of them. I must be more modest and limit my comments to the experience of a country I know fairly well---Sweden.

Thus, the first question to be asked and answered in response to Enthoven\'s suggestions is whether the Swedes need his advice or not. I am personally totally convinced that we do; otherwise, I would not have invited him to Sweden to critically review the Swedish health care system ([@b79-hcfr-89-supp-049]). For the readers of this journal, however, the need for advice may not be so obvious. Let me, therefore, begin this response with a brief description of the Swedish health care system: structure, relation to the overall economy, variations in efficiency, and lack of consumer choice. The second issue concerns the practicality of reforms in Swedish health care. I do share Enthoven\'s pragmatic view: "The really interesting questions are how to identify and design politically feasible incremental changes that have a reasonably good chance of making things better." Thus, I discuss Enthoven\'s proposals from these perspectives.

The Swedish health care system
==============================

Structure
---------

A characteristic feature of the Swedish health care system is the dominant role played by the county councils. The 26 county councils (including some independent larger cities) are by law responsible for health care delivery within their geographical boundaries. They are also empowered to impose a proportional income tax on their residents. Moreover, health care is practically the county council\'s sole responsibility; health care accounts for 85-90 percent of the operating costs of a county. Inpatient care is almost completely financed through county-council taxes and delivered by hospitals owned by the county councils.

During the last 25 years, the role of the county councils has actually been strengthened. Mental hospitals used to be a central government responsibility but were transferred to the county councils in 1963. Another important change occurred in 1970, when the ability of hospital physicians to have private outpatients treated at county council facilities was abolished. Since 1980, public vaccination programs are no longer the responsibility of central government but of each county council. Also, the two university hospitals still owned by the State at the time (the Karolinska Hospital of Stockholm and the Academic Hospital of Uppsala) changed from State to county council ownership in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Furthermore, the Swedish Health Care Act of 1982, revised in 1985, places the prime responsibility for all health care planning on the county councils. This responsibility implies, for instance, that the county councils have the authority to negotiate the establishment of a new private practice and the maximum number of patients that the private practitioner will be allowed to see per year. Without an agreement with the appropriate county council, visits to private physicians are not reimbursed from social insurance. Thus, the county councils also regulate and, to a high degree, control the market for private health care.

Each county has at least 1 central general hospital, with more than 1,000 beds and between 15 and 20 specialties, as well as several minor district hospitals. There are also nine regional hospitals in Sweden. These are affiliated with medical schools and serve as centers for research and teaching. A regional hospital provides specialized services such as neurology, neurosurgery, dermatology, thoracic surgery, plastic surgery, radiotherapy, urology, and pediatric surgery. It serves residents of several counties, so there are cooperative agreements among the counties on provision and financing of these highly specialized services.

Two additional things should be noted. First, in addition to its duties to serve the whole region with specialized services, the regional hospital also functions as a district hospital or a central general hospital for those people who live in the town or city where the hospital is situated. Second, all hospitals in Sweden have large outpatient departments; in fact, about 40 percent of the 27 million yearly visits to physicians in Sweden take place at hospitals. Besides, to a large extent, patients are allowed to make appointments with the hospital outpatient departments even without having a referral from a general practitioner. This is also true of regional or university hospitals. Hospital-based inpatient and outpatient care accounts for more than 70 percent of total health care costs in Sweden.

Most health care in Sweden is provided by the public sector, i.e., by the county councils; 97 percent of hospital admissions, for instance, are public. About 20 percent of all physicians (one-third of these in occupational health) and SO percent of all dentists are privately employed; their incomes normally depend on how many patients they see. Publicly employed physicians and dentists are all salaried. The pharmacies were privately owned until 1971, when they became nationalized and organized as one national corporation. More than 60 percent of all pharmaceuticals are imported. The Swedish pharmaceutical industry is private with one exception, Kabi, which was nationalized in the late 1960s. Medical schools are financed and administered by central government.

Direct consumer charges for health care are only nominal; for visits to the public health care facility, for prescribed medicines, and for visits to private doctors associated with the social insurance plan, the charges are less than the price of a man\'s haircut. In total, consumers\' out-of-pocket expenses account for 9.5 percent of total health care expenditures. The proportional county council personal income tax rate has increased from an average of 8 percent in 1970 to 13.5 percent in 1985. County council taxes finance 65 percent and central government 6.5 percent (through subsidies to county councils) of the total health care bill. The remaining part is paid for by social insurance: 8.5 percent of the total bill is for privately provided medical and dental care and prescribed medicines, and 10.5 percent is for publicly provided health care.

The health insurance part of social insurance is mainly a sickness cash-benefit system; sickness cash-benefit payments account for about 65 percent of the total social health insurance expenditures. However, social insurance pays a nominal charge per bed-day to hospitals but contributes more substantially for prescribed medicines and private or public outpatient health care. Swedish social insurance is a centralized system; central government is the supreme decisionmaker. Social health insurance is financed mainly by a proportional payroll tax; some transfer payments from central government (15 percent of the total expenditure for social health insurance) are also involved. The social insurance plan covers all Swedish citizens as well as foreigners residing in Sweden. Residents are automatically insured, and, in general, the insurance is compulsory.

Relation to the overall economy
-------------------------------

Health care represents the largest subsector within the public sector and, apart from the social sector, it is also the fastest growing. In 1985, expenditures for health care were nearly 75 billion Swedish Krona (SKr), or SKr 9,000 per inhabitant. Additional expenditures associated with sickness and disability are also significant; sickness cash benefits totalled SKr 18 billion, and early retirement pensions SKr 15 billion in 1985, i.e., SKr 3,940 per inhabitant ([@b84-hcfr-89-supp-049]). As a percentage of gross national product (GNP) in current prices, health care consumption appears to have stabilized at a level just below 9 percent.

Whereas health care consumption reached a constant share of GNP in nominal terms in the 1980s, the development looks somewhat different in real terms. Real health care consumption increased at an annual rate of 2.2 percent from 1980 to 1985, compared with 1.8 percent for real GNP, hence, increasing its share of real GNP. Thus, in real terms, health services not only used more resources but also a greater share of all resources. The tendency, however, was not as pronounced as it was during the last half of the 1970s, when annual real health care consumption increased three times faster than did real GNP.

The impression of a large and expanding sector is strengthened by a look at labor statistics. Employment in the health care sector increased rapidly during the 1980s; annual increases averaged 2.4 percent, for both persons employed and hours worked. Granted, this is less than it was during the 1970s, when the annual increase averaged 5.6 and 3.6 percent, respectively. Nevertheless, employment in health care increased much more rapidly than did employment generally in Sweden, raising its share of total employment from 9.9 percent of all hours worked in 1980 to 11.1 percent in 1985.

The explanation for the divergent trends in health care consumption in nominal and real terms, respectively, is obviously to be found in the development of prices. Before 1980, salaries for health care staff increased as rapidly as they did for other groups in Sweden. Between 1980 and 1985, salaries rose only 6 percent per year, on average, compared with 9 percent for the rest of the economy. It is clear, however, that the labor markets for health care personnel were not in equilibrium, so future increases in payments would be expected ([@b82-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Variations in efficiency
------------------------

Despite the absence of a relevant and consistent management information and control system, which Enthoven emphasizes in his article, some data and statistics are produced regularly or on an ad hoc basis. A number of comparative studies have been made, and these indicate significant differences among hospitals and hospital departments concerning the costs for comparable output, productivity, production technique, and quality. Of course, inefficiency is not the sole explanation of observed variations, but in most studies, the differences are significant enough to reveal an efficiency problem.

Thus, Eckerlund, inspired by the works of [@b91-hcfr-89-supp-049], studied variations in practice at departments of gynecology ([@b76-hcfr-89-supp-049]) and dermatology ([@b77-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In gynecology departments, the average length of stay in the maternity ward varied between 4.4 and 8.2 days, averaging 6.5 days. The rate of cesarean section varied from 7.5 percent to 19.2 percent of all deliveries. A comparison of dermatology departments in Sweden found that the number of dermatology beds varied between 2.5 and 11.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in a catchment area. [@b83-hcfr-89-supp-049] found significant differences in the development of productivity among Swedish hospitals form 1960 to 1980, ranging from -9 percent to + 3 percent change in productivity per year. There was no evidence that hospitals with low costs and a rapid increase in productivity neglected the quality of services.

Lack of consumer choice
-----------------------

There are considerable deficiencies in consumer choice in Swedish health care. The opportunities for a Swedish citizen to influence his or her own situation and the general development of society have been studied by one of the research projects associated with the 1985 government committee on power and democracy in Sweden ([@b87-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The analysis was based on more than 2,000 interviews in which persons 16-80 years of age were asked about the degree of influence they had over their own situations in six essential dimensions: housing, consumer, patient, parents with small children, parents with school-aged children, and employee. Of the six areas investigated, health care showed the greatest tendency toward "silent powerlessness"; widespread dissatisfaction existed but was relatively seldom expressed by independent action. For example, patients and families felt they had little opportunity to choose their physician or to change to another hospital department or primary health care center. This attitude contrasted sharply with the area that ranked highest in terms of consumer influence, i.e., the role of the consumer.

Furthermore, [@b86-hcfr-89-supp-049] asked each of the 26 county council health service managers in Sweden about their patients\' opportunities to choose a primary health care center or physician within the county council\'s domain. The responses showed a wide gap between patients\' hypothetical and actual opportunities for free choice. Free choice seemed to be regarded as something difficult, something that creates administrative problems, and that therefore should be permitted only as a last resort after a patient has lost all confidence in the physician assigned to him or her.

Enthoven\'s proposals
=====================

Enthoven\'s advice is separated into two parts: one concerned with management information, evaluation, and control; the other with changes in the financing and organization of health care that might be considered in the European countries. Enthoven presents a detailed argument for developing advanced management information systems and explains in detail the role market incentives might play in improving the efficient provision of health care, often with direct reference to Sweden. Therefore, I shall not repeat all the arguments here. In principle, the arguments are no different in Sweden than anywhere else. Furthermore, it would add little, because I fully agree with Enthoven that the Swedes should have much to learn from the American experience, not least from "best practice" as he presents it. So, instead, I try to concentrate most of my discussion of Enthoven\'s proposals on what is actually happening in the Swedish health care system and on the political feasibility of introducing "glasnost" and "perestroika."

Management information, evaluation, and control
-----------------------------------------------

Information by which performance can be measured should, naturally, be as important to the public health care sector as it is to private industry, a necessary internal management instrument on which to base incentives for efficiency. Normally, consumers do not concern themselves with how private firms measure their performance or how they provide quality assurance for their products. This is up to the individual firm. The market test of survival serves the purpose of external control. Only the efficient producers will, in the long run, find consumers willing to buy their products at prices that cover their costs of production. Inefficient companies will run at a loss and, if things do not change, they will have to close and leave the market.

For activities within the public sector, there is a second purpose for information on performance in terms of productivity, efficiency, and quality. Because the monopolistic public health care sector does not have to face competition in the market and, hence, cannot go bankrupt, there is a need for detailed information for decisionmakers and taxpayers to ensure the greatest health care value for the money spent. In place of the market test, comparisons of costs, productivity, and quality become important. The information is then no longer just a private affair, but a social concern. As such, a large amount of openness is required.

Enthoven presents an 11 -point program for management information, evaluation, and control. The core of the information system consists of uniform hospital discharge data reports and a national uniform hospital cost accounting system, which could be linked to each other via the use of DRGs, diagnosis-related groups. For long-term care and ambulatory care, similar-in-purpose systems are not yet available, but are presently being developed in the United States. Based on the information produced, a number of examples of possible ways to compare productivity and quality and to set standards for service and access are given by Enthoven.

I doubt that there is much controversy in Sweden, at least in principle, about the possible usefulness of this kind of information and evaluation studies. Studies of medical practice variations are performed from time to time; there are a few regional and national registries of longitudinal patient records for some surgical and orthopedic surgical procedures; there are quality assurance study groups in some hospitals; DRGs are being adapted to Swedish conditions; and comparisons of costs per case and so on are being done now and then.

These studies reveal a spontaneous curiosity and a natural interest among some physicians and administrators to evaluate their own work. Yet there are no regular evaluations, no consensus as to how to do the evaluations, and still very little public openness about the results. And the studies are made difficult by the fact that Swedish health care lacks the uniform cost-accounting system necessary to compare costs for patients, treatments, hospitals, and hospital departments. Nor is there a good working system for reporting on patients according to diagnosis, treatment, health status, etc., which could be interfaced with a cost-accounting system. True, providers are obligated to report patient information to the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, but there is little incentive for accurate reporting, hence, these reports contain errors of importance for planning ([@b74-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b85-hcfr-89-supp-049]). It is also true that the Federation of County Councils has issued guidelines for the cost-accounting systems to be used by the county councils. These recommendations, however, give wide latitude for different interpretations, which make direct comparisons difficult.

To produce good data, data collection and processing must appear meaningful to those who do the job. As Enthoven emphasizes, mandatory reporting to national data bases will never be successful, if the local hospital or hospital department does not have incentives to use the information in the first place, or if it does not get any useful feedback from the national central agency. Within the context of the present Swedish health care system, however, I would guess that one must think more about positive incentives to do it right than about penalties for not doing it. The strong independence of tax-raising county councils makes them less sensitive to the nonpayment of central government subsidies, which Enthoven suggests in order to ensure accurate and timely reports.

There must be created a self-interest for hospitals and hospital departments to report information properly and promptly. A majority of physicians, other health care personnel, and administrators---or, because of their key role in Sweden, the relevant trade unions---should therefore be persuaded to accept that promotion possibilities and pay should be related to performance in terms of productivity, efficiency, and quality. To evaluate performance properly is not possible without a fairly large sample of hospitals with which to make comparisons. This would require uniform national reporting systems. Some system of independent auditing would also be needed.

The central government in Sweden seems to be aware of the need for better management information and for evaluative studies. In May 1988, a government committee was established to propose a uniform (national and county council) health care information system that meets the basic informational needs for different levels of planning, management, monitoring, and assessment. However, despite the fact that information will be collected and used only if it appears meaningful for the decisions to be made at the local level, the committee (which is still working) is not supposed to deal with the issues of proper incentives.

It is quite obvious from Enthoven\'s article that it is certainly not impossible to create systems for information, evaluation, and control that better utilize existing knowledge, experience, and initiatives. The internal systems of information, evaluation, and control, however, reflect conditions in the external environment---the way in which health care is financed and organized. Thus, internal reforms would be facilitated, or rather, made necessary, by changing the external conditions. If sensible changes in financing and organization could be introduced, and if the survival and success of providers were to depend on how well they met the requirements formulated by consumers, then there would also be a good chance that the internal management and control structure would adapt and develop accordingly.

Financing and organization options
----------------------------------

I strongly sympathize with Enthoven\'s view that "the really interesting questions today are about the merits of marketlike incremental changes intended to make our systems more efficient and responsive to consumers." So, what changes in finance and organization could be made? Could consumer choice and provider competition be introduced in Sweden to improve efficiency, while at the same time satisfying equity considerations to a degree not less than today? In principle, the answer is yes, and I do believe that there are important lessons to be learned from the American experience and from the ideas presented by Enthoven. Moreover, Swedish economists have shown how the concepts of prepaid group practices, health maintenance organizations, and managed competition might be used in the Swedish context ([@b75-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b80-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b81-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b88-hcfr-89-supp-049] and [@b89-hcfr-89-supp-049]; and [@b90-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Consumer choice and influence could certainly be increased within the framework of the present organization. Without shaking the system down to its foundations, patients might very well be allowed to freely choose a primary care center, physician, and hospital to a much greater extent than what, according to present studies, is currently the case. Patients could also be given more opportunity to feel that they can influence decisions and to speak up concerning conditions that they believe are not satisfactory. This would be particularly effective if they could be supported, as Enthoven suggests, by strong independent organizations---sponsors---with a consumer point of view ([@b78-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

The opportunity to choose is important per se to consumers and, hence, is a source of well-being. However, in order to result in more than marginal improvements in efficiency, consumer choices must have an influence on the revenues or budgets of the health care providers. This would then create competition among individual health care providers, who might look for ways of acquiring patients by delivering high-quality care at lower cost.

Competition can never work if the roles of the consumer and provider are not separated. This is definitely true in health care. In Sweden, however, the county councils are by law the main providers of health care, while at the same time, they have constitutional rights to tax their citizens. Thereby, the county councils finance their own production, while at the same time, elected county politicians are expected to represent the interests of their consumers or voters. Potential and actual conflicts between consumer and provider interests are innumerable, and there is a tendency for the provider interests to dominate. The county council is the sponsor, insurance organization, and provider---all in one.

Technically, it would be quite possible to create a system in which the three roles of the county councils would be separated. The most natural role for the county councils would be that of sponsor. As before, the county councils could have the right to tax their citizens, and insurance for all citizens could be mandatory. But rather than having only one provider, the county councils should offer their citizens a selection of different arrangements. No health care institution would remain under county council ownership. Hospitals and other health care institutions could instead be owned by insurance companies, consortia of private companies, not-for-profit trusts, or companies owned by the central government. These arrangements could be so designed that they stimulate cost-conscious consumer choices. Then consumers would be motivated to try to obtain the best buy for their money.

There may be several reasons why proposals on changes in the organization and financing of health care have not gone very far from mere academic discussion in Sweden. First, the existing system enjoys, despite all, a certain advantage in public opinion. There is always a resistance to change in the health care system. Not only politicians but also voters are highly risk-averse. Second, except for dental care, health care in Sweden is a public monopoly; over the years, more and more power has been concentrated in the county councils. Third, many people in Sweden are opposed to competition for strictly ideological reasons, especially competition in health care. Fourth, legislation today gives the county councils and their elected officials direct responsibility for providing health care; the county councils are supposed to not only finance health care but also run the hospitals. Existing legislation is thus an obstacle, and new laws would be needed. However, in overhauling the legislation, it would be important to also make an investigation into what, for instance, the. optimal sponsor would look like. There are several alternatives that seem natural to investigate. One would be to let the local communities be the sponsors. Another alternative would be to let health care finance be incorporated within the same central government system as social insurance.

There are certainly many lessons to be learned by Europeans from Americans about the financing and organization of health care. But I wonder whether the best lesson to be learned, especially for the Swedes, might be the willingness of Americans to experiment and to set up demonstration projects. The number of projects mentioned by Enthoven is impressive. I personally do not believe that it is possible to choose one optimal approach based solely on a priori reasoning and available empirical evidence. Thus, if we Swedes are not totally convinced that we have found the best organizational solution for supplying ourselves with the health services we want---and much indicates that we are no longer as convinced as we were---then we must allow ourselves to experiment in order to explore alternatives to the present organization. Because the present system is a rigid public system, market incentives seem natural candidates to be tried. The evidence from carefully evaluated experiments could be used to make more global decisions about how to provide health care most effectively.

Closing remarks
===============

I am sure that Europeans have much to learn from Americans, not least from what seems to be best practice in the health care business. There is no doubt about that. However, every society has its own social, cultural, economic, and political goals and traditions. The relevance of the American experience is then very dependent on from what country\'s perspective it is seen; how health care is presently financed and organized in that country; and the kind of political environment in which health care must work.

Swedish economists have shown a great interest in adapting and transforming the best American experience and ideas into suggestions as to how Swedish health care might change its financing and organization to improve consumer choice, introduce provider competition, and increase efficiency. The discussion of alternatives has not reached far beyond academia, and the economists\' arguments have mostly been met with political counterarguments based on worst American experience. The need for better information should, however, be self-evident in a country in which all official documents, including the Health Care Act, emphasize the need for planning in health care. Naturally, the Swedes could afford to spend some share of their huge health care bill to create one of the best health care information systems in the world. It is really not a question of resources, but a matter of political will.

For other countries in Europe, a minimum of necessary information may seem to be enough, taking into account the limited resources available for health care. To yet other countries, i.e., countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany, with long traditions of strong independent institutions, marketlike incremental changes should look more tempting. Come 1992, all member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) will probably be much more oriented toward consumer choice and provider competition in the financing and organization of health care.

1992 will be important for the Swedes, too, even if Sweden were to continue to stay outside the EEC. The member states may be able to provide the Swedes with good examples of how more competition could be introduced in health care, without completely destroying the foundations on which the welfare state has been built. A number of good examples close to home might more than balance the bad experiences of the United States in the political debate. Consumers-voters-taxpayers might then acquire the experience and information necessary to demand the changes that will be required.

The American predicament
========================

Enthoven takes on a formidable challenge. Rehearsing the stylized facts of the American health care system---an immodest system with much to be modest about---his summary is blunt. "... \[I\]t would be, quite frankly, ridiculous ... to suggest that we have achieved a satisfactory system that our European friends would be wise to emulate." Agreed. A more plausible proposition might be that most European countries have achieved a reasonably satisfactory system of health care funding and delivery, any one of which the United States would be wise to emulate. If only they could.

The long-standing American problems of cost escalation and grossly inequitable coverage are well known and widely deplored. But Enthoven emphasizes an additional point often obscured in the partisan rhetoric. Many Americans comfort themselves with the belief that, even if their system is by far the most costly and least equitable of any in the industrialized democracies, at least it provides "the world\'s best care" for those who can afford it. But if "best" is defined in terms of outcomes achieved, rather than as a simple linear function of cost, then the evidence suggests that even this is wishful thinking. "More" is not the same as "better." What America provides is not the world\'s best, but the world\'s most, and most highly priced. (Providers of health care, in the United States and out of it, assiduously promote the illusion that the quality of health care is a simple linear function of expenditure, with a significant (positive) slope coefficient. This relationship certainly holds for provider incomes, which are in total identically equal to health expenditures; the activity and outcome data are rather more refractory.)

This is an important lesson for all of us. For the past decade, most western European countries have limited the expansion of their health care systems to a roughly constant share of (growing) national incomes ([@b108-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Providers, habituated to the rapidly rising shares of earlier years, have grown increasingly restive over these "cutbacks," and their ambitions press ever more strongly upon the restraints imposed by payers. Everywhere they seek "just a bit more" (than everyone else), to do ever more good, and allege growing threats to the health of patients if their claims are denied. But only in America have providers succeeded in commanding an ever-growing share of national economic resources. Hence, the importance of Enthoven\'s point: Americans are not better served, or healthier, as a result.

But are they nevertheless more satisfied with their system? After a decade of growing divergence between the United States and Europe ([@b92-hcfr-89-supp-049]), a poll of individual Americans has found a substantial majority who say they would like to trade their system for someone else\'s---specifically that of Canada ([@b95-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This extraordinary finding suggests that a majority of the American public shares the assessment of external observers and of Enthoven.

Necessity---the mother of invention
===================================

Yet in spite, or more probably because, of its overall difficulties, the United States appears to be far and away the most fertile field of major institutional innovation in health care delivery and finance. Its experience presents, Enthoven suggests, many examples of the good as well as the bad and the ugly. He offers a selection of promising American innovations from which others might "... identify and design politically feasible incremental changes ... that have a reasonably good chance of making things better."

His category labels for these innovations---glasnost and perestroika---are both eyecatching and functional. Unexpected and foreign, they emphasize the system independence of the issues involved. But the categories themselves are very old and very familiar--- information and incentives. The behavior of individuals and organizations is determined by what they (think they) know about their environments and capabilities and how (they believe) their behavior will further their objectives. To modify a system, one must change the information held by and/or the incentives bearing on the actors in that system. At this level of generality, it makes no difference whether one is contemplating the economy of the U.S.S.R., the health care system of the United States, or a private corporation such as Exxon or Philips.

Glasnost: More information for whom?
====================================

But who are the critical actors for whom better information is to be provided? Proposals such as uniform discharge abstracts and cost accounting, or patient coding by diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), are improvements in MIS, management information systems. They presuppose a health care system with a well-defined management structure, whose managers are to be enabled and encouraged to achieve the best possible health outcomes for the resources that the rest of society hands over to them---or rather, through them to the providers of care. American employers, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and insurers, Canadian provincial governments, German Krankenkassen, and British District Health Authorities are all, in different ways, financially at risk for the behavior of their health care systems and need much better information than they now have to ensure that they are getting value for money. Enthoven suggests that the United States is farther ahead in developing appropriate information systems, and, on balance, we believe he is right.

On the other hand, publication of outcome information, and the development of risk-adjusted measures of outcomes (RAMOs), peer review organizations (PROs), and standard-setting processes that will generate the publishable information, presuppose a much more powerful role for the individual citizen, either as actual or potential patient, or as voter, employee, and tax or premium payer. In Enthoven\'s proposals for the United States, individual choice and system management are subtly interlocked ([@b96-hcfr-89-supp-049] and [@b97-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The choices (and political pressures) of better informed individuals create incentives to keep the system managers up to scratch, while the improved MIS not only provides the latter with the necessary tools but becomes the source of improved information for the former.

The glasnost strategies thus address two distinct audiences, through a combination of MIS and public information, though the two are powerfully linked and interdependent in a way that represents an important lesson for both the United States and Europe. Better management may require better management data, but from whence arises the demand for better management?

Who wants to know?
------------------

This interconnection requires emphasis, because comparative system performance suggests that MIS improvements---more, better, and especially more timely data---have heretofore been neither necessary nor sufficient for better results. They were not necessary, as indicated by Enthoven\'s argument that European systems are significantly better than that of the United States, despite a management information base that no private firm would or could tolerate for 20 minutes. And they have not been sufficient, because, in fact, many of the MIS-type innovations that Enthoven describes (uniform discharge abstracts and accounting systems, comprehensive population-based utilization data) have been in place, or within easy reach, in the Canadian provinces for roughly 20 years. As an MIS, the Canadian health care data bases have a number of inadequacies. But the key point is that, for roughly two decades, the provincial agencies that generate these administrative data have not judged it worthwhile to improve them. The constraints have not been technical ones. Yet critiques of the Canadian health care system have consistently emphasized that, despite its important advantages, it is seriously undermanaged and displays substantial room for improved performance (e.g., [@b106-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Better tools for management do not themselves lead to better management. In Canada, the payers for care (provincial governments) have not had the political legitimacy or will to engage in the more detailed, microlevel system management that such better data would make possible. The extraordinarily underdeveloped state of European data bases may reflect similar inhibitions felt by governments and social insurance agencies ([@b100-hcfr-89-supp-049]). After all, it is hard to believe that, over a time span of decades, Europeans have simply not noticed that their information base was somewhat scanty.

Who is in charge here?
----------------------

At present, in Europe, Canada, and, to a large extent, still in the United States, the providers of health care, particularly physicians, regard themselves as the only legitimate managers. If "there \[are\] well-established scientifically based standards for medical practice" that form part of professional training, then obviously only professionals are competent to interpret and apply those standards, to decide what shall be done, to whom, and by whom. Insurers and governments are there to pay the bill, not to direct the performance. What Enthoven (and we) would regard as more cost-effective management, most providers would---do---regard as wholly unwarranted and inappropriate lay interference with professional autonomy.

Not only do professionals believe this, it is even more important that most of the general public agree. The illusion of physician omniscience has been much eroded in recent years, but physicians still enjoy a great deal more public confidence than health researchers, insurance agencies, or bureaucrats.

Shifting the locus of control
-----------------------------

As Enthoven points out, students of health care utilization have long ago exploded the myth that patterns of care are based on coherent professional standards of any sort, much less on standards based on scientific evidence. Indeed, the sorts of data that are generated through his glasnost proposals have played an important role in undermining that myth.

Moreover, managerial control is implicitly shared between payers and providers, in countries with universal payment systems, because governments impose direct or indirect controls on the physical and financial resources available to the health care system that clearly affect patterns of medical practice. But payers have largely shied away from direct intervention (Evans, Lomas et al., 1989). Only in the United States have private payers, under extreme pressure and without access to the sorts of global controls applied in other countries, begun to intervene in the clinical decisions of the individual physician.

One can make a strong case, as sketched by Enthoven, for more detailed intervention. There are many opportunities for improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of health care delivery on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, it seems unquestionable that better data on which to base clinical and managerial decisions are essential to this process (e.g., [@b107-hcfr-89-supp-049]). But to become policy-relevant, this view must not merely be shared by the payers for and regulators of care. In addition, they must believe that there is a political consensus among the general public that will support, or at least not strongly oppose, such intervention.

Political costs and benefits
----------------------------

The opposition of providers, and particularly of their organizations, can be taken as automatic. More effective and efficient management will, must, mean diminution, on average, of professional autonomy and incomes. The key question is whether any responsible political authority will be prepared to confront that opposition, data in hand, and argue a case for better management before the general public. Up until now, the answer in both Canada and Europe has been "no." Nor can the academic, comfortably isolated from both the battle and the consequences of defeat, honestly blame them. After all, the first man over the barricade gets the spear through the chest.

In such a political environment, with popular health care systems functioning at a bearable cost, why should Europeans go to the trouble of acquiring information that might be very dangerous to use? The evidence for significant potential improvement in efficiency and effectiveness may be compelling, but neither patients nor voters know that. Physicians will vehemently deny it. Better data might be a political embarrassment! Better management of health care is not, at root, a scientific problem requiring more research and more data, but a political problem of mobilizing support for intervention against the opposition of powerful and genuinely threatened interests. (These interests include private insurers, drug and equipment manufacturers, and hospitals and clinics, as well as physicians.)

The suggestion that Europeans would find it easier to establish mechanisms to improve the quality and effectiveness of medical practice, because they already have unified, comprehensive health care systems, reflects a technical view of the issue. The real question is whether, in a unified system, the opponents of such oversight mechanisms can mobilize more or less effectively to resist or subvert them.

The Canadian provinces, for example, have all had physician practice monitoring programs for a number of years. But they compare each physician\'s profile against norms defined by the contemporaneous behavior of his or her peers. By definition, therefore, the average practice pattern is the right one, and other patterns over broad ranges on either side are acceptable; as Enthoven notes, outliers are very few. There is no exogenous standard in this process, only consensus. As one (American) physician said, "We protect each other by all agreeing to make the same mistakes."

Perestroika: Restructuring the incentive environment
====================================================

In all systems, many of those responsible for reimbursing and regulating providers of care have now come to the same conclusions, in general terms if not in specific details, as the research community. Health care utilization (and cost!) does not result from the application of "well-established scientifically based standards," and in aggregate appears fundamentally arbitrary. But effective policy based on this understanding depends on the development among the general public of a broader political constituency that recognizes the tenuousness of the connection (in both directions) between health states and medical interventions. In Marmor\'s terms, the "political market" is at present seriously imbalanced on this issue ([@b104-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

As long as a large section of the public provides a receptive audience for allegations that quality is a linear function of expenditure, or at least of activity, and that only professionals know what is to be done, then payers and would-be managers of health care will have to intervene in "Stealth and Total Obscurity" (the alternative British name for the Department of Health and Social Security), if at all. The public information aspects of glasnost thus form a bridge between MIS and perestroika. Changing public perceptions through more and better information may---perhaps---restructure the environment of political incentives that presently constrains both public and private management. The feasibility of improved system management depends less on improved data per se than on the creation of a more supportive political environment in which to take managerial action. (Better data are, of course, relevant to this process, in that detailed management based on obviously faulty information loses credibility rather rapidly, especially in an adversarial environment.)

The lesson for Europeans, and Canadians, appears to be an old one: "You must educate your masters." But this process of information transmission is little developed or understood. Enthoven is undoubtedly correct that the United States has more examples of attempts to communicate directly with the public on medical matters over the heads of the professionals. But it is not at all clear that this has resulted in, or is moving in the direction of, a more supportive environment for the management of clinical activity. Intrusions on physician autonomy are increasingly occurring, but through private institutions that have no counterparts outside the United States, and the motivation and balance of benefit are contentious.

But there is much more to Enthoven\'s perestroika than public information campaigns. Attempts to graft various forms of managed competition onto European systems and to decentralize the payment and control processes are attempts both to change the incentive structures in which decisions are made, and also, importantly, to raise up new organizational allies for the existing payers. If governments alone do not have the credibility to challenge providers on matters that can be interpreted as falling within the scope of medical practice, then national variants of the sponsors, which Enthoven has described in more detail elsewhere ([@b96-hcfr-89-supp-049] and 1989b), may be called into existence or molded out of preexisting institutions to serve as counterweights to the health care delivery system itself. The progressive evolution of the District Health Authorities in the United Kingdom, partly under the influence of Enthoven\'s ideas, toward being purchasers of services on behalf of their populations rather than monopoly suppliers, is a clear example (*Working for Patients*, 1989).

But is it working?
------------------

There is, however, a critical distinction between the American experience as it is and Enthoven\'s vision of what it might become. He recommends, in the United States and in Europe, the creation of institutions independent of the health care system, "to get more informed choice into the system"---prudent purchasers on the patient\'s behalf, yet without the political constraints that inhibit governments. But he would be the first to admit that this has not yet happened in the United States. Despite the rapid expansion of various forms of managed care, now covering more than one-half of the employed and privately insured population, and even in those regions where perestroika is most extensive and longest established, the anticipated benefits---equity, efficiency, and cost control---have yet to emerge ([@b101-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Enthoven\'s reference to the "big success" of the prospective payment system (PPS) based on DRGs is premature; its impact on costs between 1983 and 1985 now looks like a one-time effect that did not influence the overall trend.[^1^](#fn2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} He might argue, and very justly, that the full structural requirements of informed and cost-conscious choice have not yet been put in place--- his system has not really been tried. But the same might be said for Christianity---or communism.

The jury is still out on managed care in the United States. There is certainly a school of thought (e.g., [@b93-hcfr-89-supp-049]) that argues that most such programs have placed little risk on providers and that the real "deep capitation," provider-at-risk revolution is yet to come. But others are losing heart---most notably the Chrysler Corporation---and national health insurance is, in 1989, back near the top of the American political agenda, after over a decade in the wilderness. This fact is itself a commentary on both the effectiveness of present forms of managed care and the perceived political feasibility of Enthoven\'s much more sophisticated form. Europeans should take note.

Decentralization: Accountability to whom?
-----------------------------------------

Furthermore, there seems to be an essential ambiguity in the argument for decentralization. Do decentralized structures change the information and objectives of the general public---empowering the expression of more informed choice? Or do they merely weaken the expression of the views of the general public by eliminating centralized political accountability? Citizens of most European countries, which in this context includes Canada, are at root very satisfied with their health care systems, and have well-developed channels of accountability through which to express dissatisfaction in specific cases. Americans are unique in that they are not, and have not.

It may well be that Europeans should be less satisfied, and, in particular, much less confident in the professional institutions and decisions that determine their patterns of care. If they knew more, they would want less, and perhaps different things. But it is not clear, at least to this point, that decentralized reimbursement and control structures have been developed, anywhere, that empower more informed "market" choices rather than simply disempowering (however badly informed) political ones.

There is certainly room for improvement in all the European systems, and particularly in their balances of provider and patient convenience, as Enthoven points out. But---and this is the crux of the debate over the recent British White Paper (*Working for Patients*, 1989)---if provider incentives are changed, to which patients do they become more sensitive? Those with the greatest needs? Or those whom it is most profitable or professionally satisfying to serve (cream-skimming, or moving up-market...)? No one should underestimate the power of incentives. But it is easy to overestimate our ability to control or even predict their direction of effect, particularly if we rely on economic models of human behavior that are grossly oversimplified both in their postulates of objectives, and in their specification of the range of possible behaviors.

None of this is news to Enthoven; nor are we so naive as to imagine that existing systems of political accountability yield (nearly) ideal results. But it does suggest a good deal of caution in introducing restructuring proposals that may have unpredictable and far-reaching effects, into systems that appear to be basically satisfactory. Careful monitoring, piloting, and some clear idea of how one can withdraw if things work out badly would seem at least prudent.

Copayments: How not to decentralize
-----------------------------------

The varying national approaches to user charges provide a good example of the risks of decentralization. European and Canadian experience demonstrates that centralized financial controls over fees, budgets, and new capital outlays ("sole source funding") are relatively successful and politically acceptable, if not always popular. Decentralization of funding, in the form of substantial charges to individual patients or widespread private insurance, destroys this control. Providers of care in all countries, recognizing this relationship very clearly, press for increased private funding and particularly greater charges to patients, explicitly in order to increase the flow of funds into health care.

The results of this form of decentralization---which is not at all what Enthoven is advocating---are displayed in the American experience. The poor, the elderly, and the sick spend a much larger share of their incomes on health care than does the general population. There is no evidence that Americans generally approve this distribution of burden, which most other societies would find, have found, unacceptable, any more than they favor the steady escalation of health care costs. Both emerge, not from anyone\'s conscious choice, but from a whole series of decisions by employers, insurers, providers, and patients. No one can control, or be held accountable for, the overall outcome.

Amazingly, many Americans continue to believe that at least user charges hold down overall health care costs, a view strengthened by the RAND study to which Enthoven refers. Yet this is clearly inconsistent with the observations that only in the United States, where such charges are most prevalent and most significant, are costs out of control, and that the loudest advocates of such charges in other countries are the providers of care, whose incomes would suffer if charges really did moderate the growth of health care costs.[^2^](#fn3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} Moreover, international comparisons suggest that the more rapid escalation of costs in the United States is traceable to more rapid price inflation ([@b105-hcfr-89-supp-049]), consistent with the interpretation that user charges serve not to constrain utilization, but to undermine collective price controls.[^3^](#fn4-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"}

The RAND findings, that direct charges reduce care-seeking by patients, cannot be generalized to systemwide levels of utilization. That experiment, by design, excluded the effects of provider responses to changes in patient-initiated behavior, and consequent changes in provider workloads and incomes. Yet those responses, the information and advice given to patients, are the critical determinants of overall utilization. Attempts to interpret the RAND results as support for greater allocations of burden through user charges represent an elementary fallacy of composition and teach a strong negative lesson in both research and policy. (This negative lesson is reinforced by more recent reports from the RAND study ([@b103-hcfr-89-supp-049]), which are much less sanguine about the impact of user charges on access to "needed" care and the distribution of their burden across the population, than those cited by Enthoven.)

The paradox: Why restructure success?
-------------------------------------

So we have something of a paradox. The serious weaknesses of the American system are rooted in its decentralized structure; the advantages of European systems are rooted in their centralized funding control. Enthoven\'s perestroika suggestions imply greater decentralization. Might not a European (or a Canadian) reply: "If it ain\'t broke, don\'t fix it."? To what question is Enthoven providing answers?

Only diamonds are forever
-------------------------

Several, we think. Although Europeans are, in the main, satisfied with their systems, these are far from perfect and very expensive. Enthoven\'s MIS comments are well taken, and in a world of scarce resources should not lightly be dismissed. Further, his emphasis on "user friendliness" is also important. The convenience and comfort of the patient, although perhaps secondary to results achieved, are not trivial considerations. They can easily be neglected in the tug-of-war between payers and payees. Providers in all systems will respond that better service requires more resources; as a long-time student of management, Enthoven points out that the real answer is different incentives.

Perhaps most important, the political resistance to top-down global financial and capacity controls does appear to be growing. Such controls may, over time, become less effective and/or more expensive to maintain---the status quo may not be an option for the long term.[^4^](#fn5-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} A failure to develop the political and informational base for improved management could conceivably result in a slow drift towards "privatization" on the uncontrolled, inequitable, and expensive American model. There is no reason to believe that Europeans (much less Canadians) are immune to "the American disease."

Decentralized incentives within central controls
------------------------------------------------

The trick is, exactly as Enthoven says, to find "politically feasible incremental changes" with "a reasonably good chance of making things better." These probably will take the form of increased decentralization of decisionmaking, but within a continuation of the quite-tight centralized constraints that apply in one form or another in the successful European systems. These critical constraints will continue to include:

-   Global controls on health spending (not just public sector spending.)

-   Separation of individual contributions from either illness experience or health status.

-   Protection of the de facto universality of the European financing and delivery systems (some countries have separate arrangements for the wealthy, but not for the poor) against fragmentation.

Decentralization of funding, American-style, has strongly promoted competitive cost shifting, and concomitant escalation, and made overall control virtually impossible. (Do not worry about the size of the bill, you cannot do anything about it anyway. Just get someone else to pay.) At the same time, it has encouraged the distribution of the burden of health care costs according to both actual and expected illness experience---user charges and risk-related premiums---rather than according to ability to pay. Those with the greatest needs carry the greatest financial burdens or do without.

But this does not have to be the case---or at least so Enthoven believes (and we agree). Nor does he advocate a continuation of this pattern of financing in the United States, much less its extension to Europe; as noted above, he is one of the most clear-eyed critics of the present American situation. More sophisticated organizational design can make it possible to reconcile decentralized and better informed management of the specifics of care with centralized defense of the essential principles.[^5^](#fn6-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} Such changes will not be easy; they are both inherently technically difficult and will be strongly opposed or subverted. Among their opponents will be those who advocate decentralization precisely to break out of spending controls, and/or to redistribute the burden of costs back from the more to the less healthy and wealthy. But the process will certainly be interesting, and the stakes are high enough to justify the effort.

It may also be relevant that a substantial decline occurred in acute care hospital use in Canada in the 1980s, without any change in the payment system---but under substantial administrative pressure ([@b98-hcfr-89-supp-049]). There may be several ways to skin a cat.

International opinions differ. In France, it seems widely believed that the "ticket moderateur" paid by patients helps to hold down costs. In the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada, patients are not charged for hospital or medical care. Health expenditure levels and trends are roughly similar in all three countries.

Lest one fear the starvation of the health care sector, it is important to recall that the American experience is one of health care price increases that are much more rapid than general inflation rates ([@b102-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Centralized controls in other countries manage to keep health care inflation more closely aligned to general inflation (e.g., [@b94-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

On the other hand, one must beware of being stampeded by Chicken Little cries that "the sky is falling"---the health care system in Country *X* is on the verge of collapse. Such claims are part of the everyday litany of providers negotiating for more resources in politically controlled systems---"orchestrated outrage" (Evans, Lomas et al., 1989).

The British White Paper, *Working for Patients* (1989) appears to represent such an effort, whatever one thinks of its chances for success.

Introduction
============

The United States, with its great plurality of organizational, ownership, and financing forms in health care, has been described as a laboratory for experimentation in health service organization and financing. The variety of institutions and financing mechanisms is enormous, and it has, over time, produced many interesting experiments that have been of great interest to European countries looking for models to reform their health care systems. During the last decade, concepts such as HMOs (health maintenance organizations), DRGs (diagnosis-related groups), and MTA (medical technology assessment) have become part of the standard vocabulary in most European countries.

It is therefore a somewhat strange situation, for an economist who has devoted a significant amount of time and effort to looking for opportunities to learn from the U.S. health care scene, to reverse his perspective and look for lessons that Americans can learn from European systems. Because there is so much variety in U.S. health care, it is also difficult to find new ideas and approaches that have not already been tried somewhere at some time in the United States. There is also the risk of being irrelevant. Means cannot be judged without reference to the goals. It is obvious that the moral bases or values on which health care systems are based differ between the United States and European countries. In the United States, personal responsibility, freedom of choice, and pluralism are the major moral commitments. In European countries, goals related to population health and equality of access to health services have been relatively more important. Centralized health planning and a large governmental role in health care financing have therefore been more generally accepted in Europe.

As has been pointed out by others (e.g., [@b116-hcfr-89-supp-049]), it is unhelpful to seek to learn from a system that is seeking to accomplish different aims. However, this should not be overstated: After all, a means may serve more than one end or may be adopted more appropriately to serve another end. Therefore, even though the ideological bases may vary between countries, it does not follow that neither has anything to learn from the other. So without appearing presumptuous, I hope to identify some areas or issues in which I think the experience of European countries can be of value in the development of U.S. health policy. I concentrate on issues that I can substantiate with data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data base on international differences in health care ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Common aspects of European systems
==================================

Europe, as well as the United States, shows a great variety in health care systems and consequently also in health care policies. In addition to learning from its own diversity, the United States can learn from the specifics of different European systems at different points in time. There are also many studies in which U.S. researchers have looked at particular types of policies, such as physician reimbursement and cost containment ([@b140-hcfr-89-supp-049]) or have focused on individual countries. For Sweden alone, it is easy to find more than a dozen publications in which U.S. researchers have looked at various aspects of the Swedish health care system and made comparisons with the United States (e.g., [@b132-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b111-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b135-hcfr-89-supp-049]; and [@b141-hcfr-89-supp-049] and [@b142-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

In this article, I concentrate on a number of aspects that are common to most, if not all, European health care systems. There are many from which to choose. The most obvious to start with is the financing and delivery of health care to the elderly. The populations of Europe are significantly older than that of the United States; therefore, Europe can give interesting evidence of what is to come in the United States. As shown in [Table 1](#t1-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, the proportion of the population 65 years of age or over is 13.8 percent in Europe, compared with 12.2 percent in the United States. In some countries, such as Sweden, it is more than 17 percent.

An increasing share of health care resources spent on the elderly dramatically alters the conditions for health care financing and delivery. The insurance function becomes more of an intertemporal allocation problem, similar to the pension system, than a traditional health insurance. In the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter called Germany), the public pension funds transfer money to the sickness funds to subsidize health care expenses for retired members. In 1975, these transfers accounted for 27 percent of total revenues for sick funds ([@b127-hcfr-89-supp-049].) An increasing amount of total health expenditures is spent on the last years of life, and almost everyone reaches the average life expectancy ([@b131-hcfr-89-supp-049]).[^1^](#fn7-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} For the provision of health care, this means that nursing home care becomes relatively more important, as does the integration of social and medical services. In order to study health care for the elderly in different countries, age-specific cost and utilization data are needed. These data are not yet available, so this topic will have to wait for further refinements of the international comparative health statistics.

Another aspect of great interest is the quality of care. Systems of quality control are different in Europe from those in the United States. The use of litigation to deal with medical malpractice is considerably more common in the United States than in Europe. This affects health care costs directly, through insurance premiums paid by doctors, and indirectly, through its effect on physician behavior---the practice of defensive medicine. It would be of great interest to know more about the consequences for quality of care of the different ways of practicing medicine. In addition, it would be helpful to look at measures of quality assurance in the United States and Europe. However, international comparative statistics provide only scant information for such exercises.

Instead, I concentrate on three general aspects of European systems for which there are existing international statistics: the comprehensiveness of these systems; the role of regionalization in achieving cost control, efficiency, and equity; and the management of new expensive medical technologies.

A comprehensive health care system
==================================

The most striking difference between European systems, taken as a whole, and that in the United States is the comprehensiveness of the European systems. In most European countries, everyone is eligible for coverage of medical expenses through a public plan---usually public both in the sense of finance and in the sense of provision. This is the case for hospital care, ambulatory care, and medical goods, though the element of copayment is usually higher for the latter two categories. Even in countries with a significant amount of private insurance, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, the share of the population eligible for coverage through public plans is close to 100 percent for hospital care ([Table 2](#t2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). Those not covered are mainly the more affluent members of the population, who may choose not to participate in the public plans.

In Switzerland, three partners share the expenditures for the health care system. In 1984, public funds accounted for 6.2 billion Swiss francs, sickness funds and social insurances for 5.1 billion francs, and privately insured and uninsured persons for 5.2 billion francs ([@b125-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In the Netherlands, about 70 percent of the population is insured with the sickness funds, which operate the social insurance system of the Sickness Funds Insurance Act. Individuals with an income of more than a certain amount (approximately 43,000 Dutch guilders in 1982) have to acquire private health insurance, but employees with an annual income under that level are mandatorily insured by sickness fund insurance. Private financing accounted for about 25 percent of total health expenditures in 1980. Insurance for greater risks, i.e., exceptional expenses, is governed by the General Special Sickness Expenses Act. This is a national insurance plan applying in principal to all residents of the Netherlands ([@b143-hcfr-89-supp-049]). At present, the health care system in the Netherlands is in a period of transition. In October of 1988, the Dutch parliament approved the implementation of the first steps in the new direction. Two major issues are the introduction of national health insurance ("basic insurance") and regulated competition among insurers and among providers. For a review of the recent developments, see [@b147-hcfr-89-supp-049].

In the United States, the coverage rate of public plans is estimated to be only 40 percent of the population for hospital care and 25 percent for ambulatory care. Even if a higher degree of private insurance, subsidized through tax exemptions for employers or individuals, partly compensates for this, a significant part of the population lacks coverage or is inadequately covered for health care. It has been estimated ([@b117-hcfr-89-supp-049]) that as many as 37 million people, 15 percent of the population, lack adequate insurance coverage; many lack coverage of any kind and are dependent on private charity. However, other sources show that 14.5 percent of the poor, 15.6 percent of the near-poor, 11.9 percent of other-low-income people, and 4.5 percent of all others lack insurance coverage ([@b129-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This is a total of 17 million people, or 7 percent of the population, who are uninsured.

The coverage rate is only one aspect of the comprehensiveness of a system. We also have to look at what benefits are provided. In [Table 3](#t3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, the average or typical percent of a bill paid by public insurance is shown for several European countries and the United States. It can also be seen that the copayment rate is lower in European countries than in the United States.

The advantages as well as the problems associated with a system that provides insurance coverage for everyone probably provide the most significant lessons for the United States.

Differences in total health expenditures
========================================

A higher coverage rate and a greater share of public financing in Europe may be thought to imply significantly higher total expenditures. However, this is not the case. On the contrary, the health expenditures share of the gross domestic product (GDP) is significantly higher for the United States than it is for any European country ([Table 4](#t4-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). (Gross domestic product is the gross market value of the goods and services attributable to labor and property located in a given nation.)

In 1986, total health expenditures, as a percent of GDP, were 10.9 percent in the United States, compared with a European average of 7.2 percent. Sweden, the European country with the highest share, had 9.1 percent. Also in absolute terms, using exchange rates or purchasing power parities (PPPs) for conversion of national currencies, the expenditures in the United States are significantly higher than in any European country.

Does this mean that the level of expenditures in the United States is totally inconsistent with the experiences of the European countries? To answer this question, we must look more closely at the determinants of health care expenditures. The major determinant of such differences is GDP per capita. (See [@b124-hcfr-89-supp-049], for a review and some new estimates.) Taking into account that GDP per capita is higher in the United States than in Europe, are the expenditures still higher than would be expected?

In [Table 5](#t5-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, the actual and predicted 1986 health expenditures for 18 European countries and the United States are shown. A logarithmic function has been used ([@b124-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The regression equation is:
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The constant elasticity is 1.36, which means that a 1-percent increase in GDP will give a 1.36-percent increase in total health expenditures. Both the elasticity and the constant are strongly significant. As can be seen in [Table 5](#t5-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, the actual health expenditures for the United States are 28 percent higher than predicted. This is close to the upper bound of a 95-percent confidence interval. (The comparability of health care expenditures data among countries is, despite significant improvements, still not exact. The lower-than-predicted levels of expenditures for Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway can be explained partly by underreporting of certain types of expenditures, mainly nursing home care.)

The expenditure levels of 18 European countries were used as a basis to predict health expenditures for the United States ([Table 6](#t6-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). The result is very similar for the logarithmic specification of the regression function, although the elasticity is slightly reduced. For the linear specification, the prediction is lower and the level of actual expenditures is significantly outside the 95-percent confidence interval.

We can conclude that the higher share of public financing in European countries does not result in higher expenditures than in the United States. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary.[^2^](#fn8-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"} Details on the cost-containment policies used in Europe are covered in the article by Culyer in this issue; therefore, they are not discussed here. Instead, let us look at other aspects of health policy that relate to the comprehensive nature of European systems. However, it is necessary to relate these aspects to expenditure restraint, because this is the major mechanism by which resources are allocated in European systems.

Preventive versus curative services
===================================

The most important question for any health care system is how well it is achieving the basic health objectives of the population. The difficulties in comparing the objectives of health care systems are well known. Health is difficult to measure and is determined to a major extent by factors outside the control of the health care system. However, one area in which health care can make a directly measurable difference is in the reduction of infant mortality, although it is difficult to document exactly the relative contribution of various factors.

The [@b149-hcfr-89-supp-049] states that the infant mortality rate "is a useful indicator of the health status not only of infants but also of whole populations and of the socioeconomic conditions under which they live. In addition, the infant mortality rate is a sensitive indicator of the availability, utilization, and effectiveness of health care, particularly perinatal care." [@b148-hcfr-89-supp-049], examining trends in infant mortality, perinatal mortality, and gross national product in four Scandinavian countries, suggest that perinatal mortality (late fetal and neonatal deaths per 100 live and still births) is preferable to infant mortality (death rates of infants under 1 year of age per 100 live births) as an indicator of the quality of heath care. However, examining the relationship between infant mortality and perinatal mortality in 1986 and changes from 1960 through 1986 in European countries and the United States gives no support for this hypothesis.

The differences between countries and over time are very similar with both measures ([Table 7](#t7-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). As can be seen in [Table 7](#t7-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, several European countries have an infant mortality rate that is 30-40 percent lower than that of the United States. Smaller countries can be expected to have lower rates because of greater cultural homogeneity, but it may be observed that the rates are also lower for the big European countries. Taking into account the high GDP per capita and the high rate of health expenditures, one would expect the United States to have significantly lower infant and perinatal mortality rates than the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. To the extent that the differences between Europe and the United States can be attributed to medical action, the lower mortality rates must have been achieved mainly by preventive measures. The resources for neonatal intensive care and the frequency of cesarian delivery are higher in the United States, but this obviously does not result in a lower infant mortality rate.

My hypothesis is that it is easier to allocate resources to programs like prenatal care and vaccination for children in a more comprehensive system. Considering the relative efficiency of health care services, it is difficult to allocate resources to interventions with dubious value, when even basic services with proven or obvious cost effectiveness are not being provided. The underprovision of such inexpensive but cost-effective services is a serious inefficiency in a health care system.

The commitment to primary health care and prevention in many European countries must be considered in the shaping of the future U.S. health care system. But this policy has not been without its problems, and, in many instances, it has been only a verbal commitment. In other instances, it has resulted in overoptimistic expectations about its ability to solve health problems or even to control escalating health care costs. But there is much to be learned from the mistakes as well as the successes. Focusing on health problems from a population perspective, rather than an individual perspective, gives new insights into the relative efficiency of different interventions. It also indicates that more health services are not always a solution to social problems; rather the solutions to social problems can have a significant impact on health. A comprehensive system enforces this broader perspective.

Regionalization, global budgets, and planning
=============================================

One important common aspect of European health care systems is regionalization. Typically, regions, rather than the country as a whole, are the basis for the allocation of health resources. However, regionalization is achieved in different ways in each country. In Sweden, for example, the regions (counties) have total responsibility for both the health of the population and the provision of health care. The average population of a region is 350,000 inhabitants, and the decisions about health services provision are made by elected representatives (community councils) in the region. The financing of services comes from a local proportional income tax.

Similar systems can be found in the other Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Finland. However, in Finland, the local communities are the basic regional unit, and in Norway, the regions (fylke) are responsible for hospital care and the local communities for primary care. In Denmark, the responsibility for hospital services, general practitioners, and practicing specialists is decentralized to 16 regions (counties or "amt"). the typical population being 250,000-300,000 inhabitants. Local health and social services, including home care, are run by communities of varying size. The Copenhagen and Frederiksberg communities, in the Copenhagen metropolitan area, have community as well as county obligations.

In contrast, in the United Kingdom, regional authorities are not elected, nor do they have tax powers, nor do the districts beneath them, which are responsible for the provision of hospital care to the locality. Instead, their finances are directly controlled by cash-limited budgets allocated from the center. Since 1977, the allocation of resources among regions has been based on the Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP) formula, with the objective of securing geographical equity in the availability of resources ([@b118-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Different indicators of need determine the per capita-based funding for the regions. RAWP has been controversial, and there is an extensive literature of criticism and comment ([@b134-hcfr-89-supp-049]). But after 10 years, the gap has narrowed substantially between the regions receiving the most and the least funds.

Regionalization is also strong in insurance-based systems such as those in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. In the last country, health care is by law a responsibility for the regions (cantons), some of them very small. Although the majority of financing comes from private and public insurance (Krankenkassen), it is the canton that has the overall responsibility for the provision of health care resources. The cantons also have to underwrite the deficit in public hospitals operated by them. This gives them a strong influence over the allocation of resources.

In the Netherlands, hospitals, whether owned by local communities or lay boards of trustees, operate on a fixed predetermined budget since 1984. The budget is negotiated with the third-party payers. The central government has a strong influence on construction of facilities and acquisition of major medical equipment through licenses, which are issued on the basis of regional and national health sector planning.

The strict planning systems for hospital care in Switzerland and the Netherlands, the two European systems most similar to those of the United States, are the major reason why expenditures are constrained in these countries, and the share of GDP that goes to health care is kept below that of the United States. In practice, these countries have global budgets for the most expensive part of health care, hospital services.

In Germany, the hospitals are financed through prospective, hospital-specific, all-inclusive per diems negotiated between the hospital and regional associations of sickness funds. These rates are subject to approval by the State governments, which also must approve and finance capital investments, based on statewide hospital planning. The State governments therefore control the capacity of the hospital system.

In [Figure 1](#f1-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}, a first attempt to develop a way to classify regionalized health care systems is shown. The first question to be asked is whether regionalization is based on a federal structure of the country as in Canada, Switzerland, and Germany. This aspect is of particular relevance for the United States, being a federal country. In federal countries, the constitution usually states the division of responsibilities in health care between the federation and the individual States. The constitution determines the possibilities and limitations for regionalization. In Switzerland, the constitution clearly states that the cantons forming the federation are responsible for health care within their borders.

The second aspect of regionalization concerns the size of the population in the region, because this determines how regionalization works in practice. Very large regions must be divided into smaller regions in order to find a suitable size to manage health care institutions. An example of this is the Regional Health Authorities in the United Kingdom, which are divided into districts that provide health services. Very small regions (such as some cantons in Switzerland) must rely heavily on cooperation with other regions for provision of specialized services.

If the region is governed by elected representatives, there is a political process behind the allocation of resources. This is, of course, the case in the federal countries, but also in the Scandinavian countries. However, in the United Kingdom, the members of the RHAs and District Health Authorities (DHAs) are appointed by the government. A system with elected representatives is usually combined with the right to levy regional taxes. But elected representatives and the power to tax do not always go together. In Norway, the regions (fylke) receive 50 percent of their budgets from the central government; once they reach the cap on their own tax power, they cannot spend more than the amount set by the government. In Sweden and Denmark, the regions (landsting and amt, respectively), can finance health care through a proportional income tax.

A region can be both a purchaser and a provider of care. Usually the two functions go together. However, in Germany, the states finance capital costs, but do not themselves provide any services. In Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland, the regions are also the main providers of hospital services, but there is also a "market" for services, mainly tertiary care, between regions. In the United Kingdom, there is discussion about separating the regions\' roles of purchaser and provider. Similar discussion is found in Denmark and Sweden.

In most regionalized systems, the region operates a global budget for health services. Although this is not the case in, for example, Germany, there have been attempts to form a voluntary agreement, negotiated between the different interest groups, to contain costs through a global budget. For a description of the German Health Care Cost Containment Act of 1977, see [@b145-hcfr-89-supp-049]. In Sweden, the global budget includes all health expenditures except drugs and dental care, but in other countries, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, it includes only hospital expenditures.

For many regions, health care is their main responsibility. In other instances, they have a wider responsibility for public services and transfer payments. This obviously has implications for the tradeoff between health care and other public expenditures. The percentage of the total budget that comes from central funds can also have significant implications for the relationship between central and regional governments and for total spending on health care, as well as for the allocation of resources to different services. Even in countries in which regions have the power to tax, the central government exercises influence through different types of government grants. In Sweden, the tax equalization plan and transfers from the social insurance system to the counties are of great financial importance for the regional budget.

Another significant aspect of regionalization is the distribution of regulatory power between the central government and the regions. This is done very differently in different countries. Usually the central government regulates fees and capital investments. However, regions can also have important regulatory power. In Sweden, the county councils regulate how many private practitioners are allowed to practice under the health insurance plan and how many patient visits they can have during a year. In Germany, there are regional negotiations of reimbursement rates.

Regionalization is one way of controlling total health care expenditures as well as guaranteeing everyone access to basic and effective health services. Public choice theory tells us that, the larger the population served by a given budget, the more difficult it is to manage that budget. Rent-seeking from different interest groups becomes impossible to handle when the budget serves a country as large as the United States. It is impossible to make rational decisions about allocation of resources based on knowledge of local health needs.

In Europe, it is only the United Kingdom that has for a long time operated a global budget for the whole country. But there the total budget is allocated to the Regional Health Authorities, according to a weighted population formula, and it is the RHAs that determine the allocations within these geographical areas. This global cost containment has obviously been successful, if we look at total health care expenditures and value for money. However, we must not forget that a major reason behind the lower share of GDP allocated to health care in the United Kingdom, compared with the United States, is the significantly lower GDP per capita.

The major advantage of regionalization is that it provides a forum for discussion about priorities in health care and value for money for different services. It also gives an opportunity to identify the total resources for health care spent on a population and to assess the appropriateness of these expenditures in relation to population needs. Because the need (defined as services with a positive marginal product on health) is for all practical purposes unlimited, a tradeoff between health care and other goods and services has to be made. Regionalization is a way to make this tradeoff more transparent and responsive to local needs. The region also forms the basic unit for planning of facilities and mobilization of resources. It is also an important mechanism for ensuring geographical equity in the availability of services.

Regionalization, freedom of choice, and competition
===================================================

I have introduced concepts such as regions, priorities, value for money, planning, and global budgets in relation to population needs. Does this not amount to socialized medicine? Without very precisely defining what "socialized medicine" is, I will argue that this is not the case. My main argument is that regionalization can take many different forms and is consistent with different degrees of freedom of choice and competition among providers. The wide variety of European health care systems, all more or less based on the concept of regionalization, shows that regionalization can be combined with different financing systems, different reimbursement systems, different mixes of private and public providers, and different regulatory mechanisms.

A comparison between Sweden and Switzerland can illustrate the different forms that regionalization can take. In Switzerland, ambulatory health care is provided by private practitioners working on a fee-for-service basis. The costs are reimbursed by private or public insurers. The copayment is very small and almost everyone is covered. Physicians can locate where they wish, but there is an incentive plan to stimulate location in remote (mountain) areas. The majority of the hospitals are owned and operated by the cantons. There are also private and community-owned hospitals. The hospitals are reimbursed from the insurance plans on a per diem basis. The public hospitals, which constitute the majority, run deficits that are covered by regional taxes. This provides the raison d\'être for a strict planning and budgeting system for hospital services. Doctors in hospitals are salaried but can take private patients both as inpatients and outpatients, and share the revenue for these patients with the hospital-. Patients can choose their doctors as well as the hospitals where they are treated.

In Sweden, the county councils are responsible for all health care for a defined population---a county or region. Ambulatory care is delivered in public health centers as well as in outpatient clinics at the hospitals. The number of private practitioners is small, and their activities are highly regulated, both in terms of the number of patients they can treat and the reimbursement their patients can receive from health insurance. There is a small market for private care outside the public reimbursement system. The choices are limited for the patients, who are assigned a specific health center and a hospital and seldom have any influence over which doctor treats them.

The Swiss experience tells us that an insurance-based system with both private and public insurance and total coverage of the population can be combined with a strict planning system for hospital care at the regional level. The strict planning system is a prerequisite for controlling the health care budget funded by the canton. In terms of cost containment, it has been very successful. In dollars (PPP), Sweden and Switzerland spend almost exactly the same amount on health care ([Table 3](#t3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}), which is far less than the United States spends, both in absolute terms and in relation to GDP.

The Swedish experience shows that a regional monopoly can be successful in creating access for everyone to health services and in containing costs. The quality of care is also judged to be high. However, there are problems with that type of organization that should not be overlooked and from which we can learn. First, among the people, there is dissatisfaction with not being able to make any choices in health care. But this lack of choice is not inherent in either regionalization or regulation. It can be changed in different ways within the system. [@b144-hcfr-89-supp-049] have suggested that opportunities for consumers to choose which health care center to use, which doctor to see, and which hospital to use should be increased. This will, however, have very little impact on efficiency unless the choices have financial consequences for the providers. We still do not know if the budget system can be made flexible enough to accommodate such choices. However, the experiences in the United Kingdom show that strict regulation can be combined with freedom for patients to choose a doctor and hospital. In the United Kingdom, the patient is free to select any general practitioner (GP) and the GP is likewise free to accept the patient or not. GPs are also free to refer patients to consultants of their choice, including those in hospitals outside the region. The GP\'s income comes partly from capitation and partly from fee for service. In contrast to Sweden, the global regional budget does not include ambulatory care; therefore, the Swedish system can be seen as financially more tightly controlled than the system of the United Kingdom.

Second, there is a problem with incentives for providers working on a fixed budget without competition. One way to improve productivity and efficiency among providers is to separate financing from provision of services in order to create competition. In Sweden, it has been suggested that the purchase of health care should be transferred from the county councils to the local communities ([@b128-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The county councils should continue to be primarily providers of hospital services to the local communities. The ideas behind such a division of health care services relate closely to the discussion and research on HMOs and managed competition in the United States during this decade ([@b121-hcfr-89-supp-049]). In this issue, Culyer\'s article presents similar ideas for improving internal efficiency in the National Health Service (NHS). The advantage of separating financing from delivery is mainly that public providers must compete with each other and with private providers. One can, of course, question whether local communities can efficiently carry out the two roles as sponsors ([@b122-hcfr-89-supp-049]) and financers of health care, but it is a first step in creating managed competition in a regionalized system such as those in the United Kingdom and Sweden.

Today, in both Sweden and Switzerland, there is a well-functioning market for specialized (tertiary) care, in which one region buys services from providers in other regions. This gives smaller regions access to high-quality specialized care. For some services, they are buyers, and for others, they are sellers. This division of tasks is created with planning and competition, the latter increasing in importance over time. To an increasing extent, the payments are based on (prospective) prices that have been negotiated using a DRG-type framework. There is no reason why this market could not also be extended to referrals, not only between hospitals, but also between primary care centers and hospitals. Discussion about competition as a way to improve health services has taken place primarily in the United States. However, the reforms being implemented in Europe will provide not only interesting information about the problems of and opportunities for managed competition, but also examples for decentralized experiments in the United States.

Introduction of new medical technology
======================================

One important aspect of a health care system is its ability to control the introduction and diffusion of new, and often expensive, medical technologies. The European countries provide good examples of how new medical technology is managed in a comprehensive health care system based on regionalization. Because systems differ, the pattern of introduction and diffusion differs among technologies and countries, providing an interesting variety for study and analysis. Because information about new medical technology is more or less simultaneously available in all industrialized countries, the same opportunities for adoption and diffusion exist in all countries. Differences in rates of adoption and levels of diffusion can be explained primarily by characteristics of the national health care systems, including availability of resources and cultural patterns. The European countries therefore provide a laboratory in which the United States can observe the management of new medical technology.

The introduction of dialysis and transplantation for treatment of end stage renal disease (ESRD) in the 1960s can serve as an example of how the introduction and diffusion of a new technology is managed in European countries compared with the United States. In 1970, the number of treated patients per 1 million of population was about 25 in the United States, which was only one-half the number treated in Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, and about the same as in the United Kingdom. Two years later, when the Social Security Act was amended to authorize funding for the treatment of ESRD under Medicare, the rate of treatment was also significantly higher in countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands than in the United States.

When treatment of ESRD became available, it was obvious that many Americans could not afford it and people were dying, for lack of adequate insurance coverage. There was no way that the new technology could be accommodated within the existing system. A separate reimbursement program had to be enacted to provide equity of access to these costly new technologies. When reimbursement became available, the number of persons treated increased rapidly. By 1975, the treatment rates in the United States were higher than in all but two European countries, and, in 1980, the treatment rate in the United States was the highest in the world ([Table 8](#t8-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). In the 1980s, the treatment rate has continued to increase and is now far higher than in most European countries, although Belgium and Switzerland seem to be catching up.

The European countries experienced the same emotional debate about equity, access, and costs, but the situation was different in that the new technology could be accommodated within the existing systems of resource allocation. However, tradeoffs had to be made between this new technology and treatment for other conditions. The need to establish priorities had a significant impact on the choice of technology for treatment of ESRD. Thus, in the United Kingdom, a high proportion of patients was treated with home dialysis. Before the establishment of the Medicare ESRD program, 40 percent of treatment in the United States was home based. Because home dialysis support services furnished by nonphysicians were not covered in the original legislation, physicians had no incentive to steer patients toward this treatment. Therefore, the proportion of patients treated by home dialysis in the United States declined to 12 percent by 1978 (Drucker, Parsons, and Maher, 1986). Also the age distribution of patients shifted, so that the proportion of patients 55 years of age or over increased from 7 percent in 1967 to 45 percent in 1978 (Drucker, Parsons, and Maher, 1986). In 1981-82, the rate of treatment was 82.4 per 1 million of population in the United States, compared with 25.8 on average for the 32 countries in the European Registry ([@b133-hcfr-89-supp-049]). High-rate countries, such as Belgium and Switzerland, had 44.1 and 44.9, respectively. The share of patients 60 years of age or over at the start of treatment was 26 percent in the 32 countries, compared with 38 percent for the United States. The introduction of reimbursement has obviously shifted the indications for treatment, without any assessment of the marginal costs and benefits.

Another important difference between the United States and Europe is the share of patients treated with transplants. It is well documented that this treatment is the cost-effective alternative when possible. It also gives the patient a better quality of life. The proportion of patients with functional transplants in the United States is difficult to document, but best estimates give a figure of about 20 percent of all patients treated for ESRD ([@b113-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b120-hcfr-89-supp-049]), which is less than one-half the rate of the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland ([Table 9](#t9-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). Efforts have also been made to provide incentives for more transplants in the United States ([@b120-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

The effect on cost per case is difficult to assess for each system. However, there is reason to believe that the incentives in the United States have had an impact on not only the number of treated cases but also the cost per case. Many European health care systems seem to have performed well, compared with the United States, when we look at both cost and cost effectiveness of treatment for ESRD---that is, they have achieved a lower treatment rate and a higher share of transplants. (Also, for many years during the introduction of the technologies, the rate of treatment was higher in many European countries than it was in the United States.) The higher incidence of treated renal failure in the United States is, of course, not necessarily a bad thing. One could argue that the United States is providing better access to a life-saving technology than are the European countries. But the marginal costs and benefits of the extended indications for intervention are largely unknown, and a comparison with European countries is one way to answer the question. The comparative studies that have been undertaken between the United States and the United Kingdom ([@b110-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b133-hcfr-89-supp-049]), do not give a full account of how new technology is managed in Europe. By looking at a greater number of European countries, a better perspective on the U.S. allocation of resources to new technologies can be achieved.

Extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy
=====================================

A more recent example of a new medical technology is extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy (ESWL) for treatment of kidney stones and lately also gallstones. This technology disintegrates stones through the use of shock waves and does not require an incision. It is an equipment-embodied technology and the equipment cost is several million United States dollars. A single ESWL unit can serve a large population, analogous to the specialized services of a heart surgery center or a burn unit. The cost per treated patient is dependent on the number of patients treated per year. ESWL was developed in Germany, and the first patients were treated there in 1980. The lithotriptor was approved for widespread clinical use in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration in December 1984, at which time six experimental sites had lithotriptors ([@b112-hcfr-89-supp-049]). By July 1, 1986, there were 84 ESWL units in operation in the United States. At that time, 31 States had at least one unit; there were 11 in California, 6 each in Illinois and Texas, and 5 in North Carolina (Bloom, et al., 1989). In the spring of 1989, the number of lithotriptors had increased to about 225. In relation to the size of the population, it is about the same as in countries such as Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland ([Table 10](#t10-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}). However, there are wide variations among European countries; the United Kingdom has by far the lowest number in relation to the population.

The introduction of ESWL has brought up a number of policy issues relating to the introduction of new medical technology in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, the discussion has centered around the problems of adapting the Medicare payment system to this new technology ([@b138-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Because it is neither "medical" nor "surgical" technology, there is no appropriate DRG to which the treatment can be assigned. If the surgical DRG is used, it will grossly overpay the procedure. If the most appropriate medical DRG is used (324-urinary stones, patient age under 70 years, without complications or comorbidities), it only covers about 60 percent of costs ([@b115-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The compromise seems to have been to assign all patients treated with ESWL to DRG 323 (urinary stones, patient age over 69 years, with complications or comorbidities), which comes closer to the estimated costs for the procedure ([@b115-hcfr-89-supp-049]). However, it has also been suggested that a special DRG should be established for ESWL.

Unlike the situation for many other technologies, the European countries can provide comparative information on both costs and charges for ESWL. In [Table 11](#t11-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, a detailed account of the costs for treating the average patient with ESWL in Sweden in 1985 is shown. These costs (U.S. \$3,900) include physician salaries and can be compared with an average of \$5,700 in the United States ([@b112-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The difference in costs can be studied in detail and can give important lessons about the way this technology is used and managed in the different countries. Even more interesting is to look at how costs vary among different types of patients. In [Table 12](#t12-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, the cost per patient for treatment of different sizes of kidney stones is shown. Costs increase with the size of the stone, especially for stones larger than 30 millimeters.

Detailed comparisons of costs and charges can give interesting information of relevance in assessing the consequences of the reimbursement system in the United States and can suggest ideas for reform. However, there are also other aspects of health systems that must not be overlooked. The regionalized systems in Europe can provide population-based data on utilization of medical technology that can be used to study the proper indications for as well as the consequences of new medical technology. The role of medical technology assessment in the management of new technology can also be an interesting area for comparison. The European countries do not have a formal approval system for medical devices. Nevertheless, many countries in Europe have performed more comprehensive evaluations, including not only safety and efficacy, but also cost effectiveness and quality of life, of ESWL than have been undertaken in the United States. Such comprehensive evaluations of ESWL for the treatment of gallstones are now under way in both Sweden and the United Kingdom. These assessments form part of the policy for controlling the diffusion of medical technology. In addition, the wide diversity of policies used in the European countries can yield interesting lessons for the management of the same technologies in the United States.

Are health care systems converging?
===================================

European health care systems obviously differ from the U.S. system in important aspects. There are also important differences among European systems. One important difference is the open-endedness (that is, the lack of budget restrictions) of the systems. However, the need to contain costs has forced open-ended systems to find different ways to restrict total expenditures for health care. It seems clear that a "free" market cannot solve the basic resource allocation problems in health care: efficiency and equity in health care production and consumption. Public insurance systems, tax subsidies to private insurance, asymmetric information between producers and consumers, and provider monopolies through licensing (doctors) are inherent factors in a health care system that make free competition an ineffective policy; competition has to be "managed."

In the United States, the discussion of managed competition has centered on HMOs and their ability to provide total coverage for health care at a lower cost than traditional fee-for-service arrangements. The jury is still out (see the article by Culyer in this issue), but the discussion has already changed the perception of what is needed to contain costs and increase efficiency in health care. The idea of prospective payment lies behind the development of DRGs to classify patients. This system, developed at Yale University, is as close as one can come to what [@b130-hcfr-89-supp-049] called "market socialism." Hospitals compete against a set of predetermined administrative prices. So far, this payment method has been used only for Medicare-covered inpatient acute hospital care, but work is under way to extend it to ambulatory care. Another example of how the health care market has changed in the United States is the introduction of medical technology assessment (MTA) as a tool for health policy. The role of MTA in U.S. health policy has been controversial, but it was invented as a response to a need for more information for policymakers---this information will be needed even more in the future. Today, when the era of rapidly expanding health care resources has come to an end, new medical technology is the major dynamic factor in health care. Clearly, future policy will be aimed at control of introduction and diffusion of new medical technology. Medical technology assessment, based on explicit cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit studies, will certainly have a major role in the development of those policies.

The convergence theory implies that planning will play an increasing role in market economies. Developments in the United States during the 1980s cannot accurately be described as increased health care planning. But they certainly represent an increase in public control over the health care system. This can best be understood by looking at the great attraction HMOs, DRGs, and MTA have had for health researchers and policymakers in Europe. These ideas have fit in well with the more comprehensive and planned systems in Europe. They have been seen as a way to increase the role of markets and competition within systems in which traditional planning has proven impotent to adapt to a situation of slower resource growth with continued introduction of new medical technology. In this way we can talk about a convergence of systems.

This convergence creates interesting opportunities for the future. When new ideas, such as HMOs, DRGs, and MTA, are transferred to European countries, it is possible for the United States to learn how they work under different regulatory conditions. How will HMOs work when based on regional, rather than voluntary, participation? How will HMOs that include the elderly work? It has been suggested that the evidence for cost savings from HMOs in the United States is not relevant for Europe, because the majority of HMO members are under 65 years of age. This may be the case, but one hypothesis could be that HMOs will yield even greater savings for the elderly, who have higher consumption rates of care and for whom there are more alternatives for intervention. These questions can be answered, if experimentation on a broad basis can be started in Europe. Changes in the health care systems of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, based on Enthoven\'s ideas, are already under way. The first HMO is also about to be started in Switzerland.

The DRG system has been introduced, at least on the research agenda, in most European Countries from Sweden in the north to Portugal in the south. There is also a very interesting experiment under way with financial incentives for hospital efficiency in Leningrad, U.S.S.R. ([@b126-hcfr-89-supp-049]). The research and the experiments in Europe will give not only interesting comparative data on DRG groupings, but also information about how, for example, physician costs can be integrated in the DRG payment and how this will change the weights.

Medical technology assessment, including consensus conferences, has also been imported into Europe from the United States. The Netherlands and Sweden have been in the forefront of this movement and have established special government committees for MTA. The European Regional Office for the World Health Organization has a special program for MTA, and introduction of MTA is one of the targets for "Health for All" by the year 2000. Within the European Common Market, a special committee for MTA has been set up within the health service research committee. It seems that today, MTA is more vital and growing in Europe than in the United States. This will, in the longer term, produce important information on medical technologies that are also used in the United States and will give lessons on how MTA can be implemented as part of health policymaking.

Conclusion
==========

The single most important lesson from the European health care systems during the 1980s concerns the role of central government. The European systems have been able to reduce the total costs of health care not so much through central planning and regulation as through global budgets at the regional level. In fact, the role of the central government in health care policy has never been as strong in Europe as is perhaps thought in the United States, and during the 1980s there has been a strong trend toward decentralization. The reason for this is the obvious difficulty in managing such a huge and complicated system from the center. Compared with Europe, the U.S. Federal Government seems to have less control over the totality of the system, at the same time that it is more directly involved in detailed regulation of efficacy, safety, and price setting. Leadership and control of global expenditures and decisions regarding the comprehensiveness of the system must come from the center, but planning and management should be left to the regional level. Decentralization can be combined with internal markets and competition among providers. Planning and markets are not necessarily antithetical; they can work together to create better health services.

I am grateful for the helpful comments of A. J. Culyer and Jean-Pierre Poullier.

The results shown by Le Grand and Rabin (1986), a decline during the past 50 years in the Gini coefficient for variation in the age of death, can be described as a "rectangularization" of mortality. For a discussion of rectangularization of morbidity, see [@b123-hcfr-89-supp-049]. Please note that rectangularization is not caused by changes in demography but by changes in the epidemiology of disease, partly caused by medical interventions.

This does not necessarily mean that the United States is "overspending." This is a normative concept, which cannot be judged with reference to international comparisons only. Studies indicate that a significant part of the higher expenditures in the United States are the result of higher relative prices for health care, rather than greater volume of services ([@b139-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

![Worksheet used to develop a classification system for regionalized health care systems](hcfr-89-supp-049-g001){#f1-hcfr-89-supp-049}

###### Percent of the population in each of three age groups: Selected countries, 1987

  Country                                                    Years of age         
  ---------------------------------------------------------- -------------- ----- -------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Percent              
  United States                                              12.2           5.0   2.6
  Europe[^1^](#tfn1-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   13.8           6.0   3.0
  Austria                                                    14.7           6.9   3.4
  Belgium                                                    14.3           6.4   3.3
  Denmark                                                    15.4           6.7   3.4
  Finland                                                    12.9           5.3   2.5
  France                                                     13.5           6.5   3.5
  Germany                                                    15.9           7.3   [^2^](#tfn2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}3.4
  Greece                                                     13.5           5.7   [^2^](#tfn2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}2.8
  Iceland                                                    10.3           4.4   [^2^](#tfn2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}2.5
  Ireland                                                    11.0           4.2   2.0
  Italy                                                      12.9           5.4   [^3^](#tfn3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}2.5
  Luxembourg                                                 13.3           5.7   [^2^](#tfn2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}2.7
  Netherlands                                                12.4           5.2   2.7
  Norway                                                     16.1           6.8   3.5
  Portugal                                                   12.5           4.9   2.2
  Spain                                                      12.4           5.1   2.5
  Sweden                                                     17.7           7.7   3.9
  Switzerland                                                14.4           6.5   3.4
  United Kingdom                                             15.5           6.6   3.4

Unweighted average.

Data from 1986.

Datafrom 1985.

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Percent of population eligible for public health insurance, by type of coverage: Selected countries, 1987

  Country          Hospital care   Ambulatory care   Medical goods
  ---------------- --------------- ----------------- ---------------
                   Percent                           
  Austria          99              99                90
  Belgium          98              93                68
  Denmark          100             100               100
  Finland          100             100               90
  France           99              98                92
  Germany          92              92                97
  Greece           100             100               90
  Iceland          100             100               ---
  Ireland          100             37                95
  Italy            100             100               99
  Luxembourg       100             100               95
  Netherlands      77              72                80
  Norway           100             100               100
  Portugal         100             100               100
  Spain            98              97                84
  Sweden           100             100               100
  Switzerland      98              98                100
  United Kingdom   100             100               99
  United States    40              25                ---

Notes: Most countries do not publish data on the number of people covered by, or benefits received under, public health insurance plans. These are crude Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Secretariat estimates based on descriptive evidence.

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Average percent of bill paid for by public insurance, by type of benefit received: Selected countries, 1987

  Country          Hospital care   Ambulatory care   Medical goods
  ---------------- --------------- ----------------- ---------------
                   Percent paid                      
  Austria          90              80                50
  Belgium          68              50                52
  Denmark          100             76                45
  Finland          90              70                61
  France           92              62                58
  Germany          97              85                56
  Greece           90              85                75
  Iceland          ---             ---               ---
  Ireland          95              47                48
  Italy            99              65                63
  Luxembourg       95              98                83
  Netherlands      80              67                58
  Norway           100             ---               ---
  Portugal         100             100               67
  Spain            84              ---               77
  Sweden           100             90                75
  Switzerland      100             86                90
  United Kingdom   99              88                93
  United States    55              56                ---

NOTES: Most countries do not publish data on the number of people covered by, or benefits received under, public health insurance plans. These are crude Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Secretariat estimates based on descriptive evidence.

Source: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Total health expenditures expressed as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and as expenditures per capita: Selected countries, 1986

  Country          Real GDP index[^2^](#tfn10-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   Percent of GDP   Expenditures per capita[^1^](#tfn9-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   
  ---------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------
  Austria          64                                                                  8.3              \$ 929                                                                      \$1,023
  Belgium          66                                                                  7.2              825                                                                         883
  Denmark          75                                                                  6.0              777                                                                         962
  Finland          70                                                                  7.4              900                                                                         1,069
  France           71                                                                  8.7              1,068                                                                       1,142
  Germany          73                                                                  8.1              1,031                                                                       1,183
  Greece           36                                                                  5.3              331                                                                         212
  Iceland          82                                                                  7.5              1,063                                                                       1,192
  Ireland          41                                                                  7.8              550                                                                         553
  Italy            66                                                                  6.6              764                                                                         702
  Luxembourg       80                                                                  7.0              962                                                                         928
  Netherlands      68                                                                  8.3              983                                                                         1,002
  Norway           86                                                                  6.8              1,021                                                                       1,144
  Portugal         33                                                                  5.5              310                                                                         158
  Spain            46                                                                  6.1              486                                                                         358
  Sweden           75                                                                  9.1              1,193                                                                       1,429
  Switzerland      88                                                                  7.6              1,162                                                                       1,573
  United Kingdom   57                                                                  6.1              706                                                                         594
  United States    100                                                                 10.9             1,886                                                                       1,886

ln U.S. dollars.

United States = 100.

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Actual and predicted health expenditures[^1^](#tfn12-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"} per capita, differences, and upper and lower bounds of a 95-percent confidence interval: Selected countries, 1986

  Country          Actual   Predicted   Difference   Lower bound   Upper bound
  ---------------- -------- ----------- ------------ ------------- -------------
  Austria          929      810         \+ 119       644           1,018
  Belgium          825      844         −19          671           1,061
  Denmark          777      997         −220         791           1,258
  Finland          900      909         −9           722           1,143
  France           1,068    918         \+ 150       730           1,156
  Germany          1,031    963         \+ 68        765           1,213
  Greece           331      363         −32          277           477
  Iceland          1,063    1,122       −59          886           1,421
  Ireland          550      431         \+ 119       334           557
  Italy            764      842         −78          670           1,059
  Luxembourg       962      1,081       −119         856           1,367
  Netherlands      983      873         \+ 120       694           1,098
  Norway           1,021    1,198       −177         943           1,521
  Portugal         310      321         −11          241           426
  Spain            486      516         −30          405           659
  Sweden           1,193    1,003       \+ 190       795           1,265
  Switzerland      1,162    1,230       −68          967           1,563
  United Kingdom   706      850         −144         676           1,069
  United States    1,886    1,472       \+ 414       1,145         1,894

Expenditures converted from national currency units to U.S. dollars using purchasing power parities.

SOURCE: Jönsson, B.: Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 1989.

###### Actual and predicted health care expenditures[^1^](#tfn14-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"} for the United States in 1986, based on data for 18 European countries

  ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------- ------------ ------------- -------------
  **Log function: *HEXP*** = −**5.30** + **1.29 GDP** *R* ^2^ = 0.89                                              
  Actual                                                                   Predicted   Difference   Lower bound   Upper bound
  1,886                                                                    1,466       \+ 420       1,041         2,064
  **Linear function: *HEXP*** = −**139** + **0.0853 GDP** *R* ^2^ = 0.83                                          
  Actual                                                                   Predicted   Difference   Lower bound   Upper bound
  1,886                                                                    1,341       \+ 545       1,064         1,617
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------- ------------ ------------- -------------

With 95-percent confidence interval.

NOTE: *HEXP* is health expenditures. GDP is gross domestic product.

SOURCE: Jönsson, B.: Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 1989.

###### Infant and perinatal mortality rates: Selected countries, selected years 1960-86

  Country                    1960   1970   1980   1986                       
  -------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ----- ------ -----
  Rate per 100 live births                                                   
  Austria                    3.75   3.5    2.59   2.7    1.43   1.4   1.03   0.9
  Belgium                    3.12   3.2    2.11   2.3    1.21   1.4   0.97   ---
  Denmark                    2.15   2.6    1.42   1.8    0.84   0.9   0.82   0.8
  Finland                    2.10   2.8    1.32   1.7    0.76   0.8   0.58   0.6
  France                     2.74   3.1    1.82   2.3    1.01   1.3   0.80   ---
  Germany                    3.38   3.6    2.34   2.6    1.27   1.2   0.87   ---
  Greece                     4.01   2.6    2.96   2.7    1.79   2.0   1.22   1.5
  Iceland                    2.17   2.0    1.33   1.9    0.77   0.9   0.54   0.8
  Ireland                    2.93   3.8    1.95   2.4    1.11   1.5   0.87   ---
  Italy                      4.39   4.2    2.96   3.1    1.43   1.8   1.01   ---
  Luxembourg                 3.15   3.2    2.49   2.5    1.15   1.0   0.80   0.7
  Netherlands                1.79   2.7    1.27   1.9    0.86   1.1   0.64   1.0
  Norway                     1.89   2.4    1.27   1.9    0.81   1.1   0.78   0.8
  Portugal                   7.75   4.1    5.51   3.7    2.43   2.4   1.59   1.8
  Spain                      4.37   ---    2.81   ---    1.23   1.4   0.87   ---
  Sweden                     1.66   2.6    1.10   1.6    0.69   0.9   0.59   0.7
  Switzerland                2.11   ---    1.44   1.8    0.91   1.0   0.68   0.8
  United Kingdom             2.25   3.4    1.85   2.4    1.21   1.3   0.95   ---
  United States              2.60   2.9    2.00   2.3    1.26   1.3   1.04   1.0

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Number of patients receiving treatment for end stage renal disease: Selected countries, selected years 1970-86

  Country                                                      1970   1975   1980   1984   1985   1986
  ------------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
  Rate per 1 million people                                                                       
  Austria                                                      13     56     134    210    256    294
  Belgium[^1^](#tfn18-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   30     103    233    394    333    392
  Denmark[^1^](#tfn18-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   56     132    202    252    190    262
  Finland                                                      25     71     135    232    253    262
  France                                                       26     102    229    286    291    303
  Germany                                                      18     88     208    301    305    333
  Greece                                                       5      48     119    142    154    225
  Iceland[^1^](#tfn18-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   20     42     75     105    67     158
  Ireland                                                      20     45     99     161    179    193
  Italy                                                        6      81     197    238    263    305
  Luxembourg                                                   7      91     178    225    277    383
  Netherlands                                                  36     90     186    293    289    318
  Norway                                                       9      67     134    201    227    234
  Portugal                                                     2      4      28     158    197    269
  Spain[^1^](#tfn18-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}     4      27     145    284    232    337
  Sweden                                                       54     85     178    198    319    283
  Switzerland                                                  49     136    260    357    383    405
  United Kingdom                                               23     62     128    200    216    242
  United States                                                25     106    272    393    ---    ---

Because of changes in reporting and incomplete surveys, some entries do not correctly portray trends.

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Patients under treatment for end stage renal disease with functional transplants: Selected countries, selected years 1970-86

  Country                                                      1970   1975   1980   1984   1985                                                    1986
  ------------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------------------------------------------------------- ------
  Percent of patients                                                                                                                              
  Austria                                                      19     33     19     23     24                                                      30
  Belgium[^1^](#tfn20-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   34     27     28     36     24                                                      33
  Denmark[^1^](#tfn20-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   62     53     47     49     45                                                      48
  Finland                                                      42     60     65     65     63                                                      58
  France                                                       15     13     13     17     19                                                      31
  Germany                                                      7      6      8      14     16                                                      17
  Greece                                                       39     16     13     13     9                                                       14
  Iceland[^1^](#tfn20-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   25     44     53     ---    24                                                      47
  Ireland                                                      18     27     43     54     52                                                      47
  Italy                                                        2      6      7      5      9                                                       12
  Luxembourg                                                   ---    10     3      8      13                                                      16
  Netherlands                                                  18     25     30     42     41                                                      44
  Norway                                                       51     74     66     70     75                                                      78
  Portugal                                                     1      3      3      7      9                                                       8
  Spain[^1^](#tfn20-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}     10     4      8      17     19                                                      23
  Sweden                                                       50     48     47     47     57                                                      55
  Switzerland                                                  31     35     34     40     42                                                      33
  United Kingdom                                               27     36     44     50     48                                                      50
  United States                                                ---    ---    ---    ---    [^1^](#tfn20-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}22   ---

Because of changes in reporting and incomplete surveys, some entries do not correctly portray trends.

SOURCE: ([@b137-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Number of extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy units in operation: Selected countries, May 1989

  Country           Total   Per 1 million inhabitants
  ----------------- ------- ---------------------------
  Number of units           
  Belgium           11      1.10
  Germany           57      0.93
  Spain             34      0.88
  Italy             48      0.84
  Sweden            5       0.60
  Ireland           2       0.56
  Netherlands       8       0.55
  France            29      0.53
  Greece            5       0.50
  Denmark           2       0.39
  Portugal          3       0.30
  United Kingdom    12      0.21
  United States     225     0.88

SOURCE: Jönsson, B.: Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 1989.

###### Distribution of costs for extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy (ESWL) treatment, by item: Sweden, 1985

  Item                              Cost per patient[^1^](#tfn23-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"}   Percent of total
  --------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------
  Total costs                       24,826                                                                100
  Equipment                         5,150                                                                 21
  Building                          283                                                                   1
  Physician salaries                1,360                                                                 6
  Other salaries                    654                                                                   3
  Anesthesia                        1,972                                                                 8
  Materials, drugs                  3,736                                                                 15
  Other services                    1,039                                                                 4
                                                                                                          
                                    14,194                                                                57
  Adjuvant procedures               515                                                                   2
  Laboratories:                                                                                           
  Radiology                         2,122                                                                 9
  Chemistry                         1,593                                                                 6
  Intensive care                    1,057                                                                 4
                                                                                                          
                                    4,772                                                                 19
  Ward:                                                                                                   
  Building                          449                                                                   2
  Physician salaries                768                                                                   3
  Other salaries                    1,917                                                                 8
  Materials, drugs                  516                                                                   2
  Services (excluding laboratory)   1,695                                                                 7
                                                                                                          
                                    5,345                                                                 22

ln Swedish kronor.

NOTE: Percents may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

SOURCE: ([@b114-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Costs[^1^](#tfn26-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table-fn"} per patient for extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy (ESWL) for different types of stones, by cost item: Sweden, 1985

  Cost item                       Size of stone   Ureter stone   Bilateral treatment                     
  ------------------------------- --------------- -------------- --------------------- -------- -------- --------
  Total cost per patient          17,880          20,437         26,689                49,416   17,618   32,707
  ESWL treatment                  8,879           11,680         14,892                22,766   8,768    17,474
  Intensive care unit             900             987            1,074                 1,800    900      1,800
  Radiology                       2,561           2,017          2,365                 5,000    2,427    3,658
  Clinical chemistry laboratory   1,448           1,466          1,706                 2,516    1,458    1,761
  Adjuvant procedures             220             230            198                   3,045    100      1,100
  Recovery                        3,872           4,057          6,454                 14,568   3,965    7,014
  Number of cases                 4               84             31                    13       15       14

In Swedish kronor.

SOURCE: ([@b114-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

The Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter called Germany) proves that one can achieve universal enrollment and comprehensive insurance coverage without having a form of socialized medicine. In addition---and this is a European challenge to the United States---medical care is provided to everyone, regardless of income, social status, or residence. This is accepted as a major goal of national health insurance in Germany and other European countries.

The sickness fund system, which covers approximately 90 percent of the population, is decentralized and self-governed by autonomous administrations. There are no government agencies; the funds are almost completely independent of the Federal Government and the States (Länder). Federal law merely requires that persons with incomes below a certain level receive mandatory health insurance coverage and that health care be sufficient and effective according to the standards of medical practice. This means that the organization of the sickness funds and the medical associations make their negotiations in the fields of hospital and ambulatory care, dental care, medical appliances, etc., in principal without government interference. This mixture of Federal control and decentralized administration is typical of the European countries, as Jönsson has written.

The statutory insurance plan, with the underlying principle of self-government, is administered by some 1,150 different funds (local sickness funds, industrial funds, crafts funds, rural funds, sailors\' fund, miners\' fund, blue-collar-workers\' funds, and white-collar-workers\' funds). The different types of sickness funds vary as to the number of individual member funds. In 1988, almost 24 percent of all funds were local sickness funds, with 46 percent of the mandatorily insured. At the same time, the industrial funds, comprising more than 60 percent of all funds, covered only approximately 11.5 percent of the population insured with the sickness fund system.

The funds are governed by a board of directors and an assembly of representatives from both the insured employees and their employers. The payroll tax that finances the system is split equally between the employees and employers. The payroll tax base consists mainly of wages, salaries, and lately also pensions. Thus the payroll taxes are totally independent of individual, medical, and social risks of the insured and provide coverage for the insured and (nonworking) family dependents. In case of unemployment, old age, disability, or poverty, special provisions are made for paying contributions. Either other branches of the social security system (old age fund, unemployment fund, etc.) or the Federal/regional government pays the contribution fees. In Germany, the old age fund provides a transfer to the statutory insurance fund system, and the unemployment fund pays the fees in case of unemployment. The unemployed, disabled, or aged are covered within their fund, and the fund is compensated for the fees.

The tax base for the payroll tax is defined by the Health Insurance Law and does not correspond to the broader concept of income used for taxing personal income. Copayments (user charges) under statutory health insurance are limited to a few items, such as dentures, eyeglasses, and prescription drugs. There is also a small daily charge for the first 14 days in a hospital, and a daily charge for inpatient rehabilitation treatment. Experts estimate the total of copayments to be only about 5 percent of total health care expenditures of the statutory sickness funds. This percentage will rise in the near future as a consequence of the. 1989 health reform law, one of the major objectives of which is the stability of the payroll tax rate, which is presently at a level of almost 13 percent. The philosophy behind payroll tax stability is to steer the health care sector according to the revenue available and thus hold down labor costs. The current payroll tax rate, which may (from an American perspective) seem incredibly high, finances all the benefits under the plan that are centrally defined, with only little freedom for the funds to add certain services.

The sickness fund plan
======================

The insured population is limited by residence and occupation in its freedom to choose a sickness fund. Approximately 50 percent of the individuals may choose their own health insurance, but this choice does not mean that the benefit packages differ much. The benefits (services) under statutory health insurance in Germany are almost the same for all covered persons and include:

-   Free ambulatory care and free (unlimited) hospital care.

-   Freedom to choose any general practitioner or specialist (including dentists) registered with the sickness fund.

-   Preventive care.

-   Family planning.

-   Medical services when needed for rehabilitation.

-   Maternity benefits (free pregnancy tests, free ambulatory and hospital treatment, midwife care, cash benefits, and household help if the pregnant woman has children under 8 years of age or a disabled child).

Legal maternity leave extends from 6 weeks prior to 8 weeks after confinement. Moreover, the mother can choose to stay at home for 6 months after confinement, with a small monthly salary paid by the employer.

Upon expiration of the continued payment period (generally 6 weeks, during which the employer continues to pay one\'s salary), an employed person insured by statutory health insurance receives, when he or she is unfit for work, sick benefits (80 percent of the normal wage or salary) for a period of up to 78 weeks (within any 3-year period). When this period expires, the beneficiary is entitled to a pension based on disability or to social assistance (welfare payments). With the new health insurance law, benefits for people who care for the elderly, new services in prevention, and quality assurance are included under the sickness fund plan. At the same time, certain services are reduced (e.g., burial allowances, cash subsidies for dentures).

The range of benefits is extended by a certain degree of competition among the various sickness funds, which may provide extended medical services. The Health Insurance Law requires that medical care be "sufficient and effective according to the standards of medical practice." With only the qualification that it be "necessary," the built-in tendency for expansion of benefits is further strengthened in the system. Furthermore, adjudication of insurance claims is handled by a system of special courts (Sozialgerichte), which are generally inclined toward a generous interpretation of the claimants\' rights.

At present there is a lively political and academic debate about the various risk structures of the different funds. With regard to age, sex, number of family dependents, and payroll tax base, there are significant differences that cause unfair competition among the funds. Various solutions for balancing these risk structures are in the center of the discussion and are considered a major subject for further health care reforms. A balanced risk structure would offer a basis for persons to choose not to participate in the system and to choose from a variety of health plans with a minimum level of protection. At present, only persons with incomes above a certain income level (54,900 Deutsch marks in 1989, which is roughly equal to the average annual employee compensation) may join a private health insurance plan. If one\'s income again falls below the (dynamic) income level, he or she may stay in the private plan or go back to the statutory health insurance plan.

In addition to the statutory health insurance system, there is a small public health service, administered and financed on a local basis, and a factory-based physician service, organized and paid for by the employers, in large companies.

Health care for the mentally ill is considered to be poor. Care for the elderly in nursing homes is not included under public or private health insurance plans and is financed by local welfare funds, if individual incomes are insufficient to cover the nursing home bill.

Redistributive effects
======================

Benefits from private health insurance are, to a certain degree, equivalent to those already described, except that private insurers offer a variety of plans with copayments. But one must keep in mind the different redistributive effects of an income-related financing system and a risk-oriented premium system. According to the provision of benefits and income-related financing, there are not only risk-related redistributive effects between age and sex groups but also between:

-   Single-person households or couples without children, and families.

-   Persons with differing incomes.

-   Retired persons and employed persons.

These and other processes of income redistribution through the statutory sickness fund system are known on a qualitative level but are largely unknown quantitatively. This is particularly true when considered from a life-cycle perspective, rather than a cross-sectional-analysis view. In private health insurance plans, these effects are restricted to distributive effects within the age cohort in question. These effects play a significant role in the European context and are not particularly dealt with in Jönsson\'s article. The sickness fund system is a significant instrument of income redistribution. Politicians must decide whether they want this redistribution restricted to the population involved or to the total population through the tax transfer system. Many experts already consider the social -security system in Europe to be part of the overall transfer system.

Lack of cost-consciousness
==========================

A negative feature of German national health insurance is the absence of cost consciousness among physicians and patients. A major cause could be that there is no direct economic relationship between the two. The basis of demand for health services is the sickness voucher that each insured person receives on request from the sickness fund for each calendar quarter. Providers keep a record of the services rendered on the sickness voucher, which is normally not signed by the patient. The patients insured by the statutory health insurance fund are not given an invoice for their medical treatment either. Office-based physicians receive their reimbursement quarterly from the various statutory health insurance funds to which their patients belong and by way of the regionalphysicians\' association ([Figure 1](#f2-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}). Because of this institutional setting and because copayments still play a minor role, cost consciousness on the part of patients and physicians is severely underdeveloped. This may lead to both fiscal illusions and an abuse of the system by both parties. Patients may insist on overtreatment or certain types of services. Doctors, in turn, are stimulated to provide these services by the fee-for-service system, which induces them to see as many patients as possible and to provide as many services as possible in a given time span. A better understanding of costs and benefits could be achieved in Germany if health insurance were changed from a system of benefits in kind to a cost-reimbursement system, in which the patient pays the medical bill first, then is reimbursed by the sickness fund. This system, although difficult to introduce completely, would then facilitate the introduction of certain types of coinsurance. At present, expenditure targets and other cost-control mechanisms are being installed or intensively discussed for the different sectors (pharmaceutical, inpatient, or outpatient care, etc.).

Cost containment
================

Health care expenditures could be reduced in many ways. For example, many routine physician activities could be handled by paraprofessionals, thus saving money. Such activities include renewing prescriptions and issuing certificates of illness, which are needed by patients to receive their sickness allowances. More and better medical knowledge, healthier life styles, risk rating, and more concern for medical costs must not be ignored. Programs to better inform and educate patients are still in their infancy and call for further debate and vision. Furthermore, the power of the sickness funds must be increased to make them more effective when negotiating with the physician associations.

In 1977, a new instrument of health policy was established, called Concerted Action in Health Care, bringing together the main participants in the health care system, i.e., representatives of health services providers, health insurance funds, employers, trade unions, and State and Federal governments. Concerted Action deals primarily with managing the expenditures of the statutory health insurance funds. Its participants will develop recommendations to improve efficacy and efficiency in health care. On the basis of the findings of Concerted Action, the providers and funds make their negotiations and contracts.

Since 1986, a board of (medical and economic) advisers to Concerted Action in Health Care provides in its annual reports medical and economic guidelines on which Concerted Action can base its various recommendations. Concerted Action is the major forum in which the various health care participants meet publicly to decide upon the further development of the health care system. In particular, the group discusses the allocation of financial resources of the statutory health insurance funds for the various types of services.

To realize a constant payroll tax rate, expenditures for the various types of health services may, on average, increase only by the rate of growth of the payroll tax base. This economic guideline should, in fact, leave enough room for the expenditure categories to increase by different rates, according to necessary changes in the treatment mix. But there is still the question of who will establish health care priorities and by what means these priorities will be set. With payroll tax rate stability being a major objective, a permanent change of emphasis from unnecessary to indispensable health services is called for. In making this change, the right incentives are important, if one does not want the government or parliament to define health care priorities. In addition, it is necessary to discuss in more detail the development of and the differing pricing mechanisms in the various health care fields (e.g., dental, inpatient, outpatient, pharmaceutical). Otherwise, it is impossible to find ways to equalize---as the economists would say---the marginal utility of health care expenditures by the statutory health insurance system. So far, there are no evaluative studies concerning the effectiveness of these cost-containment efforts.

Summary
=======

In case the majority of Americans want more universal and comprehensive insurance coverage, while avoiding socialized medicine (in either provision or financing of care), the German, Dutch, French, and other European health care systems offer valuable lessons. Their experiences prove that federally mandated systems need not include federal administration of the system. At the same time, federal leadership is required to encourage competition. International health services research is needed to provide the necessary data, including better and more up-to-date information on current health care reforms in Europe.
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In this commentary, I should like to summarize my understanding of Jönsson\'s article and complement his remarks with some additional perspectives. To provide a backdrop for my remarks, I begin with a bird\'s-eye view of the fiscal relationships in modern health care. Next, I employ a compact menu of alternative cost-control policies to highlight the differences between the European and the American approaches to that task, relying on both Jönsson\'s and my own insights into European health systems. Finally, I comment on the "convergence theory" proposed by Jönsson and add another convergence theory of my own.

I should mention at the outset that I have enjoyed reading Jönsson\'s instructive paper and that I have gained valuable new insights from it.

Economic relationships in health care
=====================================

At the highest level of abstraction, the economic relationships embedded in the delivery of health care can be distilled into three distinct nexuses, as shown in [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}.

In nexus A, a third-party payer---either a private insurance carrier or a government---shoulders the financial risks of illness the patient would otherwise face, in exchange for a transfer of money. At one extreme, this transfer takes the form of "actuarially fair" insurance premiums that reflect the insured\'s own health status as best as it can be determined by the insurer, as would be the case for an individually purchased health insurance policy bought from a commercial carrier. At the other extreme, the transfer takes the form of taxes or premiums that are totally divorced from the insured\'s health status and based strictly on ability to pay.

All of the European health insurance systems are based on the latter extreme for the great bulk of their populations, because Europeans tend to view actuarially fair health insurance premiums as manifestly unfair and believe that contributions to health insurance should be based on ability to pay. Most Americans probably abhor actuarially fair health insurance premiums as well. Indeed, the bulk of Americans are covered either by tax-financed government programs or by private group policies that socialize health insurance, at least within the community of a single business firm.

In nexus B of [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}, the third-party payer transfers money to providers under a variety of distinct compensation methods. These methods may range all the way from piece-rate compensation (triggering a money flow for each distinct service or supply a provider reports to have delivered to a patient) to prepaid compensation in the form of capitation or salaries for physicians or global budgets for inpatient facilities. One finds all of these methods used in the European health systems.

Finally, in nexus C of [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}, health services and supplies are transferred from individual providers of health care to individual patients. Nexus C represents what economists call the "market" for health care (services and supplies). In fact, however, that nexus does not constitute the genuine market of textbook fame, for at least two reasons. First, depending on the patient\'s insurance status, nexus C may or may not trigger a money flow in the opposite direction at the time services are received. Absent that money flow at the time services are received, the recipient is spared the benefit-cost calculation that is the sine qua non of a well-functioning market. Second, as is suggested in [Table 1](#t13-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, in any given year, the bulk of the transactions in nexus C is accounted for by only a few individuals who can be assumed to be quite sick and usually frightened when they enter this market. These sick and frightened individuals, or their relatives, probably could not offer providers the vigorous countervailing power one observes in markets for regular commodities, even if they were forced to bear the full cost of health care at point of service.

The best one can hope for under these circumstances is that the patient\'s physician will act in all cases as the patient\'s financially disinterested agent. That assumption becomes strained under fee-for-service compensation, especially when it is coupled with third-party payment.

Controlling health care expenditure
===================================

The much-discussed percentage of the gross national product (GNP) that a nation is said to devote to health care actually measures only the money transfers made to providers in nexuses B and C; it does not reveal what real resources actually flowed to patients in return for this money transfer. Strictly speaking, that percentage also includes whatever funds the third-party payers retained as income or to cover administrative expenses. Furthermore, it includes certain expenditures (e.g., the construction of certain types of facilities or spending on basic medical research) not factored into the payments made directly to the providers of health care. Even within an American city, one finds vast differences in the money transfers made to doctors and hospitals for well-defined standard medical procedures, and one observes similar variation across national borders.

There is, then, considerable leeway in the amount of GNP that providers can extract from the rest of society per unit of health service and overall. American readers, for example, should be intrigued by Jönsson\'s suggestion that the amount of GNP transferred to American providers per patient treated with extracorporeal shock wave lithotripsy (ESWL) appears to be about 50 percent higher than the amount of GNP per patient that Swedes transfer to their providers of ESWL. To be sure, Jönsson\'s is a very rough estimate. Even so, he is correct in asserting that much could be learned by Americans from Europe in the use and pricing of new medical technologies.

To control the allocation of GNP to providers, the rest of society must somehow control not only the amount of money providers may extract from society per unit of real resource transferred to patients, but also the flow of real resources applied to given medical conditions. In other words, some limits will always have to be set on the providers\' clinical decisions. This cost-control process is inherently rancorous, because providers will generally seek to maximize the allocation of GNP to themselves, and the rest of society will seek to minimize it.

Conflict over the proper size of this allocation is thus a fundamental state of human nature in health care everywhere, and at all times. It is all the more so because sick individuals can easily feel exploited by providers, while providers can easily feel underpaid for the magnificent services they believe they are rendering their fellow human beings. As early as the 18th century, for example, the Babylonian King Hammurabi felt moved to settle this inherent conflict by including in his famous code a binding fee schedule for physicians ([@b158-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Modern governments in Europe and Canada typically have felt compelled to do likewise, and a stirring in this direction can be discerned now even in the United States.

In [Figure 2](#f4-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}, a compact summary of the various approaches used in modern economies to control the allocation of GNP to health care providers is shown. This control may be sought on either the supply side or the demand side of the health care process, and it may be sought with either macro- or micromanagement of that process.

European macromanagement
========================

As Jönsson shows, most European nations tend to emphasize macromanagement in the control of their health systems. They seek to guide their health systems not primarily through the use of fine-tuned financial incentives aimed at providers and patients but instead through direct, regulatory edict.

The supply side of European health systems is typically managed with explicit regional planning, designed to distribute health care equitably among regions and social classes. In addition, there are usually strict limits on the overall physical capacity of at least the hospital sector, designed to control the flow of real resources into health care.

Because the supply-side regulations favored in Europe inevitably create provider monopolies, these regulations are accompanied on the demand side by strong controls on the compensation of providers. The European nations achieve these demand-side controls by concentrating the flow of money from third-party payers to providers (nexus B in [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}) into one or more large pipes, the monetary throughput of which can easily be controlled with the turn of one or more powerful valves. These valves are operated either by a government (e.g., in the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries) or by regional associations of private health insurers endowed by statute with quasi-governmental powers to operate all-payer systems that negotiate binding contracts with regional associations of providers as in, for example, the system of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter called Germany).

Usually, the individual European patient is not viewed as a potent agent of cost control---certainly not in the case of serious illness. Indeed, in many European countries (the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy), nexus C, between patients and providers, does not involve a money flow at all.

Where European providers are compensated on a fee-for-service basis, their prices are typically subject to binding price ceilings. In such cases, the utilization of services is usually monitored by third-party payers through retrospective statistical profiles of individual providers, who may face financial penalties if they deviate significantly from the average. Because it is so difficult to effectively control the volume of health services through retrospective utilization review, however, the demand side in European health care is frequently subject also to fixed overall budget constraints. This approach is natural where the public sector actually owns the bulk of health care facilities (e.g., in the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries). But such overall budget caps are now being used also in countries dominated by private providers. In Germany, for example, the individual physician in ambulatory practice is compensated on a fee-for-service basis, but subject to a global expenditure cap for all physicians in a region (the state). If total billings by physicians exceed the global budget, fees are later reduced commensurately. (Inpatient physician services are rendered by salaried physicians employed by the hospital and thus are not affected by this cap.)

Americans who look to European health systems as potential models for the United States learn from Jönsson\'s article that many Europeans are now actually somewhat disillusioned with the heavy-handed fiscal and physical controls on their health systems.

To be sure, they have been successful in stemming the flow of money to providers. Throughout the 1980s, most of these systems have succeeded in maintaining the percentage of GNP going to health care at a relatively constant level, ranging between 6 and 9 percent across Europe. At the same time, health spending in the United States rose from 9.1 percent of the GNP in 1980 to 11.4 percent in 1987. On the other hand, the regulatory strictures in Europe often limit the freedom of choice available to patients and, in particular, the amenities accompanying the delivery of care.

For many years now, European health policy analysts have scouted the American landscape to learn which of the many new economic arrangements developed and practiced here might be grafted onto the European systems. As Jönsson notes, attempts are under way now to insert such American inventions as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and health maintenance organizations into the regulatory European systems. How these American inventions perform within the more highly regulated European structures, suggests Jönsson, will furnish a valuable object lesson for Americans, who are beginning to question their entrepreneurial, market-driven health system and to reexamine their traditional aversion to regulation.

American micromanagement
========================

Throughout their history, Americans have been fearful of concentrating economic power in the hands of a few who might be either corrupt, or inept, or both. Consequently, Americans have traditionally looked askance at regulatory macromanagement of their health care system. Instead of concentrating the flow of money to providers into one or a few major pipes, the American health system lets these funds flow through a myriad of small, uncoordinated conduits coming directly from patients (nexus C in [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}) and from literally thousands of third-party payers, including governments at all levels, business firms, insurance companies, labor unions, and countless private, voluntary agencies (nexus B).

The global health care budgets imposed in Europe can easily be kept too tight, thereby withholding from the citizenry health services that they might wish to procure and to finance. Such mistakes are unlikely in the pluralistic American system, where any attempt on the part of one third-party payer to tighten the valve under that payer\'s control would quickly result in loss of access to health care for patients insured by the payer. An individual payer---even one as large as a nationwide commercial insurer or General Motors--- will therefore always think twice before attempting rigorous cost-control over providers, even if the payers believe they are paying too much for too many services and supporting vast excess capacity in the system.

And therein, of course, lies one reason for this Nation\'s extraordinarily high health care expenditures. For better or for worse, our health system is designed to render patients and third-party payers relatively impotent in the market for health services. This then vastly enhances the GNP share that providers can receive, not only per year but also per unit of health care delivered. Where European (and Canadian) providers have for years chafed under the yoke of a monopsonistic health care market---leaving the rest of society luxuriating in relatively low health care expenditures---their American counterparts have been able to luxuriate in a system over whose financial flows they have wielded substantial control through the principle of "divide and rule"---leaving the rest of American society to chafe under the yoke of seemingly uncontrollable health expenditures.

In seeking control over their ever-rising health care costs, Americans have meandered back and forth between advocacy of government regulation and espousal of free-market principles ([@b150-hcfr-89-supp-049]). During the 1960s and 1970s, for example, American health policy tended to move toward more regulation, which went so far as to embrace, during the mid-1970s, some feeble and therefore unsuccessful attempts at regional planning. During the early 1980s, Americans had tired of regulation---without really having tried it---and embraced with enthusiasm the so-called pro-competitive market approach. At this time, the Nation appears to be tiring of that approach as well--- once again, without really having tried it---and the 1990s are likely to witness a reversion to various forms of regulation.

The so-called pro-competitive strategy of the 1980s was based on the thesis that a set of carefully crafted financial incentives could efficiently and optimally allocate real health care resources among patients and could also determine the proper allocation of GNP to providers. These incentives were to be aimed at both the supply side and the demand side of the health care market. The effectiveness of that approach, in terms of its stated objectives, remains a matter of controversy.

Micromanagement of the supply side
----------------------------------

Global constraints on the supply side, so common in Europe and briefly espoused during the 1970s even in the United States, are anathema to the new American "market strategy." On the contrary, that strategy openly invites the Nation\'s profit-seeking entrepreneurs to find in health care a new economic frontier. In that respect, the strategy certainly has been successful. It has drawn into health care not only vigorous entrepreneurship in the development of new health care products and delivery systems but also new legions of management, marketing, and financial consultants needed to help both payers and providers cope with the turmoil and complexity of the new market environment.

The market strategy did call, on the supply side, for paying providers in a manner that would induce them to minimize the real-resource flow to patients per episode of illness. Thus, prepaid capitation for comprehensive health care, in place of fee-for-service compensation, became the ideal among both private and public payers. For its part, the Medicare program switched from paying hospitals retrospectively for reported actual costs to paying them predetermined global fees per medical case, based on the assigned DRG. One may think of it as prepaid capitation per inpatient medical case.

Micromanagement on the demand side
----------------------------------

Initially, the market strategy envisaged that the search for health care mammon on the part of the newly invigorated health care entrepreneurs (doctors and hospitals now exuberantly among them) could readily be controlled by a resuscitated demand side. Fundamental to this demand-side strategy was the conversion of the American patient into the genuine consumer of textbook fame. This conversion was to be achieved by rolling back the patient\'s insurance coverage, which, however, had never been nearly as complete in the United States as it has long been elsewhere, even in the mid-1970s, the heyday of America\'s Great Society programs ([Table 2](#t14-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}).

Furthermore, as was shown in [Table 1](#t13-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="table"}, in any given year, the bulk of all health expenditures are made in the names of a relative few, probably fairly sick, individuals. The belief that overall health care expenditures can be effectively controlled by these sick human beings at the nexus between patients and providers (nexus C in [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}) seems to be uniquely American and, even within the United States, uniquely incident upon the economics profession, whence the idea originated (e.g., [@b151-hcfr-89-supp-049][^1^](#fn9-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fn"}).

To bolster patients in their role as consumers of health care, they (and third-party payers paying on their behalf) were to be equipped with reliable information on the cost and quality of services produced by individual, competing providers in a given market area. In practice, of course, that tactic represents a monumental analytic task, for the typical provider represents a multiproduct firm whose quality and cost are not easily captured in readable, one-dimensional index numbers that can be meaningfully compared across providers.

Remarkably, it was not deemed necessary under the market strategy to gather patients and third-party payers into organized huddles to coordinate their defensive tactics---for example, to form all-payer systems in which all payers in a market jointly negotiate single compensation rates with providers (on, say, the German mode). On the contrary, it was thought that the strategy would work best if each payer, large or small, were left to fend for him- or herself in a genuine market free-for-all. Furthermore, it was believed that, singly and uncoordinated, payers (individual patients among them) could at long last turn the tables on providers, by dividing and ruling them with genuine price competition.

The convergence of health systems
=================================

Oddly, just as many Europeans apparently have begun looking longingly at this novel American market approach, the American public itself appears to have become rather disillusioned with that very strategy. For, whatever that strategy may have achieved so far, it has not reduced the money flow to providers; it has increased that flow, even after adjustment for general price inflation ([@b156-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Furthermore, by commercializing the entire process of health care more fully than ever before, the strategy has served to worsen the plight of the estimated 31 to 37 million Americans with no health insurance coverage altogether, who find it ever more difficult to secure charity care from providers increasingly focused on their bottom line.

A problem with assessing the new market strategy has been that so little of it has actually found its way from the blueprint to actual practice, which speaks volumes on the practicality of the entire notion. It is truly remarkable, for example, that the Reagan Administration, always the most vocal champion of deregulation and markets, actually operated the health programs under its purview with the most regulatory regimen ever in American health care. In principle, the DRG system for hospitals is but a relative value scale for inpatient care, the monetary point value of which could have been determined either by negotiation with hospitals or even by competitive bid. Instead, however, the Medicare program has so far implemented the DRGs in a manner more reminiscent of price controls imposed by central governments behind the Iron Curtain: Year after year, the DRG rates have been set unilaterally by the Federal Government on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Payments by Medicare to physicians have also been subject to unilaterally set price ceilings throughout much of the 1980s.

Nor has the supply side of the American health care market ultimately remained as free of direct regulation as certainly the providers of health care once hoped it would be. To control the flow of health services from providers to patients---a flow that the new health care consumers seem either unwilling or unable to control---both public and private third-party payers increasingly intervene directly in the individual physician-patient encounter. This is done by means of what is called "managed care," that is, by prospective, concurrent, and retrospective reviews by outside monitors of individual medical treatments. (I consider the peer review organizations to be a form of managed care.) Although European health systems relying on fee-for-service compensation do employ retrospective statistical profiles of individual providers (notably physicians), the direct outside interventions into individual medical treatments now increasingly common in the United States are as yet unknown in Europe. The proponents of the American market strategy may well conceive of these interventions as normal features of a market. American physicians and hospitals, however, decry them as nettlesome private and public regulation of their professional domain, which, of course, they are.

In the meantime, American patients, providers, and third-party payers alike are beginning to appreciate that the American style of micromanagement visits upon all of them a vexatious and costly paper war that can be handled only with the help of specialized paper-war consultants. The cost of this paper war alone, relative to the much simpler Canadian and European health systems, has been estimated to amount to some 8 percent of total national health expenditures, which would be about \$48 billion in 1988 ([@b157-hcfr-89-supp-049]). That figure, however, does not even include an imputed value for the time patients spend choosing among competing insurers and claiming reimbursement from insurers.

In a recent nationwide survey, about 90 percent of those surveyed felt that the American health system requires "fundamental change or a complete rebuilding," and, remarkably, more than 60 percent professed an outright preference for the Canadian health system ([@b153-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Although it is never quite clear just what one such survey really portends, it is, as noted, a safe bet that the United States will embrace a more regulatory approach during the decade ahead. Indeed, the Government is likely to be encouraged in this direction by American businesses, which now finance, through employer-paid health insurance coverage, more than one-third of the national health bill and which now find themselves at a loss over how to control that ever-growing drain on their treasuries.

It is therefore quite possible, as Jönsson implies, that the American and European health systems may eventually converge onto a common middle ground. If so, these systems might learn from one another as they stumble along the path toward convergence.

Just what that common ground might ultimately look like remains anyone\'s guess. Perhaps it will closely resemble the type of arrangement first envisaged by Alain Enthoven in his *Health Plan* ([@b154-hcfr-89-supp-049] and [@b155-hcfr-89-supp-049]). That approach abandons the peculiar idea that health care costs can be effectively controlled by the sick and anxious individuals facing providers in nexus C of [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}. Instead, Enthoven envisages a two-stage process. In nexus A of [Figure 1](#f3-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}, well-informed, healthy individuals choose among competing, managed-healthcare plans, offered to them by so-called sponsors, which may be either a government or a private business entity. In nexus B; these sponsors procure health care from the competing, managed-care systems, typically health maintenance organizations or other delivery systems that control both prices and utilization. Were such a system introduced in Europe, it would in effect replace the current system of highly centralized regulation with a more decentralized set of smaller, private regulators, among which prospective patients choose when they are still healthy. After all, managed care, even if administered by private plans, is nevertheless direct regulation of doctors and hospitals.

If the American and European health systems did converge toward this form of pluralistic, private regulation of health care providers, one must wonder what would happen to their respective class structures. Would the private regulators specialize by income class? That is, would the quality and amenities of the care offered by the competing managed-care plans vary by income class? Would plans offering few amenities and harsh regulation of providers be reserved mainly for low-income subscribers and plans approximating the more open-ended style of traditional fee-for-service medicine attract mainly high-income groups?

Convergence toward two-tier health care
=======================================

American critics of European health care frequently decry it as two-class medicine---so-called socialized medicine for the poor and private medicine for the rich. Conversely, European critics of American health care frequently depict it as leaning toward Social Darwinism.

Both visions contain kernels of truth.

Broadly speaking, in the current European health systems, about 90 percent or so of the population share a one-tier health system. That system may couple privately owned production of health care with socialized insurance (for example, France and Germany), or it may couple socialized insurance with public ownership of substantially all production of care (e.g., the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom). Typically, an affluent and highly mobile 5 to 10 percent of families in these countries are permitted to opt out of the public plan in favor of private health insurance. They procure health care on what they believe to be superior terms either in their own country or abroad. In this sense, the typical European health care system does represent two-class medicine.

By contrast, Americans in the top 80-85 percent or so of the Nation\'s income distribution have access to what is called mainstream American medicine. But, as Rosemary Stevens demonstrates in her fascinating recent book, *In Sickness and in Wealth* (1989), even this mainstream system has always reserved special treatment and accommodations for the high upper income groups. Millions of low-income uninsured or underinsured Americans, however, are left merely to nibble at the fringes of this mainstream system. When illness strikes, they approach that system in the role of health care beggars in search of charity care. They may receive such care from kindly providers within the mainstream system. Alternatively, they may be relegated to sorely underfunded and overcrowded government hospitals, sometimes in the perilous process of "dumping," in which barely stabilized patients are transferred from mainstream facilities to government-owned hospitals. In some instances, such individuals are left out of the health system altogether, as countless disturbing vignettes in the daily media and some more formal surveys ([@b159-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b153-hcfr-89-supp-049]) suggest. At its worst, then, the American health system does seem to slouch toward Social Darwinism.

It is well known that, even after all transfer programs, America\'s poor have become poorer during the 1980s and the rich have become richer. It therefore can be doubted that, in the face of this dispersion of the income distribution, the United States will ever move all of its citizens into the one-class health care system the Nation has long espoused as the ideal, but has never attained so far. America\'s growing number of well-to-do individuals are unlikely to finance for the Nation\'s poor quite the quality of health care they demand for themselves. Thus, even after the convergence postulated by Jönsson, the American health system is likely to remain tiered by income class. However, with some vision and effort, the bottom tier of a future American health system could be made vastly superior to today\'s much-neglected bottom tier.

The question is whether the European nations can avoid a similar trend toward multiclass health care for the bottom 90 percent of their populations, who now do share a genuine one-class health system. It may be hypothesized that the continued development of the global economy will disperse the income distributions in Europe as it has in the United States. In this newly emerging global economy, individuals endowed with either financial or human capital (i.e., education) are likely to see their relative income position improve. At the same time, the elimination of national boundaries in international trade is likely to rob low-skilled European workers of the protection they have hitherto enjoyed. They may see their real income erode, as they are forced to compete with more abundant, cheaper, unskilled labor elsewhere on the globe.

If European income distributions were to drift apart in this way, the upper-middle income classes in these nations, too, might become unwilling to finance for low-income families quite the health care they seek for themselves---health care with the technical sophistication and often luxurious settings they can witness on their visits to the United States. In fact, the yearning among some European health policy analysts for "more market" on the American model may well betray a yearning for just such tiering by income class. (I should mention that Jönsson\'s article does not lead one to count him among this group.)

It remains to be seen whether the *Principle of Solidarity* that has for so long now driven European health policy for all but a small, upper-income elite can survive these yearnings for more systematic tiering by income class. At the very least, one would expect the still-tiny private health insurance markets in these countries to grow in size. Perhaps the future evolution of the European health systems will teach Americans that the lack of social solidarity typically ascribed to American health care---and most assuredly typical of American education and jurisprudence---is actually the more natural long-run state of nature.

In his testimony, commissioned by the American Medical Association and presented before the Physician Payment Review Commission (which advises Congress on payments of physicians by the Federal Medicare program), noted economist William Baumol warned the commission against the imposition of ceilings on the fees physicians may charge the aged over and above those approved by Medicare. He recommended instead that they increase cost sharing borne by the aged at the point of service, although the aged already pay for the first hospital day in a stay, 20 percent of approved physician fees (and whatever extra charges the physician may bill the patient), and virtually all prescription drugs. For the poor aged, these out-of-pocket expenses amount to an average of 20 percent of disposable income. "Such enhanced user sharing arrangements," Baumol suggested, "would provide a greater incentive for patients to shop around, to provide demand-side pressures that impede excessive charges, and would also help to curb unnecessary use of medical facilities." Baumol\'s testimony, endorsed in writing by 10 prominent economists---several Nobel Laureates among them---suggests a remarkable faith in the ability of frail, elderly persons struck by illness to function as vigilant, rational health care shoppers, capable of disciplining wayward doctors and hospitals.
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###### Distribution of health expenditures, by magnitude of expenditures: United States, selected years, 1970-80

  Percent of population ranked by expenditures   1970   1977   1980
  ---------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------
  Top 1 percent                                  26     27     29
  Top 2 percent                                  35     38     39
  Top 5 percent                                  50     55     55
  Top 10 percent                                 66     70     70
  Top 30 percent                                 88     90     90
  Top 50 percent                                 96     97     96
  Bottom 50 percent                              4      3      4

SOURCE: ([@b152-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

###### Percent of family health expenditures paid for out of pocket, by type of service: United States, 1977

  Type of service                 Percent paid out of pocket
  ------------------------------- ----------------------------
  Outpatient physician services   49
  Inpatient physician services    22
  Outpatient hospital care        21
  Inpatient hospital care         9
  Dental care                     72
  Prescribed medicine             73
  Other                           60

SOURCE: Kasper, J. A., Rossiter, L. F., and Wilson, R.: A summary of expenditures and sources of payment for personal health services from the National Medical Expenditure Survey. Data Preview No. 24. National Center for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology Assessment. Public Health Service. Rockville, Md. May 19, 1987.

Introduction
============

Jönsson makes a compelling case for the importance of international comparisons of health care systems. Increasingly, health systems in industrialized nations around the world are facing similar problems. The diversity of solutions attempted by different countries yields fertile ground for learning from the ideas and experience of others. Worldwide improvements in communication, information technology, and transportation are converting the world into a global village. Increasingly, nations are realizing that health problems do not recognize national boundaries, regardless of whether the problem is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), drug addiction, or the aging of the population.

In the United States, there is a new interest in learning from the experience of health systems in other countries. In part, this interest is stimulated by new information and data bases that make investigation of other experiences possible. In part, it is a reflection of growing discontent with rapidly rising health expenditures in the United States, coupled with the persistent gaps in health insurance coverage and barriers to access to health care. More fundamentally, it is linked to growing uneasiness about the future of the U.S. economy, and its ability to maintain international competitiveness and a standard of living that has been the highest in the world.

This new interest in international experience does not mean that the United States is likely to adopt the health system of any other country in total. Instead, the United States is likely to continue to shape its health system based on the historical, political, cultural, and economic forces that have shaped it in the past. Research and analysis of the merits of other systems, however, can identify features that show promise of being incorporated in the U.S. health system.

Considerable barriers to capitalizing on the experience of other nations, however, exist. Funding for cross-national studies is extremely limited. Exchange programs to help scholars learn about other systems through indepth exposure are rare. Some of the aspects of European health system performance that show the greatest promise for adaptation to the American health system are highlighted in this article, and I offer suggestions for some steps that could be taken to facilitate building on this experience.

Comparative performance of health systems
=========================================

Jönsson joins others ([@b168-hcfr-89-supp-049]) in questioning the performance of the U.S. health system. He notes that the United States has higher health expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) than do all European countries. Further, he finds that this higher share of economic resources devoted to the health sector cannot be totally explained by the greater prosperity of the United States and the tendency of countries to devote disproportionately more resources to health as per capita income grows.

The growing evidence on the comparative costliness of the U.S. system in the face of inferior health performance shatters many myths that have long been held by policy officials and health professionals. Recent polls have shown that the U.S. public is also more highly critical of its system than are citizens of other countries ([@b161-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

The evidence on the high cost and inferior performance of the U.S. health system strikes at a number of widely held beliefs. It has been argued in the United States that universal health insurance coverage, although desirable on humane grounds, is too costly and would be inherently inflationary. The ability of nearly all other industrialized nations to cover their entire populations with very little patient cost sharing, while devoting a smaller fraction of GDP to health, counters this view rather forcefully.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the fact that health spending continues to increase as a share of GDP in the United States but stabilized during the 1980s in other industrialized nations ([Figure 1](#f5-hcfr-89-supp-049){ref-type="fig"}). In 1970, the United States and Canada each spent 8 percent of their respective GDPs on health care. In 1986, the U.S. share had risen to 11 percent, but Canada\'s remains at 8.5 percent ([@b163-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

This experience argues convincingly that greater reliance on market forces and competition among health systems in the 1980\'s have not improved U.S. health system performance. Instead, it appears to have worsened relative to other nations that have instituted a stronger governmental role in the establishment of hospital budgets and physician payment rates.

The better health performance of European countries also strikes at the widely held view in the United States that the U.S. health system is the best in the world. Americans are increasingly troubled by the failure of the United States to insure 15-20 percent of the population, by the inadequate care provided to many disadvantaged groups of the population, and by the serious financial burdens inflicted on those with inadequate health insurance coverage who are unfortunate enough to have a serious illness ([@b162-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b161-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Health performance
==================

Jönsson points to the high rate of infant mortality in the United States as "proof" that the U.S. health system is not obtaining value for its money. He argues that this health indicator is an especially sensitive indicator of the adequacy of the medical care system.

Other indicators of health performance are equally troubling. The U.S. lags behind other industrialized nations in life expectancy at birth and in mortality rates from chronic conditions ([@b165-hcfr-89-supp-049]; [@b169-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

One difficulty in learning from European countries how to improve health performance in the United States is the absence of sophisticated studies that sort out the multiple determinants of health outcomes. Some portion of the inferior U.S. performance, particularly infant mortality rates, would appear to be linked to social and economic factors, as well as to those that are specific to the health system. For example, the United States has a higher poverty rate among children than do European countries ([@b166-hcfr-89-supp-049]). About one-fourth of all infants and one-half of all black babies are born to unwed mothers ([@b165-hcfr-89-supp-049]). Drug addiction and alcohol abuse are epidemic in some communities. HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infection is a growing problem in infants born to minority women.

Another difficulty in making cross-national comparisons is the difference in populations. The U.S. population, often referred to as a "melting pot," cannot be readily compared with those of Iceland or Japan, with their much more homogeneous populations. Poor birth outcomes are particularly high among minority populations, including black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and native American Indians. The United States has a large immigrant population, both legal and undocumented, which contributes to unusually high rates of health problems in some communities. The degree to which poor health outcomes reflect social causes versus the inadequacy of the health system or insurance coverage is hard to quantify.

One useful step would be to conduct more sophisticated cross-national multivariate analyses of health outcomes, holding constant for the many factors that influence outcomes, such as poverty and other sociodemographic factors. For such analysis to take place, greater efforts must be made to ensure the comparability of health statistics across countries.

Two types of information that would be especially valuable are research disaggregated at the diagnostic level and studies of the effectiveness of specific medical procedures and patterns of care for various diagnoses. Jönsson notes, for example, the much greater use of kidney transplants for people with end stage renal disease in other countries---a technology that offers much better quality of life than does dialysis. But he also notes that a higher proportion of Americans receive treatment for end stage renal disease. Does greater use of technology buy some types of health improvements, even at considerable cost? Where could the United States reduce health expenditures without sacrificing health gains, and where should it devote more resources to achieve greater health benefits? What is the payoff for preventive health activities?

Clearly, U.S. policy officials and health experts will want to know a great deal more before identifying actions to improve health performance in the United States. The value of the analysis that Jönsson sets forth is to generate an interest in the conduct of such studies.

Cost performance
================

Perhaps the most convincing argument that the United States needs to examine more carefully the experience of other industrialized nations is the fact that the U.S. health system is the most expensive in the world---and that this disparity is growing greater, not smaller.

Jönsson argues that many European countries have achieved their superior cost performance through regionalization and establishment of global health budgets by government at either the central or local level. The share of the health system financed by the public sector is much higher in European countries. Many countries rely on public provision of services through government-owned hospitals and salaried physicians. Even those countries with private hospitals and private physicians impose strict controls on budgets, fees, and capital expansion.

Although this evidence is compelling, there is little likelihood that the United States will embrace such an extensive role for the public sector. Resistance to higher taxes makes it unlikely that the United States will markedly increase the share of health expenditures financed publicly. Any massive switch to a public system of providing health services would also be strongly resisted by health care providers.

The aspects of the European health experience of greatest interest to U.S. policy officials and experts are the methods used to pay hospitals and physicians and to assess the effectiveness of services provided. Approaches such as negotiation of physician fees, establishment of expenditure targets for physician services, determination of global budgets for hospitals, medical technology assessment, and effectiveness research on medical practice patterns and protocols are all subjects of keen interest on the American scene.

It would also be extremely helpful to know more about the nature of cost differences between the United States and other countries. How much of the cost difference comes from differences in administrative costs, compensation levels of physicians, physician supply and specialty mix, medical education, medical malpractice, staffing of hospitals, hospital bed capacity, hospital admissions or length of stay, or provision of long-term care to the elderly and disabled? How different are medical practice patterns, use of technology, rates of surgery? How much of the difference in costs is related to differences in health risks, including industrialization and environmental and occupational health risks? How much of the difference is related to poverty, immigration, minority populations, or to such problems as adolescent pregnancy, homelessness, drug addiction, AIDS, and alcohol abuse? How much of the difference is inefficiency per se, versus provision of different levels and intensity of care?

Learning from each other\'s experiences
=======================================

Although the United States could learn a great deal from the experience of other countries, a number of barriers stand in the way of this cross-national transfer. First, comparable data on health expenditures, health statistics, and other aspects of the health systems of industrialized nations are still in a quite formative stage. Much more needs to be done to standardize definitions and reporting practices to establish comparable, timely, cross-national data bases. Recently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has begun to compile comparable health expenditure data, and the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe (WHO-EURO) is compiling comparable health statistics on a wide variety of health outcome measures. These efforts should be continued and strengthened. Timely publication and extensive dissemination of such data are essential.

But much of the requisite research requires more disaggregated data than are available from these sources. Greater efforts should be made to conduct studies at the individual patient level, with cross-national comparison of treatment patterns, health outcomes, and costs. The very nature of financing health systems in European countries often makes it difficult to estimate the costs of caring for an individual patient. Methodologies and data systems for making comparative cost comparisons at the individual patient level need to be developed.

A second barrier to the conduct of this research relates to the nature of funding research. European universities are predominantly public. Research is carried out by publicly funded research institutions, universities, or government agencies. This creates pressure to focus on controlled, nationally oriented research agendas. In the United States, health services researchers are frequently based at private universities or organizations, competing for limited research dollars from governmental agencies and private foundations to conduct investigations. Research funding for international comparisons has been severely limited---both by private foundations and by governmental agencies---leading to greater concentration on research within the U.S. system.

Third, the exchange of information across geographic boundaries remains a significant barrier to useful cross-national comparisons. International conferences to share research findings and learn about policy developments are limited. International professional associations are not well developed. Language can be a barrier to learning about significant developments in other countries. Professional journals reporting on cross-national research are not numerous.

Finally, there are few collaborative relationships among research groups in different countries. Developing data bases and research on comparable patient populations in different countries have not been pursued on any significant scale. Exchange programs for scholars to learn about other systems are also extremely limited.

Although these barriers are significant, they are amenable to change. The growing recognition that health services research is essential to improving performance of the U.S. health system is leading to greater support for research funding. The growing concern about U.S. competitiveness generally and the inferior performance of the U.S. health system specifically should continue to lend support to interest in learning from experiences around the world. Developments in data and research sophistication open up new avenues for investigation that should be of tremendous appeal to a growing number of researchers.

One of the most important steps that could be taken is the institution of funding by governmental agencies and private foundations in the United States focused specifically on helping the United States learn from the experiences of other nations. Quite recently, there has been more interest in the United States in learning from the Canadian health system experience ([@b164-hcfr-89-supp-049]). However, much more extensive efforts are required to draw effectively on the experience of Canada as well as of other nations.

The opportunity to learn from "natural experiments" taking place around the world has great promise. As each country grapples with ensuring good health for its people in the face of economic constraints, the demand for cross-national information is heightened. Fortunately, a growing body of trained researchers with the tools and data to facilitate such research provides a unique opportunity to capitalize on this development. The end result should be growing international cooperation and collaboration dedicated to achieving the World Health Organization goal of health for all people.
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Introduction
============

The article by Bengt Jönsson is a useful reminder that different health care systems can learn a great deal from each other. Jönsson properly reminds us that our stereotypes of different systems, corresponding to purely market or purely regulatory regimes, are overdrawn. The U.S. system has many regulatory features, and various models of national health insurance incorporate certain marketlike incentives.

I also agree with what Jönsson calls "the convergence theory," in which planning will play an increasing role in market systems, and market-based incentives will play an increasing role in planned systems.

I have a somewhat different view than Jönsson has about the importance of the distinction between central planning and planning conducted at the regional or local level. He is correct in pointing out that many observers in the United States do not understand how localized the decisionmaking is in many European health care systems. But I believe his heavy emphasis on clarifying the locus of decisionmaking obscures more important distinctions.

I also have a different perspective on the apparent gaps between the United States and Sweden (or other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development \[OECD\] nations) with regard to health care costs and access. I would like to point out these differences, without detracting from my general agreement with many of the specific points made in Jönsson\'s article.

Most papers that compare the U.S. health system with other developed countries\' systems contain a familiar litany of aggregate facts that are, admittedly, rather embarrassing to the United States. For example, in 1987, U.S. health care spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) was 11.2 percent, compared with 9.0 percent in Sweden and 7.3 percent for the OECD countries as a group ([@b172-hcfr-89-supp-049]). This gap is probably a little wider now, as U.S. health care costs may approach 12 percent of GNP in 1990.

The United States also has more than 30 million people without health insurance, and life expectancy is about 2 years less in the United States than in Sweden. Meanwhile, the infant mortality rate among white babies in the United States is about twice as high as Sweden\'s infant mortality rate, and the rate among black infants in the United States is more than three times as high as the Swedish aggregate rate. Jönsson mentions some of these facts.

Most analyses of international differences that involve the United States either stop here or go on to point out that the U.S. public share of health spending (about 40 percent) is well below the OECD average of 76 percent, with the implication that this is the reason that we are the "outlier" with respect to cost and access.

This type of analysis is superficial and misleading. We must dig deeper and explore some tough tradeoffs to get a feeling for intercountry differences. And when we do, we will come face to face with major gaps in our knowledge.

The source of the difference
============================

What makes the U.S. health care system more expensive than those of other countries? Some surprising facts are beginning to emerge. First, the cause is not excessive utilization of services. It is sometimes said (though not by Jönsson) that Americans are hypochondriacs and that this partially explains our cost escalation. If Americans are hypochondriacs, the citizens of most other countries are worse. Cross-country comparisons of utilization make it clear that virtually every measure of utilization is lower in the United States than in other industrialized countries. As Schieber and Poullier (1988), referring to data on international differences in length of hospital stays, note in a recent article, "\... the U.S. average lengths-of-stay for most DRGs are shorter and those for Switzerland are longer than those of other countries."

For example, in each of 12 DRG categories presented by Schieber and Poullier, length of stay is longer in Sweden than it is in the United States, and it is longer (often by a wide margin) in Switzerland than it is in Sweden. For example, in the case of cerebrovascular disorders, mean length of stay is 12.0 days in the United States, 18.8 days in Sweden, and 29.9 days in Switzerland. Jönsson describes "a strict planning and budgeting system for hospital services" in Swiss cantons. Whatever successes these planners are having, they are not reflected in hospital length of stay.

Moreover, the international differences cannot be explained by the demographics of aging. About 12 percent of the U.S. population is 65 years of age or over today, and about 17 percent of the Swedish population is in this age group. Yet, per capita health spending in the United States was \$2,051 in 1987, 66 percent higher than Sweden\'s figure of \$1,233 ([@b171-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

What is it then? The major factor that seems to explain the intercountry cost differences is that the United States employs many more people in the health care system and, generally speaking, pays them more. This well-paid army of workers includes not only doctors and nurses but also thousands more people in the United States than in other countries who sell insurance and administer claims. These are the U.S. "health care workers" who are not employed in the business of actually delivering health care.

About 22 percent of U.S. health spending involves administrative costs, and it has been estimated that the United States could achieve an 8- to 10-percent reduction in total health spending just from administrative cost savings if it were to adopt a national health insurance plan ([@b170-hcfr-89-supp-049]).

Thus, the explanation of U.S. "extra costs" lies largely in a combination of greater resource intensity per unit of service delivered, higher salaries for health care workers, and higher administrative costs. The greater resource intensity is not just people; it is also technology.

One more factor is worth mentioning. The U.S. malpractice system is probably adding more to costs than corresponding systems in other countries. Although reliable data are hard to find on this point, the U.S. system seems much more plaintiff- or consumer-oriented than other systems. In part, this may reflect the more fully developed social insurance systems in other OECD countries. But it also reflects the tendency in those countries not to pile huge awards from the judicial system on top of social insurance compensation, as often occurs in the United States.

Indeed, the U.S. malpractice system has both compensation and deterrence objectives. "Collateral source offsets," or the reduction of jury awards to reflect compensation received from other sources such as workers\' compensation or disability insurance, are generally disallowed. If the United States is overcompensating some people in an effort to deter dangerous behavior, other countries, in their effort to focus on adequate compensation alone, may be leaving consumers vulnerable to risky behavior. This demonstrates the value of Jönsson\'s call for different types of systems learning from each other and possibly converging.

Is this all waste?
==================

The really important question is this: What, if anything, does the United States receive for this extra spending? In answering this question, many observers are too quick to assume that the United States receives nothing for it. By contrast, some who are defensive (or naive) about the U.S. system assume that, if Americans are paying more, they must be getting proportionately more in quality.

We know that Americans are not receiving longer lives from the extra 4 percentage points of GDP relative to the OECD average. But is this the end of the story? I think not.

The troubling but honest answer to my question is that we really do not know what we are receiving. In my view, the "premium" we are paying is not pure fat, and it is not pure lean---it is some of each. But it is hard to tell which is which.

My hypothesis is that highly skilled people, and more of them, along with highly sophisticated technology, and more of it, do make some difference in health care outcomes, even though it is not reflected in the life expectancy of the population. The additional human and physical capital per health care encounter that is built into the U.S. system may lead to more comfortable lives, even though not to longer lives.

The real problem is that we lack good health status and health outcome measures. There is a lot that we still do not know about the medical efficacy, much less the cost effectiveness, of many procedures. Vigorous debates---usually uninformed by reliable data from controlled trials---rage on about the effectiveness of hysterectomies, prostatectomies, coronary artery bypass surgery, and other surgeries, along with uncertainty about the number of tests and prescription drugs given to the population.

Picking up on one of Jönsson\'s themes involving the sharing and testing of ideas across nations, this may be an area in which other OECD nations have something to learn from the United States. Work is well under way in the United States, even though still in embryonic form, to measure and quantify health care outcomes and to profile and rank providers according to their relative effectiveness.

This knowledge is developing rapidly in both the public and private sectors. It may help us move away from the tendency to judge performance of health care systems on the basis of inputs. Judging by the amount of input, the United States clearly appears wasteful. It uses more inputs and pays a higher price for them. What it will look like as we begin to measure value---output or outcome received for any given input---remains unclear. Cross-country comparisons such as Jönsson\'s would be improved by taking this distinction into account.

The most interesting development in the U.S. health system today is that buyers of care---public and private---are beginning to question outcome for the first time. What most observers of international trends neglect to consider is that it is not the share of the U.S. health care system that is public or private that matters with respect to costs being out of control. Costs have been out of control in both sectors in the United States and for the same reason: Both public and private buyers did not know what they were buying and failed to confront the power of organized medicine with respect to both the price and quantity of services rendered.

Buyers in the United States are now beginning to move beyond the question of "How much does it cost?" to the question of "What happened when you did it?" and "Was it necessary in the first place?" Undoubtedly, these questions are being asked elsewhere. But the technology for answering the questions is developing rapidly in the United States and could be of use around the world, under the kind of cross-fertilization patterns that Jönsson envisions.

In my view, Jönsson\'s article is a bit too optimistic about the importance of decentralization of decisionmaking in Sweden and other countries. All those decentralized decisions are still playing out against centrally imposed rules and, in many cases, centrally determined overall budget constraints.

The important challenge that all countries now face in health care is not so much how to organize or reorganize the decisionmaking between central and local bodies or even how authority is allocated between public and private sectors within the buyer side. In my view, these are yesterday\'s debates. The critical challenge today is how to strengthen the buyer side of the market---irrespective of its organization--- so that it has both the information it needs and the political will to confront organized medicine on behalf of consumers.

We spend too much time arguing about the relative merits of consumers giving money to private insurance companies in the form of premiums as opposed to giving the money to government (local or national) in the form of taxes. This is not the critical distinction. The most important factor is what the recipient of the money, the third-party payer (public or private), does with it and what pressure that third-party payer brings to bear on the provider community.

It is not being public rather than private that makes a difference in getting better value for the money. It is the knowledge of performance, value, and effectiveness, and the willingness to use it, that matter. We must learn how to pick and choose among providers on the basis of their demonstrated. performance as well as their cost. This becomes the preferable alternative to what too often masquerades as cost control---picking and choosing among consumers on the basis of income or health risk.

The most dangerous trend in health care today is the tendency to avoid developing carefully researched and carefully adjusted mechanisms for measuring value and outcome, with the attendant result that costs are "controlled" by controlling consumers--- usually on some basis that bears no resemblance to ethically supportable criteria.

I do not count myself among those who believe that the United States is the only country that has fallen into the trap of trying to control costs by placing limits on consumers. Nor is it the only country to postpone developing the alternative to restricting consumers: finding out what is good medicine and bad medicine and steering business to those who practice the former and away from those who practice the latter.

The sad fact is that the United States limits consumers in one way and other countries limit them in another. The United States has a long and indefensible history of limiting access by permitting large numbers of people to be uninsured, which forces them to underconsume, or actually forego, helpful primary and preventive care. To this old story is now being added a new, equally troubling one. People are now being jettisoned from the U.S. health care system because they are high-risk patients---they have preexisting health conditions that make them more likely candidates for large outlays.

Providers and insurers are competing on the basis of good health risks in the United States because they are not yet being forced to compete on the basis of good performance. But this is beginning to change. The United States will move---in its own pluralistic, fragmented way---toward broader coverage and tougher cost controls that bear down on providers. Thus, we see one piece of Jönsson\'s convergence theory.

Other countries would never dare deny insurance coverage to large numbers of people. But in most of those countries, health care is rationed on another basis: waiting times and influence. Everyone is covered all right, but not everyone is served on a timely basis. And it is not always medical considerations that determine who moves to the head of the queue. This is the central embarrassment of the national health plans, one that is every bit as indefensible as the source of embarrassment to the United States.

Thus, I reject Jönsson\'s contention that "It is obvious that the moral bases or values on which health care systems are based differ between the United States and European countries."

The national health plans, as Jönsson points out, are moving to correct their problems, often using a mix of market and regulatory approaches, just as a blend of the two is also found in the United States. This is the other arm of his convergence theory.

In this, author\'s view, if both systems share their successes and learning---as Jönsson calls for---and go to work on their respective embarrassments, both access to health care and cost control would be improved.
